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Driscoll, Rev. John T.
Pragmatism and the Problem
of the Idea.

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PRAGMATISM AND THE
PROBLEM OF THE IDEA

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PRAGMATISM

AND THE

PROBLEM OF THE IDEA

BY THE
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Christian Philosophy: The Soul, and
Christian Philosophy: God, etc.

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PREFACE

THE present volume is the result of studies carried on for some years in an endeavor to show that the most recent Theory of Philosophy known as Pragmatism rests upon an erroneous philosophical basis.

That the ground-work of Pragmatism is a false conception of the idea was fully illustrated by the author in a course of lectures delivered at the Catholic Summer School of America during the Session of 1902. This course is summed up in the chapter of the present work entitled Absolute Pragmatism. A critical analysis of the works published by the leading exponents of Pragmatism has fully confirmed the judgment of the writer.

The plausibility of the arguments advanced, and the fact that in the last analysis God in the Christian sense of the term is excluded from human thought and life make their theory especially dangerous.

The proof that Pragmatism is fundamentally false is based on data taken from the writings of Professor Royce and the late Professor James of Harvard, Professor Dewey of Columbia, Professor Schiller of Oxford and Professor Bergson of the College of France, who are recognized as the leaders of the new philosophy.

The author gratefully acknowledges the privilege granted by the editors of the American Catholic Quarterly Review and of the North American Review, to reprint articles which appear in Chapters II and IV.

In presenting the volume to the public the hope is entertained that a discussion of this kind will prove of some value towards the reconstruction of Philosophy on a sane and sound basis.

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PRAGMATISM AND THE PROBLEM OF THE IDEA

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

THE present period of philosophic thought can be justly compared to the period of Greek Philosophy at the birth of Socrates and to the philosophy of the Middle Ages at the time of St. Thomas Aquinas. The life-work of Socrates was to show the distinction between true and false knowledge. His method was a process of intellectual analysis. He aimed at pointing out the necessity of forming clear concepts.

The Middle Ages witnessed the formation of Scholastic Philosophy, rightly described as the greatest monument of carefully reasoned thought which the human mind has ever produced. In the formation of this system, the fundamental problem was the theory of the concept or universal idea. The History of Philosophy records the theories of Conceptualism and of Nominalism as opposed to the theory of Mitigated Realism defended by St. Thomas Aquinas with keen analysis and profound learning. The Conceptualists taught that the idea was merely the product of the mind. They were the

precursors of modern extreme Idealism. The Nominalists held that the idea was a name only, something like a tag. They were the precursors of modern Sense-Empiricism. On the contrary, the theory of Mitigated Realism made a distinction between the *form* of the universal idea and the concrete element in its *content*. It held that the form of the idea was mental, i.e. that the mind fashioned or elaborated the form, but that the concrete element in the content came through the senses from the world without. This theory was summed up in the classic Scholastic phrase that the idea was a mental product with a basis in external reality. Thus on the one hand free play with proper place and proportion were allowed all the processes of mind which in their last analysis centre around the idea, and on the other hand Idealism was guarded against by showing that the mind was in direct contact with external reality. This teaching obtained in the Scholastic schools and is viewed as the Scholastic teaching on the nature of the idea.

In our own time Psychology holds the vital position in philosophic discussion. This came about naturally in the trend of modern thought. Towards the middle of the nineteenth century the Science-Philosophy arose enunciating the philosophic theory of evolution based on data of the Physical Sciences. This theory was confidently claimed to be the solution and explanation of all things. To realize these roseate hopes its advocates contended that

man also was included in the great evolutive process. Hence discussion about man's place in nature became the crucial problem. Had man a spiritual nature with an immortal destiny, or was he the mere product of physical forces evolving more and more perfectly through interminable ages from the lowest forms of life. Thus the nature of man became the vital issue in philosophy. Various theories were thereupon proposed to explain the nature of man. They are all psychological because they are based on the data of human thoughts and emotions. The latest to assume proportions and exert influence is called Pragmatism. It, too, is psychological. The purpose of the present volume is to show that Pragmatism, as set forth by its main exponents, is based upon an erroneous analysis of the idea, and that consequently the problem of the idea has assumed an important place in contemporary philosophic thought.

The term, Pragmatism, is extremely vague. Thus it is that difficulty is experienced in giving a clear and succinct definition. For the same reason the casual reader is inclined to regard Pragmatism as a new creation without any very definite philosophical antecedents. Applied to designate a prevailing type of philosophic thought, Pragmatism is a misnomer. In reality it marks only one phase of this thought. A clearer and more comprehensive term would be the Philosophy of Tendency. All the writers classed as belonging to the school of Prag-

matism, are characterized alike by the element of tendency. They are not dominated by first beginnings but by aims and purposes. They are not so much concerned with the past as with the future and results. It is the Becoming, i.e. the *To fieri* of Hegel in a new form. Hegel viewed the Becoming in the Absolute Idea. Pragmatism considers the Becoming of the idea in the human mind. As human action is colored by aims or purposes, it follows that the Philosophy of Tendency considers the Becoming as purposive or as aiming at definite ends. Now the human tendency of Pragmatism is twofold: it aims at the concrete and practical, or at the ideal and abstract. The former tendency is expressed in Professor James and Professor Dewey and is more correctly termed Pragmatism, i.e. practical philosophy. The latter tendency is best expressed in Professor Royce, who calls himself an Absolute Pragmatist. With Professor Schiller and Professor Bergson we have a mixture of both tendencies; in the former the mixture is more temperate, in the latter we find a mixture of extremes: the extreme of the abstract and the extreme of the sensual; in both the result is unsatisfactory and will not stand the test of rigid scrutiny, especially so in regard to Professor Bergson who tries to combine the extremes into a system by the aid of the most crude imaginings, contradictory statements and discarded philosophical theories.

Pragmatism therefore does not express a definite

system but is a term used to indicate a condition of contemporary philosophic thought. As such it is shown by deeper study to be the direct development of the philosophy which prevailed during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Apart from the Scholastic system the philosophy of the nineteenth century developed along two main lines: Empiricism and Idealism. The Empiricism is a re-awakening of eighteenth century materialism and owed its great influence to a reaction against the extravagant theory of Hegel and to the rise of the Physical Sciences. It was an attempt to construct a system of philosophy on the data of the Physical Sciences alone, whence its more specific designation as the Science-Philosophy.

The Idealism arose with Kant and reached its culmination with Hegel, thereupon dividing into two main streams: the Neo-Kantian and the Neo-Hegelian. About the middle of the century the notion of Evolution appeared and dominated all departments of knowledge. From the beginning Idealism completely absorbed it. The element of Evolution in Hegel differentiates his system from that of Kant. With Hegel evolution is the constructive element. His fundamental principle is the evolution of the Idea. The idea is viewed by him not in the human mind but in the mind of the Absolute. His system is based on the Psychology of the Absolute and from this Psychology he endeavors to construct a world-system. Existing things are

manifestations which the idea presents in the continuous process of its evolving. The Empiricism of the Science-Philosophy likewise made Evolution the constituent element of its system. Yet with its advocates the use and sphere of Evolution was restricted. The reason was that this Empiricism aimed at fixing man's place in the universe. It was concerned with the origin and place of man and strove to show that man is a product through a long process of evolution reaching back to matter and to the lowest forms of life. The great effort was made to show that there was a continuity in the process of evolution ending with man.

In proclaiming "the survival of the fittest" as the great principle, Empirical evolutionists aimed at showing that all existing things, man included, were results. Thus purpose and design were ruled out of Philosophy and of Science. Their explanation was known as the mechanical interpretation of nature. Yet by some strange inconsistency they did not employ the element of evolution in the explanation of mental life. John Stuart Mill is the logician, Bain the psychologist, Spencer the sociologist of this school. In none of these writers, however, do we find the element of evolution applied to the exposition of mental life considered individually or collectively. They simply took man as an evolutionary product and regarded the process of evolution as ending with this product. Hence their expositions

of mental life are static not dynamic, are structural not functional.

Toward the last quarter of the nineteenth century the influence of these writers was very great. For over twenty years Mill's *Logic* dominated the English mind. Then William George Ward pointed out clearly the weakness of his system. Bain's *Sense Empiricism* and *Determinism* were shown to be arbitrary and unsatisfactory. Spencer lived long enough to see his own system shattered. The crucial point at issue was the Theistic controversy. Theistic writers maintained that no system of philosophy can do away with the element of purpose or teleology, that teleology as a fact of mental life has to be taken into account, that the mechanical view of nature far from being opposed to teleology does in fact imply teleology. Appeal was made to the works of nature but especially to man. Purpose and aim were shown to be characteristic of mental life, were revealed in the structure of the human body, and were the moving causes of the mechanical instruments contrived by man for use. The issue was bitterly fought, but the result was a victory for Theistic writers. Purpose and aim were shown to exist in human life. Mill and Bain and Spencer are no longer names to conjure with; they merely recall to the reader shattered systems of false philosophic teaching.

With the admission of purpose in mental life philosophic thought took a new trend — it became

saturated with purpose. (Hence the Philosophy of Tendency.) Like a child with a new toy, these writers seemed oblivious to everything but their new discovery.

Fifty years ago the philosophic problem was concerned with origins, now it is occupied with the striving after aims or purposes. Then the great question at issue was the existence and nature of God. To-day man is the centre of the universe; in fact there is nothing but the human.

(In establishing the existence of purpose the controversy shifted from God to man.) Psychology became the battleground. The result of this change had a marked influence on the development of both the Idealistic and the Empiristic streams of nineteenth century thought. The Idealist kept the idea of God, but erroneously conceived His nature. To them God was the Absolute and their systems were Pantheistic throughout. Yet the change in the field of controversy had this result that whereas Hegel began with the Absolute and tried to show that all existing things, especially man, were the manifestations of the evolutive Absolute Idea, Royce reverses the process and, beginning with man, endeavors to prove that the purposive evolution of the human idea develops into the Absolute. With Hegel therefore, the problem was one of origin, and human consciousness was explained as the highest point reached by the Absolute Idea in the process of its evolution. With Royce, however, the

problem is one of purpose and end, i.e. the conscious evolution of the human idea, so that God is considered the aim and end of the process and is nothing more than human consciousness augmented and magnified. Hence the world-theory of Royce is psychological as the reader will readily perceive in the following pages where the basic principle of his system is shown to be contained in the phrase "The object of the idea" and by the word "object" in his teaching is understood "purpose."

(The recognition of purpose in human life had a profound effect upon the empiric stream of nineteenth century philosophic thought. Mental life began to be considered not as static but as active; not as structural but as functioning. With this viewpoint the element of evolution entered into the Psychology of Empiricism. Mental life was thus considered as a process of acting, functioning, evolving. With this discovery a new name was coined for the supposedly new system and the name is Pragmatism. In reality there is very little that is new in Pragmatism. It is nothing more than the Empiric Psychology of Mill, Bain, and Spencer, considered as functioning or evolving. Thus Professor Dewey complains that Mill's defect was that he did not go far enough, i.e. that he stopped at structure without considering function. Likewise Professors Small and Vincent in their *Manual of Sociology* teach that Modern Sociology begins where Spencer ends, i.e. that Spencer presented

the structure, whereas Modern Sociology takes structure as a starting-point and is occupied principally in studying the functions of the social body.

Pragmatism is an Idealism. With Professor Royce we have Absolute Idealism inherited from Absolute Idealism of the nineteenth century. The Empiric element in Pragmatism represented by Professor James and Professor Dewey teaches the Phenomenal Idealism of the nineteenth century Empiricism. Hence Pragmatism rests upon an Idealistic basis. It deals not with external things but with our subjective ideas or feelings of things. Thus it holds that mental life has no conscious direct contact with external reality. Its basis therefore is subjective experience. Shut off from contact with external reality it views the idea in the conscious process of purposive evolution. Hence it is that Pragmatism conceives mental life as a conscious purposive evolutive process, i.e. it conceives the idea in the very process of evolution. Thus the idea is true, if it is valid; it is valid, if it works; it works, if it has practical success. Hence Pragmatism is concerned not with *thought* but with *thinking*, not with *feeling* the *noun*, but with *feeling* the *verb*, and this thinking or feeling is a purposive process entire and throughout. Since the purposive process is to them the process of the idea, it follows that the idea is regarded as "a plan of action," and as action in human life is often synonymous with conduct, "conduct" to them is a

fundamental conception, with this distinction that whereas in ordinary conversation we use the word *conduct* as having a moral meaning with reference to a principle of right and wrong, Pragmatists by the term conduct mean *action* without any moral meaning but only its utility for producing results.

The same criticism which dealt a vital blow to Hegel's Metaphysics can be brought against the Pragmatist conception of mental life as a conscious purposive evolutive process. (The fundamental principle of Hegel was the evolution of the Absolute Idea. This evolution was constant and continuous. Hence this system postulated *motion* only, and had no place for *rest*. Now Physical Science admits not only *kinetic* energy but also *potential* energy. If Hegel's principle were true, nature would reveal kinetic energies only. In like manner, if conscious purposive evolution held sway throughout mental life, all knowledge would form part of the process and there would be no latent knowledge, i.e. knowledge outside of the process. This teaching, however, is not true, as our experience clearly proves. Memory can be compared to a storehouse of latent knowledge. Both Professor Dewey and Professor James admit the truth of this criticism, and the admission reveals the weakness of their fundamental principle. Professor James calls these latent elements of knowledge not ideas but "latent truths," a delightful illustration of "a contradiction in terms," for according to his teaching a truth is a

truth because it works, and if a truth is not working, how can it be a truth?)

Pragmatists evade the criticism by maintaining that their basic principle is the purposive evolution of the idea, that the idea is "a plan of action" and therefore that these latent truths or elements of knowledge are not ideas inasmuch as they are not plans of action entering into the conscious process. Hence the issue is centred on the meaning of the "idea."

(Pragmatism proposes the idea as "a plan of action." This teaching is not startling nor is it new. For centuries Scholastic Philosophy has constantly taught that there is an *idea exemplaris*, i.e. an *exemplar idea*; or in other words an idea conceived as a plan of action. What is startling and new in the statement of Pragmatists is that the idea is "a plan of action" only. In this teaching Pragmatism comes into direct conflict not only with Scholastic Philosophy but with common sense. Scholastic Philosophy teaches that the idea is the grasping by the mind of the meaning of a thing, i.e. it is the *intellectual meaning* of an object either existing in nature or pictured as an image in the imagination. This *meaning* may or may not initiate a course of action; it may or may not become a plan of action. If it does, Scholastic Philosophy terms it an *exemplar idea*, i.e. an idea conceived as or *connoting* a plan of action. The intellectual meaning of a thing may instantly become a plan of action or it

may not; yet it always has a potency to initiate action. Hence the distinction is made between active and latent ideas or knowledge of things—a distinction recognized by common sense. Modern Pedagogy admits the same distinction when it insists upon the importance of “fruitful ideas,” thus maintaining that some ideas are fruitful, i.e. lead to action, and others are not fruitful. Pragmatism restricts the meaning of “idea” to a special class of ideas because its main principle is that mental life is an active purposive evolutive process. Hence by the term “idea” it is compelled, in virtue of its basic principle, to accept only ideas that are active and fruitful of effects. But in narrowing the definition of the idea to an idea which initiates action, they not only fail to make active purposive evolution reign supreme throughout the totality of mental life, but really admit its limitations. Thus a subterfuge is employed not easily discernible to the ordinary reader but once pointed out is readily understood.

The influence exerted by the writers criticised in the following pages is not of the same degree. Professor Royce was more widely read while his system was in process of formation. At present his hold on the American mind is waning fast. Professor Dewey and the Chicago School appeal directly to teachers, and his influence therefore has been primarily academic. Professor Schiller, through his doctrine of Humanism, has struck a more popular vein. The

teachings of Professor James and of Professor Bergson, on the contrary, are not confined to the classroom. They are read and discussed in business, professional and social circles. The nature of this influence is materialistic and sensual. Their writings are in harmony with a certain trend of modern life, and consequently seem to furnish a philosophical basis for and a justification of this trend.

In the business and professional world to-day the ruling principle is success. To obtain results is the great purpose and aim. By results is understood material gain. Professor James and Professor Bergson present a Psychology and a World-Theory conformable to this frame of mind. This Psychology and World-Theory are really based on the principle that "the end justifies the means." The means employed are not judged with reference to a principle of right and wrong. They are considered to be true and good, if useful or expedient to the purpose in view. Hence the truth or goodness of an action or of conduct is gauged by success alone, and this success is personal and always of a practical kind.

In making the morality of action or conduct depend on material or practical success, the very notion of morality is destroyed. Now there is one fact absolutely certain in human life, viz. that there is a moral law of right and wrong based on the very nature of things. The conscience of the individual, the history of the human race, bear witness to the existence and sway of the moral law

as a fundamental principle and primary conviction in human life. In denying a fundamental principle and primary conviction of human life, Pragmatism is shown to be radically false.

Moreover, in teaching that practical success is the only test of what is true and good, Pragmatism advocates a principle which leads to most disastrous consequences in individual social and political life. It professedly proclaims that might is superior to right, that trickery and dishonesty are superior to uprightness and truth. The thoughtful reader is appalled at the results which would follow from the rigid application of such doctrines. Law and order would no longer exist. Personal and public conscience would become words with no meaning and the practical man would rule them out of his vocabulary. Civilization would be shaken to its very foundations, for our civilization is based on the Christian moral law.

There is more in human life than the material and sensual. There is more in the universe than the human. God rules in His world and the moral law holds sway. Any school of Philosophy which ignores these truths fails to understand the meaning of nature and to recognize what is deepest in human life. It is with this conviction that the present volume is published. The aim is not only to point out the consequences of the Pragmatic teaching, but primarily to show from a close study of its leading advocates that its doctrine is narrow, one-

sided and false, that its characteristic teaching is the importance attached to purpose and the exclusion of first principles, that its basis rests upon an erroneous interpretation of mental life, which a special meaning attached to the word *idea* in vain attempts to justify.

CHAPTER II

EMPIRICAL PRAGMATISM

PRAGMATISM is best described as a point of view which is based on definite postulates and is expressed in a distinctive way of regarding mental life and conduct. As a point of view it is looking away from first principles and looking to results, which it terms facts. Hence it claims to be an Empirical tendency. The point of view is shown in its theory of truth, its explanation of mental life and in its teaching on the relation of thought to reality. Thus its doctrines have been summed up and set forth in three phases: in psychology by Professor James, who calls his system Radical Empiricism; in logic by Professor Dewey, who proclaims Instrumentalism, and in metaphysics by Professor Royce, who claims to be an Absolute Pragmatist; Schiller, who teaches Humanism, and Bergson, who is known as the Apostle of Creative Evolution. The present chapter is confined to the psychological and logical phases which deal principally with the theory of truth and the explanation of mental life.

I. *Postulates of Pragmatism*

Pragmatism can be understood only by viewing it against a background which it accepts without question. In origin it is a reaction against the extravagant Idealism of the nineteenth century. With the reaction went a leaning to and an acceptance of the Empirical stream of nineteenth century thought. To this it added its sole characteristic doctrine: insistence on mental activity, which is viewed as a unifying principle for the Empiric background. In the background are found the postulates or assumptions of Pragmatism. The more important of these are: Sensism, Evolution and a so-called Scientific Method.

Phenomenal Idealism of Sensism is the basic postulate of Pragmatism. Sense-experience is held to be the source and material of all knowledge. Therefore the objects of knowledge are not *things*, nor the real appearance of things, but their appearances as they are viewed within the mind. Thus Professor James holds that our whole conception of an object consists of "sensations and their reactions," and that "ideas themselves are but parts of our experience." To confound ideas with sensations by denying a distinction between the two is *Sensism*, just as to say that the mental appearances are the object of knowledge is *Phenomenal Idealism*. Again he writes that things are not what they are, but only what and as "they are *known as*," and

"for us they are not different if they make no difference." But this is the false principle of the *Relativity of knowledge* added to the *Idealism*. Moreover, he tells us that we cannot know substances, either material or spiritual, as such. But this is *Agnosticism*. Besides, to say that "substance is a spurious idea," that it is only "the name for a group of sensations," because phenomena come to us "as groups of sensations," is to propose the false teaching of *Nominalism*; i.e. our conceptions of things are names only. With Professor Dewey "experience" is the sum and substance of knowledge and of mental life. He denies an ontological distinction between thought and its material, and says this distinction is "within experience" and then only "an economic distinction" to show "a division of labor." Hence the material or subject-matter of thought is not outside of and distinct from the mind. Again he writes that "the distinctions between mind and body and their alleged disparateness and supposed parallelism are a pseudo-problem created by a prejudiced metaphysics." Thus the facts with which Pragmatism deals are mental facts; not things, but the perceptions of things; not God, but belief in God; not an external world, but belief in an external world. God and the external world exist for the Pragmatist only because and in so far as these beliefs have the marks of a true belief. Hence God and the external world are known only as inferred from the beliefs.

Evolution is the constructive or integrating postulate of Pragmatism. The world, i.e. experience, is an evolutive process. Professor James rejects Absolute Monism and Absolute Pluralism. To him the world is one in so far as its parts hang together by any definite connection; it is many just so far as any definite connection fails to obtain; and he adds that "it is growing more and more united by those systems of connection which human energy keeps forming as time goes on." Professor Dewey holds that the evolution process is *of* experience and *in* experience, and writes, "Reality must be defined in terms of experience, and judgment appears as the medium through which the consciously effected evolution of Reality goes on." Hence thought is not a mere product, but an organic factor in the process. Thus the difference between mind and matter, subject and object, does not mean the existence of two separate and naturally exclusive worlds, but the rich potentiality, the creative activity of one. But this is *Ideal Monism*. Reality, therefore, does not exist outside the mind. It consists in the mental process of making or remaking the world, i.e. experience. Hence evolution is an essential character of Reality and Reality is change. This fact that "experience" is undergoing change in the evolution process is the Pragmatic doctrine that Reality, i.e. Being, is plastic. Experience is conceived as self-supporting and self-propelling. Thus the principle of *continuity* is assumed. Reality, i.e. experience,

is not conceived as individual experience, but as social. Hence the evolution is described as a social process, of which the individual experience or reality is a part. Moreover, Pragmatism holds that Darwin showed the existence of purpose, and hence teaches that the evolution-process is *purposive* or teleological.

In criticism it can be said that the evolution postulate is a pure assumption. Reality is not what is *known as*, nor is it merely the product of our thought. Realities exist without reference to our minds. The mind finds realities and must conform to them. It is true I can combine realities, e.g. build a house, or dissociate them, e.g. in chemical analysis, but I must conform to certain laws having reference to their properties and action. To make the knowledge of realities constitute realities is idealism. The familiar story of the nine blind men and the elephant comes in illustration. Many realities exist without being *known as* such and exert an influence upon our lives, e.g. the composition of the atmosphere. Again we are told that private and social consciousness make up experience, but Professor James assures us that experience only becomes experience when *known as*, and what is not *known as* does not exist.

Moreover, to set forth evolution as a world-process, whether real or ideal, is the extreme of Metaphysics, although Professor Dewey is fond of ridiculing Metaphysics. Darwinian evolution

is discredited by scientists of to-day. The only element of truth in Darwin's system is the fact of growth. He showed that growth is a law of life. But the processes of growth depend upon the nature of the life. The mind grows, but not like the body; Psychology is not Physiology. The body grows, but not like the tree; Physiology is not Botany. The only real advance in Biology within fifty years is Mendel's Law verified of vegetable life only. And Professor Bateson, of Oxford, asserts that had Darwin known of this law, the *Origin of Species* would not have been written. To conceive the abstract fact of Growth as an integrating principle in a world-process is a pure assumption in contradiction to established truths. Even Professor James holds that the perception of *sameness* in kind is a category of common sense, and according to him the one first discovered and used by our lowest ancestors. But how can we recognize *sameness* in kind in an ever-changing process of development where the "experience" is ever plastic and thinking of a thing means its "real modification" with Professor Dewey, or its "transformation" with Professor James, so that the "future may not identically repeat and imitate the past"?

A so-called Scientific Method is the instrumental postulate of Pragmatism. This method is the application of the working-hypothesis of Modern Science to mental life. Evolution explains the "going," the working-hypothesis gives us the

instrument of the "going" and unfolds the technique of the process.

The working-hypothesis of science is a "device" or "working-formula" for dealing with scientific problems and accepted provisionally if it does the work. In like manner all our theories are viewed as "leadings," "instruments for use," "modes of adaptation" to the Reality which is conceived to be in the solution of the mental problem. The sole question in the mind of the Pragmatist is not that the theory or the "idea" with Professor James or the "judgment process" with Professor Dewey be true or false, but will it "work"? The theory is adopted simply for that reason and for that alone. Its value consists in its working quality, and this consists in its adaptability for undergoing real variation in the evolutive reconstruction of experience. Thus, in the sense that it is a useful instrument, the idea becomes a mediating factor or function in the process.

In criticism we say that men of science explicitly contrast working-hypotheses with established truths and give provisional assent only to the former. It is *Scepticism* to hold that all scientific theories are purely working-hypotheses, and it is false to apply the working-hypothesis to mental life and call it a scientific method. Finally, science deals with actual existing things, not with group-sensations.

II. *The Theory of Truth*

Pragmatism tests the truth of a notion by its respective practical consequences. Truth with Professor James is what is "useful" or "expedient"; with Professor Dewey what is "instrumental" for "satisfaction." Hence truth is relative to the person: what is useful to me may not be useful to you, and what is useful to me to-day may not be useful to-morrow. Thus truth changes with persons, times and places. But this is Scepticism and destroys the bases of Physical Science.

Again, Professor James asks what difference it would practically make to any one if this notion rather than that were true, and answers, "If no difference, the alternative means practically the same." But this is *Subjectivism* and is contradicted by the history of development in every branch of science. We distinguish *pure* science from *applied* science. The truths of pure science are discovered and verified before they are applied to the practical uses of life. Again, practical significance may be real or apparent, actual or possible. Yet I do not know the possible practical significance of all things. To make my present knowledge or needs the test of truth is the ego-centric doctrine in an extreme form. But Pragmatism cannot avoid the difficulty, for its basic postulate is "experience." Truth is conceived as working within "experience." Hence experience must find within itself the source and

support of its values of truth and error. Thus Professor James holds that objective truth, i.e. apart from its function in our experience, is not to be found.

As experience is the basis upon which the theory of truth rests, so the evolution-process furnishes the test of its value. An idea is true if it works, and it works if, in the constant evolutive reconstruction of experience, it is successful in bringing one part of experience in touch with another part, especially in mediating between old opinions and new experience, so as to cause the least possible jolt in the blending. Hence truth is not a property inherent in the idea: it marks the success and efficiency of the idea as a useful instrument.

This is the theory of Instrumentalism proposed by Professor Dewey. The working is prompted by needs, hence it is true for a special purpose. But to assume that the satisfaction of needs is desirable and necessary is Perfectionism in its most flagrant form, although Pragmatists are fond of ridiculing Perfectionism. Not all our needs or desires should be satisfied, and, with many, restraint should be used. Temperance in thought and action is a cardinal virtue. Discipline of thought and character is the basic principle in education. Hence there is a difference of value in needs and desires. If the value of truth consists merely in the efficiency of work, where is the standard for the difference of value in needs and desires? The act of the idea to

Pragmatists, not the idea itself, is true, and it is true in so far as it functions or is an adaptation in the evolutive process of experience. Its truth is its utility as a means to an end. An idea is true because it makes itself true by an efficient discharge of its mediating function as an organic part of the process of real change in a developing world.

Thus with Professor James the true is only "the expedient" in the way of our thinking, just as the right is only the expedient "in the way of our behaving." As ends constantly change in the experiencing-process, so do the purposes change, and with the change of purposes comes the corresponding constant changing of the means when judged by the test of expediency. With the change in means goes a corresponding change in truth. What may be true, i.e. expedient and useful to-day, may tomorrow be false, i.e. inexpedient and useless. The ends and means change, because the means, in working, effect a change in the contents of experience.

This is the Pragmatic Doctrine of the *Plasticity* of truth. Thus as the postulate of evolution teaches a plasticity of being, so, when viewed as the background of truth, does it teach a plasticity of truth. Professor James calls Absolute Truth, i.e. what no further experience will ever alter, "that ideal vanishing-point towards which we imagine all our temporary truths will some day

converge." Nothing is stable in this teaching. Yet there are stable elements in the physical, mental and moral worlds. These do not impede, but guide and serve action. Orderly activity supposes them. Otherwise science could not exist. The very basis and structural elements of a science are made up of definite fixed principles or laws.

Thus truth as a mental activity appears in the form of a working-hypothesis, with no guide or test except the measure of success which it achieves for the time being. The measure of success justifies its use and it is useful "in so far forth" as it succeeds. Applied to business life, this principle implies, if not dishonesty, at least *sharp practice*. Applied to politics, it does not set forth a high, true ideal of citizenship, but is very welcome to the "grafter." Applied to moral life, it teaches that the *end justifies the means*. As a working-hypothesis, the idea appears as a process, a plan of action, and a process which is only approximately true. Hence there are grades in truth. Some truths are truer than others, i.e. if they are more useful instruments for the work. If better instruments are found or invented, the old truths, like old clothes, are outworn and discarded, unless a practical mother makes them over for the rising heir. Professor Dewey teaches that truth is what is "instrumental" for "satisfaction," and Professor James says that "individuals will emphasize their points of satisfaction differently."

In criticism we say that science holds data true prior to the process, hence they are true in some other sense than by being satisfactory. Besides, some truths are not satisfactory just because they are true. Again, men of science distinguish between established truths and working-hypotheses. In taking the latter to illustrate mental activity, Pragmatism assumes as its method that which in science is regarded as giving the least assurance that truth is present at all. Again, a lie may be useful at times; if useful, it is true. Moreover, to tell the truth may not be useful or expedient, hence the truth may not be true. The Pragmatist is ever asking the question, What is there in this for me? Thus Professor James says that "we cannot reject any hypothesis if consequences useful to life flow from it." Yet in fact error, delusion and deception appealing to human needs and purposes are at times effective in directing human life and conduct.

Thus, while the postulates of Pragmatism furnish the setting for the theory of truth and enable us to see how it works, yet the theory itself is clearly grasped only when viewed as the positive expression of the sole characteristic doctrine of Pragmatism, viz. its explanation of mental life which sets forth the "idea" or the "judgment process" as a purposive action, thereby combining mind and will in one act. Hence truth with them is not the correspondence of an idea within the mind to an object

outside the mind, but consists in the efficacy of the "idea" or "judgment" as a means or instrument to an end. The end, constantly changing with the constant changing subject-matter or experience, is the ever-present purposive reconstruction of the experience within the mind. The successful working, at best approximate only, and different with different persons, or with the same person at each succeeding moment, is the reconstruction of experience, and this is viewed as reality because it is the effect or result of mental action.

Thus to Pragmatists truth is the relation or the correspondence of the idea or judgment to reality, i.e. the mental effect which it produces. Therefore the postulates, in furnishing the setting for the Pragmatic theory of truth, are not accepted because they are true in themselves. In fact, they are pure assumptions and considered as true by Pragmatists "inasmuch" and "in so far forth" as they are "useful" or "expedient" for the working presentation of the theory.

III. *The Problem of Thought*

With Professor Dewey the heart of the knowing problem is the relation of thought to its empirical antecedents and to its consequent, i.e. truth, and the relation of both to Reality. To him Reality is not viewed as self-existent outside the mind; it is experience undergoing reconstruction in and

through the judgment process. Therefore mental life contains no entity as "soul" or "mind," but is "a stream of consciousness" compounded of "instincts," "interests" or "impulses." Hence he defines Psychology as the natural history of the various attitudes and structures through which experiencing passes as mental states in the stream of consciousness. Thus experience is the general term for mental activity; "habit," "attention," "consciousness" are particular works or functions of that activity.

Experience first comes to the mind unorganized; as such, with Professor Dewey, it is not knowledge, for knowledge he conceives to be organized or reconstructed experience, and as this reconstruction takes place in the judgment-process, there is no knowledge outside of the judgment. "Fact" and "idea" are distinctions within experience, and as such are parts of experience viewed as different simply because they act or function in a different manner; the "fact" is the object within the mind, the "idea" is its meaning. The antecedents of thought are not knowledge: only *stimuli* to knowledge. Hence Professor Dewey says that "the simple idea of sensation is without objective reference"; that "what is perceived immediately is that part of the datum in the mind which is the object of attention"; that "objectivity consists in actually being the object of thought," for "what I do not think about is not objective," and to be the

object of thought is what is "isolated in the stream of conscious experience by attention with a view to the attainment of a purpose." Thus "things are apprehended as objective in virtue of the agent's attitude to them; they are not objective antecedent to his attitude." In like manner Professor James tells us that things are "as they are known as." Therefore the basis of mental life is Phenomenal Idealism.

In criticism it can be said that objectivity is defined in a partial and erroneous sense. It is true a mental state may be the object of thought as in meditation. Yet a thing existing outside the mind can be the object of thought, e.g. a child playing with blocks, my friend at solitaire, or a scientist in the laboratory is dealing with real objective things. Again, the objects within the mind come wholly or in part from the outside world. Therefore the term *objective* primarily and essentially refers to things existing outside the mind. Pragmatism confines the use of the term *objective* to mental states and makes the distinction between objective and subjective a distinction within the mind because its teaching is based on mental experience, and holds that mental experience is the sole subject-matter of thought. But this contention is contradicted by the happenings of ordinary daily life.

Moreover, Pragmatism assumes mental experience as the subject-matter of thought because it

denies immediate knowledge of things external to the mind. Yet Professor Stuart admits that mental "actions are suggested by consciously recognized stimuli" and that the external "object, e.g. a stone, must have a certain meaning as a stimulus first of all."¹ These admissions overturn the foundation of his system. The "conscious recognition of stimuli" and the apprehension of their "meaning" is knowledge. This knowledge may not be classified or as complete as that found in the judgment process, but there can be grades or degrees of knowledge, and even Professor Dewey says that the knowledge of the judgment process is not final, but provisional only. Hence it is a contradiction to confine knowledge to the judgment process and admit that we grasp the "meaning" of what stimulates the process.

Thought for Pragmatism is the name for the process in which instincts and their appreciations interact and reconstruct themselves under the guidance of purpose with a view to conscious control. As ideal experience is the basic postulate of mental life, so evolution is the integrating postulate. The first stage of the process arises in inner "distractions" or "tensions" produced by needs of the mental situation. The process is active throughout and is described as a constant movement toward a defined equilibrium or reorganization which is viewed as the fulfilment of the purpose. The

¹ *Studies in Logical Theory*, pp. 251, 256. *ib.*, pp. 31, 35, 37-40 48.

“idea” is derived from the situation and mediates as “a plan of action” in readjusting the conflicting elements. This is known as “the conflict-mediatorial” theory of thought. Mind or consciousness is what it *seems* to be, viz. a transition-phase of the contents of experience undergoing reconstruction into something else. In this view experience is conceived as dynamic and self-evolving in specific conditions determined and controlled by the specific purposes.

Knowledge therefore is not a state, i.e. stable, but an action: it is knowing for the present plan or purpose, and the act of knowing is set forth in biological terms. Thus Professor Dewey says that logical theory is an account of thinking as a mode of adaptation and judges its validity by the consequences, i.e. its efficiency in meeting the problem. This view of thought as a dynamic teleological evolution effecting ever-constant change in reality brings out the fundamental doctrine in the Pragmatic theory of thought, viz. the definition of thought as *purposive action*, and purposive action is conduct, a definition which identifies thought and will and denies any distinction between them. The source of this doctrine is found in the development of modern Psychology. Just as modern Sociology differs from the Sociology of Spencer in this that it takes the Sociology of Spencer, which is structural merely and views it as functional, so that writers hold that Modern Sociology begins where Spencer’s

Sociology ends, in like manner a change in the point of view has taken place in Psychology. The Psychology of Spencer, Bain and Mill is structural only. This structural Psychology is now viewed as functioning.

The evolutive functioning of experience is expressed in the dynamic action of thought, which can be so conceived only by identifying thought and will. The identification becomes necessary from the fact that purpose is now admitted to rule in the world. Thus we can understand why Professor Dewey aims to set forth the natural history of thought, i.e. after Spencer; why he seeks its beginnings in conflict, i.e. after Spencer; why he describes the process as a teleological integrating movement toward conscious control, i.e. adding purpose to Spencer's equilibrium; why he considers first principles as results of previous inductions transmitted to us, i.e. after Spencer, and why he explains the thought-process as an adaptation not of structure to function as with Spencer, but of function to Reality, which is conceived as the product and result of the thought functioning. Reality therefore is considered as ever in the making, and here Pragmatism places its doctrine of free-will, which, with Professor James, means the introduction of "changes" into the world.

In criticism we say that, although Pragmatists teach the identification of thought and will by explaining thought as purposive action, yet in fact they

admit the distinction by regarding some thought as not here and now entering into the purposive action. Thus Professor James writes: "The practical value of true ideas is primarily derived from the practical importance of their objects to us. These objects are, indeed, not important at all times, and these ideas, however verifiable, will be practically irrelevant and had better remain latent. Yet since almost any object may some day become temporarily important, the advantage of having a general stock of *extra* truths, of ideas that shall be true of merely possible situations, is obvious."¹ Professor Dewey writes that "the conflict in thought makes certain elements in experience assume conscious objectification"; that "the most characteristic trait of consciousness is its selective function with reference to stimuli"; that "the subjective is the holding of contents from definitely asserted position"; that "the objective is that which is carried forward in the process, the subjective is what is left behind" or "excluded from the problem"; that "this subjective may become the initial in other problems and remains a fact, even a worthwhile fact, as a part of one's *inner* experience." He admits "abstractions which are without possible reference or bearing" on the specific problem, says "thought starts from a *specific*, i.e. particular occasion and ends at a specific issue," and holds that "in the history of scientific inquiry

¹ *Pragmatism*, p. 203.

there is a relegation of accepted meanings into the limbo of mere ideas.”¹

These words show clearly that there are conscious elements in experience which here and now do not enter into the present purposive thought-process. This means that while all purpose includes the element of thought, yet all thought-elements are not purposive here and now, although they may become so. But this is the fundamental teaching of Scholastic Philosophy, and Professor Dewey's admission of this truth destroys the basic element of his system. In fact, the introduction of purpose as the guiding element in the thought-process apparently makes thought purposive, and in truth much thought is purposive, but closer analysis shows that purpose is selective both in the beginning and throughout the thought-process, and selection means that certain conscious elements of experience are excluded from the present process. They are latent or quiescent and exist in the mind, for Professor Dewey describes them. Therefore all conscious experience is not at the same time purposive action.

In explaining the technique of thought, Pragmatists appeal to the “working-hypothesis” of Physical Science. To them knowledge is confined to judgment and not to judgment pure and simple, but to a special kind of judgment, viz. the judgment whose meaning is uncertain. Hence knowledge

¹ Studies in Logical Theory, ch. I-IV.

begins with *doubt* and is in essence an *inquiry*. The subject of the judgment is the *mental fact*, the predicate is the *idea*. The process is the determination of the *fact*, and the *idea* accomplishes this after the manner of a working-hypothesis.

In criticism we may say that knowledge, according to the expressed statements of Pragmatists, is not confined to the judgment, for they admit conscious elements in experience which are not included in the judgment process going on here and now. Therefore the technique of the working-hypothesis cannot be applied to *all* our conscious states, but is confined to the actual judgment process of the moment.

Furthermore, the working-hypothesis cannot be applied in explanation of all judgment, for there are judgments whose truth is grasped without any process of inquiry, e.g. first principles and axioms. These are the basis of knowledge. To deliberately exclude self-evident truths from being considered knowledge and to confine knowledge to the elucidation of mental situations which are doubtful is to make Scepticism the beginning and basis of knowledge.

Finally, even in the process of the doubt-judgment, the idea is not a working-hypothesis. If it were, then the only difference in ideas would be their efficiency in solving the situation. But the presence of purpose in the process shows clearly that some ideas are selected in preference to others as more

fitted to meet the situation, and that they are selected because their difference in character is perceived antecedent to their work.

IV. *Criticism*

The postulates in the background of Pragmatism are fragments coming from the broken Science-Philosophy of the last century. They are not true in themselves, and no mere combination can ever make them true. The sole characteristic doctrine of Pragmatism, which forms them into the new combination, is not true; for Pragmatists admit that all conscious elements of experience are not purposive. This means that all thought is not purposive.

To take the Association-Psychology of Spencer, Mill and Bain, discarded for some years in the schools, and to turn it, by the twist of a word, into a new system, does not make a new system in reality, but in appearance only. The fundamental difficulties unanswerable to the old Psychology are thus carried over into the new and persistently cry out for a solution. To get the old structural mechanism to work by the use of a word will not solve the difficulties. The mechanism itself needs attention.

Thus how can Pragmatism explain *unity of consciousness, memory, anticipation, personal identity* or even *reflection*? In fact, Pragmatists give minute description of the mental process in all its stages

and mention the other elements of conscious experience which are *outside* the process, but forget to explain the most important problem of mental life, viz. who *sees* all this. Pragmatists explicitly reject a *soul* or *mind*, but in their descriptions of mental life actually postulate its existence.

There is *direct* knowledge, e.g. when I deal with external things, as well as *reflex* knowledge, e.g. meditation. To confound both or to neglect the former and make the logic of reflective thought constitute the logical theory is on a par with confining the use of the term *knowledge* to the judgment of doubt and assume that this kind of knowledge is all we have.

. Mental distinction does not mean actual separation. I can distinguish many elements in combination without thereby separating them.

In calling attention to the activity of mental life, Pragmatism insists upon a truth. Mental life is active. Its explanation of this activity, however, is false. This is the purpose of the present analysis, viz. to point out that the distinctive doctrine of the latest philosophical system is based upon the false definition of the idea: the most fundamental and apparently the simplest element in mental life.

CHAPTER III

ABSOLUTE PRAGMATISM

THE most important contribution to Metaphysics in recent years from the pen of an American writer is the publication of the Gifford Lectures delivered by Professor Royce at the University of Aberdeen, entitled *The World and the Individual*. In these lectures is set forth for the first time the system of Constructive Idealism which has been taking shape in the mind of Professor Royce since the publishing of his early philosophical essays some twenty years ago. The reader faces a theory of the universe set forth with a wealth and vividness of language. This theory is characterized by the dominant element of *tendency* and is an exhaustive presentation of what Professor Royce calls Absolute Pragmatism.

I. *Conceptions of Being*

Professor Royce tells us that his Gifford Lectures are "a philosophical inquiry into first principles," and "an application of these first principles to problems that directly concern religion," Vol. I,

p. vii. By "first principles" he means the principles of Ontology, and he, therefore, calls his work a treatise on the Metaphysics of Religion, *ib.*, Introduction. To him religion must be studied "primarily as a body of ontological problems and opinions, in other words as, in its theory, a branch of the Theory of Being," *ib.*, p. 11. Yet in the Introductory Lecture of the second volume, he takes the reader into his confidence by the assurance that science is "the field of empirically accredited facts," religion "the field of facts beyond the range of human experience." Therefore, "an Idealistic Theory of Being lies beyond all human experience," Vol. II, p. 13; thus his Metaphysics becomes an Idealism, his Ontology an Ideology.

Closer and more detailed study places beyond doubt that this is the real value of Professor Royce's contribution to the philosophy of religion. With the avowed purpose of discussing the Metaphysics of Religion he first of all proposes a Theory of Being. The Theories of Realism, of Mysticism, of Validity are criticised and set aside as defective.

The Realistic conception of Being is "the typical notion of socially respectable conservatism, whenever such conservatism begins to use the speech of technical philosophy," Vol. I, p. 91. Realism asserts "that to be real means to be independent of ideas, which, while other than a given real being, still relate to that being," *ib.*, pp. 92, 62. Hence the world according to Realism is "a world of in-

dependent Beings," *ib.*, p. 103. The Realistic conception of Being Professor Royce rejects. His reasons are that it "especially tends to sunder the *what* from the *that*, the essence from its existence," *ib.*, p. 106. In other words it "sunders external and internal meaning: is exclusively external," *ib.*, p. 75. Hence "its central technical difficulty is the nature of individuality and the naming of universals," *ib.*, p. 76.

With Realism "independence destroys linkages among beings, hence "the problem of the One and the Many proves to be the great test problem of realistic metaphysics," *ib.*, p. 112. If the beings are "mutually independent," "the many entities of this realistic world have no features in common," and possess no "common characters," *ib.*, pp. 127, 131. Therefore, "the realm of a consistent Realism is not the realm of One nor yet the realm of Many, it is the realm of absolutely nothing," *ib.*, p. 137. Finally it is contradictory for "it asserts the mutual dependence of Knowing and of Being in the act of declaring Being independent," *ib.*, p. 76.

The Mystical conception of Being is, to Professor Royce's view, the opposite of the Realistic and must also be rejected. "The mystic asserts that the real cannot be wholly independent of knowledge . . . that the reality of which you think and speak is first of all a reality meant by you . . . that within you lies the sole motive to distin-

guish truth from error, reality from unreality, the world from the instant's passing contents," *ib.*, p. 189. Hence with Mysticism "To be real means to be in such wise Immediate that, in presence of this immediacy, all thought and all ideas, absolutely satisfied, are quenched, so that the finite search ceases and the Other is no longer another, but is absolutely found," *ib.*, p. 144. In this sense it differs from "common-sense Realism," which "makes the truth an independent Being, that is beyond our striving, in the sense of Being wholly apart from every knowledge which refers to it," *ib.*, p. 173. Professor Royce notes the unrest and aspirations of the human soul and holds that "Primarily in seeking Being we seek what is to end our disquietude," *ib.*, p. 154. Thus "Being is once for all, to a finite thinker, at least in part, the Other that he seeks," *ib.*, p. 148. The purpose of the mystic is the deliberate and conscious rejection, as something to be overcome, of "the common-sense antithesis between the immediate and the ideal and between the real and the desirable," *ib.*, p. 155. Hence Mysticism teaches that "to be means to quench thought in the presence of a final immediacy which completely satisfies all ideas," *ib.*, p. 186. "Absolute immediacy" is attained "on the borders of unconsciousness when we are closest to dreamland slumber," *ib.*, p. 168, and "to be possessed of absolute knowledge is to be unconscious," *ib.*, p. 191.

Professor Royce rejects the mystical conception of Being for the reason that it is partial and incomplete; its great fault is that like Realism it goes to an extreme but in an opposite direction. "The Mystic in general knows only Internal Meanings, as the Realist considers only External meanings," *ib.*, p. 176.

The third conception of Being which Professor Royce rejects is termed the Theory of Validity. It differs from the two preceding theories in its designation as a Transformed Realism. Thus "Being is that which is known, is found giving to ideas their validity, as that to which ideas ought to correspond," *ib.*, p. 201. "To be real now means primarily, to be valid, to be true, to be in essence the standard for ideas," *ib.*, p. 202. In this third conception, Reality is identified with Validity, for "what is Being then but the Validity of ideas," *ib.*, p. 204. Professor Royce calls this the theory of Critical Rationalism. "God is no longer a person. . . . The impersonal conceptions of a Righteous order of the universe remains," *ib.*, p. 206. This theory according to Professor Royce is found in the teaching of Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, and of Kant, *ib.*, pp. 227-239.

Professor Royce teaches that the defect of the third conception of Being is that it "consciously attempts to define the Real as explicitly and only the Universal," *ib.*, p. 240, i.e. "bare abstract

universal and does not assert the individuality of Being," *ib.*, p. 290. To be or to be valid means that an idea "has truth, defines an experience, that at least, as a mathematical ideal, and perhaps, as an empirical event, is determinately possible," *ib.*, p. 227.

Thus in this sense real Being is possible Being, i.e. Being "whose Reality lies in its Validity," *ib.*, p. 233. A negative answer is given to the question, "Can there be two sorts of Being both known to us as valid but the one individual, the other universal, the one empirical, the other merely ideal, the one present, the other barely possible, the one a concrete life, the other a pure form," *ib.*, p. 261. For these reasons Professor Royce sets it aside for his own explanation which he calls the Fourth or the Synthetic Conception of Being.

II. *Principles*

The method adopted by Professor Royce in dealing with the problem of Reality is to view it "from the side of the means through which we are supposed to attain reality, i.e. Ideas," *ib.*, p. 19. The fundamental question, therefore, is the nature of the idea.

To Professor Royce "the idea is as much a volitional process as it is an intellectual process," *ib.*, p. 311. In fact "all our thinking is itself a process of willing," *ib.*, p. 153. "A color seen, a brute

noise heard is not an idea," *ib.*, p. 24. Hence "the idea is a will seeking its own determination. It is nothing else," *ib.*, p. 332. It appears in consciousness as having the significance of an act of will," *ib.*, p. 23. By way of illustration I am informed that "when I have an idea of the world, my idea is a will, and the world of my idea is simply my own will itself determinately embodied," *ib.*, p. 327. In this sense he speaks of "the essentially teleological inner structure of conscious ideas," *ib.*, p. 310.

To make clearer and more explicit what he understands by the idea Professor Royce distinguishes the "Internal and External meanings" of ideas, Vol. II, Lect. III. By the Internal meaning he understands the "conscious inner purpose embodied in a given idea," by the External meaning "the embodiment" itself which as such is a part of sensitive experience, Vol. I, p. 308 *sq.* To a superficial thinker there is a conflict between the external and the internal meaning. This is only apparent. Deeper down there is a harmony inasmuch as the external meaning is subordinated to the internal meaning. For the "external meaning must be interpreted not primarily in the sense of mere dependence upon the brute facts, but in terms of the inner purpose of the idea itself," *ib.*, p. 33.

Hence the external meaning is only apparently external, and in very truth is but an aspect of the completely developed internal meaning, *ib.*, p. 36.

The contrast between the internal and external meanings is solved by "conscious selection," *ib.*, p. 31, i.e. by the "conscious inner purpose of the idea," selecting its own partial embodiment or fulfilment. Thus in the idea, conscious selection plays a part analogous to that played by natural and sexual selection in the Darwinian hypothesis as to the development of the organic world.

On the distinction between internal and external meaning is based the theory of judgment. For "to judge is to bring the *what* into relation with the *that*," *ib.*, p. 273. It "is to consider internal meanings with reference to external meanings," *ib.* By the *what* Professor Royce understands "the abstractly universal," by the *that* "the individual," *ib.*, p. 294.

We are now prepared to understand what is meant by "the essential relation of idea and object." This is "the world-knot," *ib.*, p. 431. By the "object" of the idea Professor Royce does not mean the objective content of the idea, i.e. the thing of which the idea is the representation, but "the purpose of the idea." For the word *object* in the English language is susceptible of two meanings, e.g. the subject-matter and the aim or purpose. As can be readily inferred from what has been said Professor Royce so defines the idea "as not formally to presuppose the power of ideas to have cognitive relations to outer objects," *ib.*, p. 20. For he tells his readers that "your intelligent ideas

of things never consist of mere images of the things, but always involve a consciousness of how you propose to act toward the things of which you have ideas," and therefore, "intelligent ideas belong, so to speak, to the motor side of your life rather than to the merely sensory," *ib.*, p. 22. He admits that "the idea is a representation of a fact existent beyond itself," *ib.*, p. 23. Yet he maintains that "representative character is not the primary character," for "this is its inner character as relatively fulfilling a purpose," *ib.*, p. 24. Phrases as "fact beyond itself" and "object" are to be interpreted in terms of "purpose." For "the idea in seeking for its object is seeking for the determination of its own just now indeterminate will," *ib.*, p. 333. "This further determination is given only in terms of experience," *ib.*, p. 334. For "my conscious will as expressed in my ideas does logically determine what objects are my objects," *ib.* Hence "the object sought is simply the precise determination of this very will itself to unique and unambiguous expression. . . . For the object is a true other, and yet it is object only as the meaning of this idea," *ib.*, p. 331. Thus, "whatever the object, it is still the object for a given idea solely because that idea wills it to be such," *ib.* The determination of the object by the will he calls a "selection." "That an idea has an object depends, at least in part, upon this that the idea selects its object . . . and this selection is manifested in consciousness

by what is usually called attention," *ib.*, p. 317. The relation of idea to object is "essentially the relation of a partial meaning to a totally express rational meaning," and "the relation of partial and total meaning is, at the same time, the relation of any finite will to the expression of the complete content of that same will," *ib.*, p. 431.

If we bear in mind that the idea is to be interpreted in terms of "purpose" and that "all our thinking is itself a process of willing" we may be able to grasp the peculiar meaning Professor Royce attaches to the universal. "Ideas as they come to us in their finite imperfections are at first indeterminate, and for that very reason, vague, general, or as technical language often expresses it, abstractly universal," *ib.*, p. 336. Hence "an universal, in the abstract sense of the term, is known to us merely as that of which there might be another instance," *ib.* For, as shall be shown later on, the idea in seeking its own determination assumes more and more unique character.

The transitions from the idea to Being and Reality, and the application of the one to the solution of the other is made very easy in the philosophy of Professor Royce. For "the whole problem of the nature of Being is in the end a study of internal and external meanings," *ib.*, p. 32. Hence, "to be is to fulfil a purpose," *ib.*, p. 335. The Being to which any idea refers is "simply the will of the idea more determinately and also more completely

expressed," *ib.*, p. 353. The "purpose" of the idea, the "object" or "other" which it consciously seeks, is, therefore, the constituent of Being and Reality. Thus, "our concept of Being implies that whatever is, is consciously known as the fulfilment of some idea," *ib.*, p. 396. This knowledge is possessed either "by ourselves at this moment, or by a consciousness inclusive of our own," *ib.* That Professor Royce proposes a theory of Idealistic Pantheism is evident from a careful study of the context, *ib.*, pp. 397-400, and will be brought out clearly in the application of the theory to God and to the world. We have no immediate perception of the external world, Vol. II, p. 159, nor have we "fundamental assurances," *ib.*, pp. 70, 160. For the "idea" is "a conscious striving" and the "object" of the idea is the "purpose" which it consciously seeks. Matter is "mere appearance," *ib.*, p. 213, and the fundamental principle of knowledge is that of "a vast conscious process," *ib.*, pp. 226-240.

In seeking its object "any idea whatever seeks absolutely nothing but its own explicit, and in the end complete determination as this conscious purpose, embodied in this one way. The complete content of the idea's own purpose is the only object of which the idea can ever take note. This alone is the other that is sought," Vol. I, p. 339.

In consulting experience "we are simply seeking aid in the undertaking to give our ideas a certain

positive determination to *this content* and *no other*," *ib.*, p. 297, but he adds that "we never reach that," *ib.* Hence "this individual determination itself remains, so far, the principal character of the Real, and is as an Ideal, the Limit toward which we endlessly aim," *ib.*, pp. 297, 446. The distinction of the Ideal and the Real involves no separation; at the basis they are identified. For "the Real is that which is *immediately beyond* the whole of our series of possible efforts to bring, by any process of finite experience and of merely general conceptions, our own internal meaning to a complete determination," *ib.*, pp. 280-299.

Reality thus becomes "the goal of life's journey," *ib.*, p. 188, and "what determines us to acknowledge as real a system of particular facts is the Ought," Vol. II, p. 41.

If we bear in mind that the idea "selects" its own object, i.e. purpose, and if "purpose" constitutes the Real, we can understand after some fashion what Professor Royce means when he writes that Being is "a selection from abstractly possible contents," *ib.*, p. 449, that "what is, is a selection from possibilities," *ib.*, that "so long as you define mere universals (i.e. vague, indeterminate strivings as they first come to us in their finite imperfections, *ib.*, p. 336), mere general notions of things, you define neither the Being of objects nor the truth of ideas," *ib.*, p. 452. The reason is that "the essence of Being is to be individual,"

ib., p. 348, and the individual is due to "the selective character of every rational conscious process," *ib.*, p. 449.

The notion of Truth in the system of Professor Royce, like the notions of Being and of Reality, follows naturally from the notion of the idea. To Him "truth is the adequate expression and development of the internal meaning of the idea itself," *ib.*, p. 33. Ideas, therefore, "really possess truth or falsity only by virtue of their own selection of their task as ideas," *ib.*, p. 32. And as ideas by "selection" constitute Reality and Being, so also "Being has to be that object which makes ideas true or false," *ib.*, p. 349. An idea is false "unless that kind of identity in inner structure between ideas and object can be found which the specific purpose embodied in a given idea demands," *ib.*, p. 306. Hence "it is not mere agreement, but intended agreement that constitutes truth," *ib.*, p. 307. There is "no purely external criterion of truth," *ib.*, p. 306, for the "sole motive to distinguish truth from error is within," *ib.*, pp. 189, 308. "The embodied purpose, the internal meaning, of the instant's act is thus a *conditio sine qua non* for all external meaning and for all truth," *ib.*, p. 311. In fact purpose is "the test of truthful correspondence of an idea to its object," *ib.*, p. 306. We say that "this instant's idea is true, if in its own measure and on its own plan, it corresponds, even in its vagueness, to its own final and

completely individual expression," *ib.*, p. 339. In like manner the error of an idea "is always a failure to win the intended aim of the idea precisely in so far as the idea sought truth," *ib.*, p. 324.

III. *Application*

Thus in a brief outline, employing as far as possible his own words, I have endeavored to set forth the basal concepts of a philosophical system which has placed Professor Royce the peer of metaphysical writers in America. These concepts are the *idea* and its *object*. On these his whole system is constructed and from their peculiar contents it takes form and existence. To make the exposition complete it is necessary to show the application of these concepts to God, to the world, and to the individual.

To Professor Royce, the absolute is "a system" yet "an unique and individual system," *ib.*, p. 563. It is an individual because the act of an individual is an "insight and a choice," *ib.*, p. 446; Vol. II, Lect. VII, and individuality of self is "the unique conscious plan," *ib.*, pp. 293, 326. The Absolute is not distinct from the world, for he speaks of the "whole individual Being called the World," Vol. I, p. 40, and tells us that "the true World as rightly viewed by an absolute insight would be a world of selves, forming in the unity of their systems, one Self," Vol. II, p. 106. Thus,

"the Absolute Individual is the sole completely integrating Self," *ib.*, p. 447. He teaches the "infinity of the real system of the Self," *ib.*, p. 451, and holds that "the various individual selves are the various self-expressions of the same system," *ib.*, p. 448. It is wrong to suppose that "a new individual" is a "new thing"; it is only "a new kind of life-purpose," *ib.*, p. 308. What in ordinary language we term individuals "are all the various expressions of the Absolute in so far as they are many," *ib.*, p. 336, and "are made distinct through their various meanings," *ib.*, p. 239. The soul is "no monad, but a life individuated solely by its purpose," *ib.*, p. 238. Hence "it is will in God and in man that logically determines the consciousness of individuality," Vol. I, p. 460. Selective attention and the nature of individuality are "studied as aspects of will," (Vol. I, Supplementary Essay). The world is nothing more than an endless *Kette*, i.e. a series, *ib.*, p. 588, and "in its entirety an embodiment of our own will," Vol. II, p. 61, or "an expression of my will," *ib.*, p. 295. For "the Theory of Being requires us to view every fact of Nature and of man's life as a fragmentary glimpse of the Absolute life, as a revelation, however mysterious and to us men now in detail illegible, of the unity of the perfect whole," *ib.*, p. 8.

That this is the logical inference from the notion of Being is evident from the doctrine that "to be

means simply to express, to embody the complete internal meaning of a certain absolute system of ideas; a system moreover which is genuinely implied in the true internal meaning or purpose of every finite idea, however fragmentary," Vol. I, p. 36. He confesses that "our ideas imperfectly embody our will, and the real world is just our whole will embodied," *ib.*, p. 37. Hence it is that "my own purpose of comprehension is itself a part of the world-purpose" and "within its limits represents one aspect of truth," Vol. II, p. 107. Thus, "amidst all the complexities of nature and of man's life, we are dealing with fragmentary glimpses of an Absolute Unity," *ib.*, p. 9. If we ask what is the nature of these "complexities" and "fragmentary glimpses" we are told that "In case of Nature in general as in particular of man, we are dealing with phenomenal signs of a vast conscious process, whose relation to Time varies vastly, but whose general characteristics are throughout the same," *ib.*, p. 226. Hence, "for our own idealistic view, all nature is an expression of mind," *ib.*, p. 158.

The phenomenal world Professor Royce calls the "World of Description" and from it distinguishes the world of Appreciation, i.e. the world of socially interrelated selves," *ib.*, pp. 107, 155, 309, or "the world of Life," *ib.*, p. 26. The unity of the world is "a unity of consciousness," Vol. I, p. 466. The universe "is a well-ordered

Infinite Series, which as embodying a single plan may be rightly viewed as forming a totality," Vol. II, p. 146. Hence "the fundamental structure of the universe is essentially both teleological and conscious," Vol. I, p. 432, and "the world is one with God," Vol. II, pp. 271, 292, Lect. III. We ascribe to the true world "a certain eternal type of Being," *ib.*, p. 111, and the reason is that "a temporal world must needs be, when viewed in its wholeness, an eternal world," *ib.*, pp. 133, 138. As a fact "in defining time, we have already and inevitably defined eternity," for "time viewed in its wholeness is eternity," *ib.*, p. 337, and "the temporal order is identical with the eternal order," *ib.*, p. 386. Thus "the whole real content of this temporal order is *at once* known, i.e. is consciously experienced as a whole by the Absolute," *ib.*, p. 138. In illustration we are told that if you "listen to any musical phase and grasp it as a whole, you thereupon have present in you the image, so to speak, of the divine knowledge of the temporal order," *ib.*, p. 145, the difference is only "one of span," *ib.*

The doctrine of the unity of Being implies "that all selves are known, without any true separation, in the organism of a single world-life," *ib.*, p. 393. Hence "the whole of time will contain a single expression of the divine will and therefore, despite its endlessness, the time-world will be present as such a single whole to the

Absolute, whose will this is, and whose life all this sequence embodies," *ib.*, p. 147. Thus "the Absolute is identical with our whole will expressed" and "we are the divine as it expresses itself here and now," *ib.*, p. 408.

Man's personality is "constituted by contrast," *ib.*, p. 425. The contrast between the self and the not-self "comes to us primarily as the contrast between the internal and the external meaning of the present moment's purpose," *ib.*, p. 272. The true self of an individual "is not a datum, but an ideal," *ib.*, p. 287; and "any finite idea is so far a self," *ib.*, p. 272. For "self is created by a life-plan, by possession of an ideal, by an intent to remain other than my fellows, despite my divinely planned unity with them," *ib.*, pp. 268, 276. Hence the self of the individual "is constituted by contrast with other selves," *ib.*, p. 296. Thus, "when I seek my own goal, I am looking for the whole of myself. In so far as my aim is the absolute completion of my selfhood, my goal is identical with the whole life of God. But, in so far as, by my whole individual self, I mean my whole Self in contrast with the Selves of my fellows, then the completion of my individual expression in so far as I am this individual and no other, i.e. my goal, as this Self, is still not any one point or experience in my life, nor any one stage of my life, but the totality of my individual life viewed as in contrast with the lives of other individuals,"

ib., p. 135. In its entirety the "Self is the whole of a self-representative or recurrent process and not the mere last moment or stage of that process,"

ib. For "every finite Internal Meaning wins final expression, not merely through the last stage of its life, but through its whole embodiment," p. 270.

The absolute is the "one absolutely final and integrated Self," *ib.*, p. 289, and as Self, "is inclusive of a variety of various but interwoven Selves,"

ib., p. 288, nay more, it is "our own very selfhood in fulfilment," *ib.*, p. 302. Thus "man is one with God," *ib.*, pp. 148, 275, 327; Lect. III, VII.

In describing the Absolute as a self-representative system Professor Royce wishes to insist that "every fact in this system fulfils a purpose," *ib.*, p. 397. He tells us that "longing exists *in* the Absolute Life and as a significant part thereof," *ib.*, p. 299, that "the Absolute to be complete must include finitude," *ib.*, p. 302, that the Absolute is "thought inclusive of will and expression," Vol. I, p. ix, and aims "to bring into a synthesis the relations of knowledge and of will in our conception of God," *ib.* Human experience is limited and to him its characteristic limitation is "that it grasps within the narrow limits of *this* or *that* instant, fragments of a meaning which can only be conceived with consistency by regarding it as embodied in an experience of a wider scope, of determinate constitution, and of united significance," Vol. II, p. 24.

Professor Royce denies the existence of a substantial soul, *ib.*, pp. vii, 60, 267, and holds that God is the only substance, Vol. I, p. 11. "Man is (only) the fragment of a whole, whose inner unity is far beyond the reach of our present form of consciousness," Vol. II, p. 8, and "a new individual life is a new way of behavior appearing amongst natural phenomena," *ib.*, p. 315. To him the principle of morality is "to harmonize thine own will with the World's will," *ib.*, p. 348, and moral freedom "is to hold by attention or to forget by inattention, an Ought already present to one's finite consciousness," p. 360.

When Professor Royce speaks of the "background of reality" he means "the world," *ib.*, p. 55. An act of concrete knowledge is "an abstraction from the background." Abstraction is "a selective process" and is very much akin to Kant's apperception. In this sense Professor Royce speaks of the "underlying unity of the object of knowledge," *ib.*, p. 56. Hence in the act of knowledge there is no active mind but only idea-forces which in some way, by virtue of the purpose and energy which constitute the internal meaning of the idea, rise over the threshold of consciousness. "This passing moment of consciousness" is "the fragment of our will," whereas "the world in its entirety is the embodiment of our whole will," *ib.*, p. 61. The so-called unity of apperception is to him "as aspect," *ib.*, p. 148, a "fragment," Vol. I, p.

401; Vol. II, p. 270, of a larger unity, which is "the unity of the world," the "unity of ordered series," *ib.*, pp. 70, 292. The rising of present consciousness out of the background of reality is explained by the "recurrent process," *ib.*, p. 297. The characteristics of self-recurrency show how it is that a process which in its entirety is considered as the only reality, as the Absolute, appears in "fragments," or "aspects," or "sensible phenomena," which we call "the empirical self," *ib.*, p. 266, and the "visible world," *ib.*, p. 288. "The ordered series," i.e. the world, is "a unity," because it is "the expression of a single volitional process," *ib.*, p. 86. Hence "the reality is not the world apart from the activity of knowing beings, it is the world of fact *and* the knowledge in one organic whole," *ib.*, p. 102. For "the world acknowledged as beyond is presented to us at every moment as a single whole *within* which the facts are present," *ib.*, p. 86. Time and eternity are thus two aspects of a single process and represent "the twofold view of your nature as a temporal process and as an eternal system of fact," *ib.*, p. 147.

IV. *Criticism*

The attempt to grasp and set forth the system of Professor Royce is by no means an easy task. The peculiar meaning he attaches to words, many of which have a place in the ordinary vocabulary of

daily intercourse, the singular beauty of the style, the lavish wealth of illustration make the work of a critic one of the greatest difficulty. The exposition presented in the preceding pages may not be exhaustive; at least it is complete in the sense that the reader can gather therefrom the salient features of his philosophical theory. The method adopted is to select the fundamental problem, viz. the nature and meaning of the idea. The reader thus has an insight into the mind of Professor Royce, a clear view of his system and an opportunity to estimate its philosophical as well as its practical value.

The classification of the Four Conceptions of Being, with which Professor Royce prefaces his treatise, is vague and unsatisfactory when viewed as a classification and erroneous when studied in detail. He admits that he refers to an extreme form of Realism, but this admission shows that his criticism is not broad, nor scholarly, nor exact. In rejecting Realism as a theory which proclaims Being and Reality to be independent of mind, he fails to distinguish between the human and the divine mind. That the world has Being and Reality independent of our minds is a fact which no elaborate system of Philosophy can destroy. But no one, unless he be a Materialist and an Atheist, admits that the world is independent of the divine mind.

A like criticism holds good for his presentation of Mysticism. To the mystic, in his view, Being

and Reality is what is immediate. But this definition is vague and inaccurate. Mysticism is not a relation of immediacy to any being whatsoever, but to a particular being, viz. God. If Professor Royce's definition were true, the little child at school, who sees for the first time on the black-board the mathematical equation $2 + 2 = 4$, and grasps its immediate truth, would be a mystic. If a friend should call on me and we have a heart-to-heart talk, we could not of necessity be called mystics. Or take another illustration. A crisis comes in a man's life. He faces the issue and plans his course and conduct. Is he a mystic? Moreover an exact and thoughtful writer would not fall into the error of citing without discrimination St. Bernard and the philosophers of the Upanishads as examples of mystics.

A like criticism applies to Professor Royce's description of the Third Conception of Being. The truth of ideas consists in their correspondence with things. The things exist as concrete particular facts. Hence it is not true to say that Being as objective truth is universal. Plato taught archetypical forms or ideas, and the Conceptualists of the Middle Ages held that universals as such were real and existing. Professor Royce evidently is not familiar with the famous controversy as to the nature of universal ideas which played so prominent a part with the Schoolmen. A universal as such is the creation of the mind, its form is logical, yet it has a basis in reality,

because the mind grasps the common nature of individual things. The common nature is denoted by the phrase "ens essentiae," i.e. *essence*, the existence of the particular fact is called "ens existentiae," i.e. *existence*. Professor Royce denies the concept of common nature, yet keeps the distinction in the terms the *what* and the *that* — the *internal meaning* and the *external meaning*, although these terms have a peculiar meaning, because of the peculiar meaning he attaches to the idea. Peter Lombard, Albert the Great, Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas of Aquin, Duns Scotus reflect the development and acme of Scholastic Philosophy, which is justly termed the greatest monument of carefully reasoned thought the world has ever seen. They all taught that a universal idea viewed as a universal was the creation of the mind, but that it had a foundation or basis in existing things inasmuch as the *content* of the universal idea represented the essence of a particular thing conceived as the same in many individuals. Hence it is that, in *Christian Philosophy, God*, ch. iv, I infer the existence of objective truth from the *content* of the idea. It is thus that the reality of the external world enters into the realm of thought, and a discussion conducted on these lines avoids the extreme of Idealism. This concept of the universal also furnishes a sound basis for the distinction between existing and possible things, and in what sense the predicate of reality applies to them.

Thus the Conception of Being as Validity is capable of a true interpretation, and as such can be classed as a Mitigated Realism.

The Synthetic Conception of Being developed by Professor Royce is the basis of his philosophical system. A critical examination of this solution is of primary importance to the student who wishes to grasp the meaning of his contribution to the Philosophy of Religion or to give a true estimate of its value. What gives to the Synthetic Conception its special characteristics is the phrase "the object of the idea." This phrase not only constitutes the Synthetic Conception but gives form and substance to Professor Royce's whole theory. To understand the importance of the phrase it is necessary to analyze the meaning of the words.

Professor Royce defines idea in terms of will: "It is as much a volitional process as an intellectual process." But this doctrine is contrary to the testimony of consciousness. That intellect and will are different is an elemental fact of conscious experience. The intellect is the cognitive form or mode of our conscious life; whereas the will is the source and spring of motive power. The intellect is primarily and essentially receptive; the will on the contrary is effective. A psychologist would be no more justified in combining intellect and will than would be a physiologist in teaching that the afferent and efferent nerves have one and the same function. Moreover these faculties are unequal in

the individual. Thus, e.g., we find a man who has a weak intellect and a strong will, or another who has a strong intellect and a weak will. Intellect and will are called faculties or modes by which our soul-life is manifested. Hence, although distinct from each other, they are not separated in the sense that they are two entities, but coalesce into a unity by virtue of the spiritual principle, viz. the soul, whose modes of activity they are. Only thus can we reconcile the unity of consciousness with the diverse experiential elements of our conscious life.

Professor Royce denies the existence of a substantial soul, and in its place accepts the unity of apperception. Now the unity of apperception is a theory of modern Psychology from the time of Kant to explain the phenomena of intellectual life without having recourse to a soul. But what about the phenomena of willing? Professor Royce sees the difficulty, and to meet it blends together intellect and will by asserting the primacy of will, i.e. by making intellect a process of willing. Thus he broadens the unity of apperception by making it include the phenomena of willing and adds to it as a distinctive characteristic the power of "selection" or of "choice." This solution may be simple and ingenious, but it is not true. An examination of our conscious life does not justify the primacy and domination of the will as explained by Professor Royce. While every act of the will is of necessity accompanied by an act of the intellect in the form of a

motive yet it is not true to say that every act of the intellect necessarily entails an act of the will. Here we have the crucial point in the problem of free-will. Freedom of will demands the distinction of intellect and will. When we say that the will is free, we mean that it has the power of choice, e.g. that when the mind proposes a course of action, the will can choose either to act or not to act, or to act in one way or the other by a selection among the various motives presented. By the power of "selection" Professor Royce understands not the power which the will has to choose among the motives presented by the intellect, for to him intellect and will are one, but the power inherent in the *idea* to select from "the background of consciousness." By way of illustration I would say: make the unity of apperception a volitional process and endow it with the power of selection from the background of consciousness, and you have some conception of Professor Royce's "idea."

The doctrine of the idea, as proposed by Professor Royce, is therefore a pure fiction of the mind and at variance with the elemental facts of conscious experience. Moreover is Professor Royce aware that, in setting forth the doctrine of the idea, he has taken an unprotected position and lies exposed to a merciless crossfire? Let me explain. Professor Royce is a Phenomenal Psychologist, i.e. he teaches a Psychology without a soul. In the present course on the Philosophy of Religion, he

proposes to treat exclusively the Metaphysics of Religion. The fundamental problem of the Metaphysics of Religion is to him the theory of Being. He attempts a restatement of the theory of Being based on the study of the nature of the Idea. Here we have a professed Phenomenal Psychologist writing a treatise on Metaphysical Psychology. The Metaphysics he proposes is a personified idea of a very peculiar structure. The result is that whereas the hypothesis of a soul is simple, natural, justified by and in harmony with the phenomena of conscious experience, the hypothesis of the idea, on the contrary, is a pure creation of a subtle fertile mind and contradictory to the obvious facts of mental life. Probably Professor Royce might reply that he denies the soul by virtue of "the mere theoretical consciousness," and admits in its place the idea by reason of "the more explicitly volitional consciousness," p. 27. This distinction is the reason given for designating the World of Description as other than the World of Appreciation. The distinction may be useful but we do not understand it. The difficulty is to admit a theoretical consciousness distinct from a volitional consciousness when the mind and the will are unified.

If we bear in mind that according to Professor Royce the idea is "a will seeking its own determination," Vol. I, p. 332, we can understand that the "object of the idea" is "the complete content of the

idea's own purpose," *ib.*, p. 329, and as such is the "other" the "beyond," the "goal of life's journey." The object, therefore, is not something in the world around us which is grasped by the mind in a cognitive act, but the object of our will in the sense that it is the purpose and goal of our striving. This meaning naturally follows from his definition of the idea. In criticism I would say that it is true to call the object of the will's striving a purpose or goal. But it is a mistake to restrict the object of the intellect to the purpose of our conscious tendencies. The object of the intellect is a purpose or goal only in case of purposive action. But our intellectual life is cognizant of many objects without thereby viewing them as goals. Speculative or contemplative knowledge as such includes no positive volitional process such as Professor Royce holds to be constitutive of the idea.

Again, if the definition of the idea given by Professor Royce is false, so also is the definition of the object false. Now we have seen by an examination of our conscious experience that the idea is a product of the mind, that the mind and the will are distinct and should not be confounded. Hence, we cannot define idea as "a will seeking to its own determination," *ib.*, p. 332. Nor can we define the object of the idea as the purpose or goal of this tendency.

Finally the error of defining object in terms of purpose is the result of another error, viz. the denial

of immediate perception of the external world, Vol. II, pp. 159-161. Hence in his system external things cannot be the objects of ideas. This is Idealism pure and simple. Now it is certain that we have direct and immediate knowledge of the world around us. Through the senses we are brought into direct cognitive contact with external things. The senses of sight and of touch make us aware of extended and resisting bodies. Hearing, smell and taste furnish sounds, odors and tastes. It is true that sounds, odors and tastes do not exist as such independently of us, that they are the product of the stimuli acting upon the sense-organs. Nevertheless, the stimuli are material and external, and therefore in these sensations the external and material elements are present. Aristotle long ago mentioned this distinction in sense-cognitions. Thus we have immediate perception of the external world. The teaching that sensations are the direct object of the mind was introduced into English Psychology by Locke, and has been ever since the fruitful germ of philosophical error. A logical form which has wrought much confusion in contemporary thought is the Phenomenal Idealism of Sensism. But this very error is the postulate of Professor Royce's theory of Being, for he writes, "Leave out the realm of the past from our conception of the real world, and our empirical universe at this instant would shrivel for us, into a mere collection of almost uninterrupted sensations," Vol. I, p. 403.

The reader is now prepared to form some estimate of the philosophical system set forth by Professor Royce. It may justly be called a synthesis formed from the best elements of modern Idealistic Pantheism merged into one whole. He takes from Kant the unity of apperception and by endowing it with the power of selection makes it not a pure intellectual but an active volitional process. The moral order of Fichte is static, the purpose-tendency of Royce is dynamic. The word *idea* he takes from Hegel, yet interprets it in terms of Schopenhauer's *Will* and of Hartmann's *Striving*, and makes it conscious throughout. By the unity of the "process" he identifies man and the world and God. With Taine and Vacherot he holds that God is the goal, i.e. *Dieu Progrès*, "that far off divine event toward which the whole creation moves," yet differs from them in teaching that the Absolute is not the goal alone, but the goal together with all the machinery of the striving; hence he calls the Absolute a system. With Spinoza he holds that God is the one substance, but differs from him in teaching that consciousness is the sole attribute of that substance, and that material things are only phenomenal "fragments" or "aspects" of the purpose seeking its complete embodiment. By the "dynamo" of ideas, Vol. II, pp. 174-178, he approximates to Leibnitz's "monads" and Fouillée's "idea-forces." He starts from what he considers an experimental basis, i.e. from the facts of

Experimental Psychology, yet views these facts in the light of the Phenomenal Idealism of Sensism, and thus his system is vitiated in the beginning by a preconceived doctrine of Idealism. In the intense introspection and the theory of the Self he shows the influence of the Hindu Pantheism. By teaching that the Absolute is a unity, that in this unity Man, the World and God are unified, that external things are phenomenal fragments or aspects of one great conscious striving process, he seems to hold a Pantheism of Manifestation.

Upon the whole the Gifford Lectures of Professor Royce are a disappointment to many who have read with delight his previous publications, and watched with interest the gradual development of his mind. His beautiful and sympathetic tribute to Scholastic Philosophy, which appeared in the *Boston Transcript* at the death of Pope Leo XIII has endeared him to the great mass of thinkers and writers in this country who look to the Schoolmen for a philosophical solution of the great problems affecting human life and destiny. It seems a pity that Professor Royce has not devoted more time to a careful study of Scholastic Philosophy before he issued these Lectures in their present form. The most interesting feature of his intellectual life is that he has been struggling against a philosophical environment initially created by Locke and Kant and developed in one form or the other by the philosophical writers of the nineteenth century. The

hope was engendered that at the publication of his system, which was in process of formation, he would break from the influence of thinkers whose fundamental principles have been shown to be false. In this sense the lectures are a disappointment. From a literary point of view *The World and the Individual* are inferior to the *Spiritual Aspects of Philosophy*. Viewed as a system they are too vague and abstract and transcendental ever to exert an abiding influence on the development of philosophical thought. Subjected to a rigid analysis the principles therein set forth are at variance with the elementary facts of conscious life and are contradicted by the ordinary language and experience of daily existence.

CHAPTER IV

ABSOLUTE PRAGMATISM AND THE PROBLEM OF CHRISTIANITY

IN a recent work, *The Problem of Christianity*, the Hibbert Lectures 1912-13, Professor Royce makes an attempt to set forth a philosophy of Christianity which is based upon human experience and is in essential harmony with the teaching of philosophical Idealism developed in his Gifford Lectures, *The World and the Individual*. In the Preface he states that these views have been gradually maturing since 1908, when he published *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, and find expression in the Bross Lectures of 1912 on *The Sources of Religious Thought*. As a logical sequence to the preceding chapter it is necessary to criticise his attempt to apply this Idealism to the Problem of Christianity wherein he discusses the Christian Doctrine of Life with the avowed purpose of setting forth the Essence of the Christian Religion.

I. *The Problem of Christianity*

To Professor Royce the Problem of Christianity arises from the relation of Christianity to the mind

of to-day. The question he proposes to discuss is "in what way, if in any, can the modern man consistently be, in creed, a Christian?" The two terms of the comparison are clearly stated — viz. Christianity and the modern man. The means of the comparison are twofold: to state in empirical terms certain aspects of Christian social experience and to defend these aspects in the light of a re-examination of certain fundamental metaphysical ideas. Thus three terms enter into the discussion: the modern man, a metaphysical theory, Christianity.

To Professor Royce the modern man is a postulate and is "one who is supposed to teach what the education of the human race has taught him." "This postulate," he continues, "includes a doctrine that the human race, taken as a whole, has some genuine and significant spiritual unity, so that its life includes a growth in genuine insight," and adds that this doctrine contains "the implication that in light of common insight gradually attained by the whole race, our creed should be tested and, if needs be, revised." The inference drawn from these words is that the teaching of the modern man is true. Yet in fact we inherit the follies as well as the wisdom of the ages. What criterion is here presented to guide me between the truth and error of the past? Or to guide Professor Royce in disagreeing with traditional Christianity? Why should it be taken for granted that a discus-

sion of the Problem of Christianity means the revision of Christianity up to the mental state of the modern man? Does not a suspicion enter the mind that the modern man might be revised up to the teaching of Christianity? The term, modern man, therefore is a fiction. Or it may be a modest way by which Professor Royce designates himself. Yet we are told that the test of a scientific discovery is the consensus of opinion, and that philosophers of to-day "do not agree regarding any one philosophical opinion." Even Professor Royce explains that these volumes are the exclusive result of his own study, that they contain a new interpretation of Christianity, and is at pains to point out how he differs from Hegel, James, Bergson, Professors MacIntosh and Sanday. May not the claim be made that they have inherited the wisdom of the ages? In truth, Professor Royce's doctrine is based on a postulate or assumption which can be maintained only by one who accepts his system of philosophical Idealism.

Professor Royce admits that he faces the study of Christianity from the viewpoint of Metaphysical Idealism and that he applies the spirit of this Idealism to the problems arising from the study. In this Idealism are found no terms as "soul" or "mind." He admits "the self" or person and holds that it is constituted by conscious memory. The active element in the self is the "idea," which is a "volitional process" and is defined as "a plan

of action." The ordinary Pragmatist—i.e. Professor James—is concerned with the direct and immediate effect of the "idea-striving." Professor Royce regards the ultimate purpose or "goal" of the idea and terms himself an "Absolute Pragmatist."

Professor Royce denies immediate perception of the self or other selves. He deprecates the controversy about "percept" and "concept," calls these "sterile," and bases his whole system on a new and integrating cognitive process which he calls *interpretation*—that is, the mediating between two ideas or processes by means of a third. Only by *interpretation* do we know the self, for self is not "a datum," but a life or process containing three elements: past, present and future. *Interpretation* sums up past experience into present experience, sets for us our future task and thus brings us into touch with the real world. The Real World is therefore the *interpretation* of our present experience, namely, Appearance, and the idea of the goal of experience, namely, Reality. By *interpretation* only do we know other selves and things. For they are only "appearances" of reality, "embodiments" of the idea, "signs" with a meaning. The reality, the idea, the meaning are attained by *interpretation*, and our interpretations are "signs" to be further interpreted. Thus experience shows that our life is a realm of signs and is made up of interpretations of signs. Metaphysics generalizes this doctrine and applies it to the world at large.

Hence the world is a process of *interpretation* not in its wholeness at any one moment, but through an infinite series of acts whereby the present progressively interprets the past to the future, thus constituting the temporal order. Thus the universe is one vast cosmic process of humanity moving on to its goal where is attained an all-embracing unity of consciousness. "The absolute, the sole and supreme Reality," is the entire process which is essentially social as made up of many individual selves. The aim and result of the process is the Absolute Self, which Professor Royce calls "the ideal community (common self) of all mankind."

Between the individual self on its way to the goal are various "spiritual communities," that is, common or social selves, through which man has closest relations to the immeasurably vast cosmic process, which is conceived as a process of coherent social evolution. Unity of consciousness constitutes the individual self. In like manner a unity of consciousness — a common consciousness among many individuals — constitutes a community, namely, a common self. This unity of consciousness is based upon a common memory and a common ideal or hope among many individuals. As a social being, man lives in communities. The community has a sort of organic unity, a mind of its own, and behaves like a conscious unit or a "suprasensible being." The notion of the community suggests to Professor Royce a solution of

the philosophical problem of the Many and the One, and also gives occasion to unfold his fundamental religious doctrine of the Two Levels, that is, man the individual and man the community.

Assuming the principle that religion is the product of certain human needs, Professor Royce seeks the origin and teaching of Christianity in Christian experience, not in the individual religious experience of Professor James, but in "that form of social religious experience which, in ideal, the Apostle Paul viewed as the experience of the Church." For religion is essentially social, in Professor Royce's view, because of man's essential relation to the social evolutive process of the cosmos. He holds that the human individual Jesus is not the founder of Christianity and denies that the Problem of Christianity can be solved by views respecting the person of Jesus. For Christianity preaches salvation and salvation cannot come from an individual, but only from loyalty to a community of ideal purpose. Besides, historical evidence as to Christ's teaching is insufficient. "Humanly speaking," Jesus gave "the impetus" to the movement in preaching the Kingdom of Heaven, and humanly speaking this can be explained by "genius." Hence the modern man can be a Christian without holding any definite views about the person of Christ. Nor can the Apostle Paul be considered the founder, for what he taught he learned from the religious experience of the Christian Church. Professor

Royce holds that the Christian community was the human founder of Christianity, but has no hypothesis about the origin of the community through lack of historical evidence. Yet he maintains that we have "priceless information about the essence of Christianity of the Pauline Churches and their actual life." The interpretation of the social religious experience of these churches reveals three ideas most characteristic of primitive Christianity — viz. the Community, the Lost State of the natural man, Atonement and Grace. The discussion of these ideas is Professor Royce's contribution to the Problem of Christianity on the basis of a social study of Christian origins.

II. *The Christian Doctrine of Life*

Professor Royce holds that the Problem of Christianity is the Christian Doctrine of Life. He says that this can be considered in a twofold light; as the product of human evolution and the outcome of a long history, and as the product of the social experience of the Pauline Churches. In the former view it is "the problem of humanity"; in the latter "it has features distinctively Christian." Therefore, he maintains that the doctrine should be analyzed in its relation to the whole lesson of human history and in the light of a philosophical study of this history, in order to know what Christianity is and means in the religious history of the race.

The Christian Doctrine of Life is constituted by the Three Ideas. Professor Royce teaches that these ideas have "a basis in human nature," are "the expressions of universal human needs, independent of Christianity," are "the verifiable results of the higher social religious experience of mankind," "can be estimated and put into practice without presupposing any one view of God or of revelation," and are "religious, for they relate to the salvation of mankind." This aspect is their "human and empirical aspect," for they furnish "a purely human philosophy of loyalty" and yet "are based upon metaphysical truths whose significance is more than human" (Lect. VIII).

To Professor Royce the natural condition of man is a state of social chaos. Man is an animal living in communities. These communities exist in human history in countless different forms and grades "of which the visible and historical Church is one instance." From the communities man derives religion, language, civilization and all his natural powers. Constant tension and conflicts exist between self, his fellows and the social will, which produce consciousness of self: that is, conscience. The standard of the social will, namely, the *law* of St. Paul, is an attempt to bring about social harmony, but in reality creates new and more complex tensions by the application of social discipline. Through this social training our self-will is developed and ideals arise. The more cultivated

the training, the stronger grows the self-will. The evil increases and the burden grows heavier. The individual may obey (conduct), but he inwardly revolts (consciousness of conduct). As culture advances, the revolt (distraction of will) increases; for high social cultivation trains Individualism. Thus the individual is by nature subject to an overwhelming moral burden which springs from the *original sin* of social contentiousness, and is increased by social training and by personal guilt. His natural condition is one of sin, for the sinfulness belongs to the race in its corporate capacity and the social order breeds conscious sinners. No act of his can save him. Escape is not from this type of cultivation — that is, the *law*. Help (salvation, which is winning the true goal of life) must come from a source above his level — that is, the *spirit*, which rescues him and lifts him from his fallen state.

The higher source, whence salvation comes, is, according to Professor Royce, the Community. For communities tend to be organized into more composite communities of still higher grade, of vaster conscious unity. Through the community the individual is most closely related to the world process, shares its spirit and lives its life, a life of ever-increasing conscious unity. Apart from the spirit and life of the community, the individual is viewed as “morally detached” and in “a lost state.” Hence we read that the doctrine of the Community

is "a doctrine about the being, nature and manifestation of God."

Here is unfolded Professor Royce's doctrine about the two levels of human existence: man, the individual, on the level of *the flesh* and *the law*, and man, the community, on the level of the *spirit*. He holds that they are levels of mental human beings and differ as two grades of human life. The individual regards the community as higher, nobler, more powerful, more enduring than himself, and shows this practical faith by devoted loyalty to its interests. He no longer loves according to the *flesh* — that is, as a mere individual loves a mere individual — but according to the *spirit*, and this love is loyalty. To him loyalty becomes the solution of the problem of personal life. The loyal "are, in ideal, essentially kin," in them all is "a spirit essentially one," and as loyalty begets loyalty, the logical development of the loyal spirit is "the rise of the consciousness of the ideal of a universal community of the loyal." Hence the higher of the two levels is essentially, endlessly and divinely above the individual level, and to act as a member of such a community is to win what religion calls salvation. This loyalty, namely, thorough-going devotion to a cause which unites many selves in one, appeals to the individual by fixing attention on a life incomparably vaster than his own, and belongs to no one time, country or people. Hence experience shows that salvation for man lies in the

purely human philosophy of loyalty and loyalty is a religion, for it creates a new type of consciousness — love for the community — and thus effects a spiritual transformation in the individual.

The "Lost State" includes not only the "morally detached" individual — that is, one who has not found his ideal community, but also the individual who, having found it, has lost it by proving false to the ideal — a traitor. Is there any reconciliation between him and his community, his moral world? Not on the part of the traitor; his deed cannot be undone and by it he belongs to the "Hell of the Irrevocable." But atonement can be given the community through heroic deeds performed on his behalf by some faithful servant in whom the very spirit of the community is incarnated. Treason's lost causes have proved to be opportunities for humanity's most triumphant loyalty. It is a human triumph of the creative spirit of humanity that could not undo the treason, but, through skill and ingenuity, effected the heroic act which transformed the meaning of the treason and made the world better by a transfiguration of loss into gain. In illustration, Professor Royce cites the story of Joseph and his brethren, where Joseph is the symbol for the spirit of the family and the result of the atoning act is a more perfect family unity. Through atonement the traitor enters into a saving union with the community, for his act of treason, now trans-

figured, is part of the community life. Hence atonement is the function in which the life of the community culminates. It teaches that in due time loyal love will oppose its atoning deeds to treason's sin. Professor Royce holds that Christianity expressed this teaching in the symbolic form of a report concerning the supernatural work of Christ, and humanity must express it through the devotion, genius, skill, labor of its loyal servants in whom its spirit is incarnated. The teaching and the symbol, he adds, "are two sides of the same life — at once human and divine."

The doctrine of the two levels arising from the study of human experience is, according to Professor Royce, the doctrine out of which the whole of Christianity grows. For Christianity, he tells us, was founded on the idea of a community, whose spirit or life was the spirit or life of its risen Lord, held as a present possession by an ideal common memory of a past event, "the rising of Jesus to the realm of the spirit," and by an ideal common hope of a future event, when, according to the Apostle, "we should rise with him" to the spirit, with love enlivening and completing both memory and hope. This belief, he says, grew out of the Master's teaching about the Kingdom of Heaven. Professor Royce holds that, historically speaking, Christianity never appeared as the religion taught by the Master, but as an interpretation of his teaching, going beyond it, and this was due to the presence

of the founder's spirit. The enlargement of doctrine is shown especially, he says, in the fact that the Master, like other religious leaders in the world's history, emphasized God and our neighbor only. Whereas the Apostle Paul introduced a third being, a corporate Entity, "the Body of Christ," which he claims to be "a new revelation" discovered in his experience of an apostle as the product of the life of the Christian community itself and due to "the spirit of his Lord." To Paul the Church was "the very presence of his Lord," at once "a fact of present experience and a divine creation," hence "a mystery," "whose origin was wholly miraculous." Professor Royce holds that this belief "constitutes a new beginning in the evolution of Christianity." The Master had laid stress on the value of individual life, but St. Paul, as also Professor Royce, holds individuality to be the source of all our sin and woe. Only by ceasing to be a mere individual, through love for the Body of Christ, can one be saved. Thus the neighbor is transfigured as a member of the Beloved Community. We love him not as an individual — this the Master taught, but as a member of this divine community which, in ideal, is one conscious unity of all mankind. The spirit of the "risen Lord," which is the life of the Body, through love becomes our own. Hence love is loyalty and loyalty is Christian faith and Christian faith is grace and grace is the mystery of the incarnation in

another form. Thus salvation comes through loyalty, for loyalty involves "an essentially new type of consciousness" — that is, "the consciousness of one who loves the community as a person."

Professor Royce holds that the Master's teaching concerning the Kingdom of Heaven, which the Apostle presented in a new revelation as the Body of Christ, "developed into the conception which the historic Church formed of its own mission," but says that the true Church is "one endlessly and conscious human spirit, whose life is to be lived on its own level"; hence invisible and still to be created by a process of evolution.

Therefore, according to Professor Royce, an examination into the Christian Doctrine of Life shows (1) how the spirit, the community, the process of salvation, are genuine realities transcending any of their human embodiments; (2) that Christianity is the most effective expression of religious loyalty which the human race has, in its corporate capacity, expressed; (3) that the rock upon which the true and ideal church is built is the doctrine that the community, wherein dwells the divine redeeming spirit, is, through loyalty, the source of salvation.

III. *The Essence of Christianity*

The aim and result of the work under discussion is to point out what is vital in Christianity, so that the modern man may know what to hold and be a

Christian. Professor Royce gives the solution of the problem by way of an illustration. Let us suppose the case of a young, highly educated Greek philosopher who became a convert of the Pauline Church and, after living the life of an earnest Christian, at length dies. He comes to life in our time, is carefully instructed in our art, history, philosophy, and then is brought face to face with Christianity as it now exists. How, asks the Professor, can he, astonished and saddened at the essential changes which have taken place, retain his Christian faith? And answers:

“The one thing he must hold fast is the Pauline Doctrine of the presence of the redeeming divine spirit in the living church. This is the essence of Christianity in the Pauline Churches and in all the subsequent ages of Christian development. Thus he will keep in touch with historical Christianity. His church will neither be the official church nor the sect. His test of the church will be simply this, that it actually unifies all mankind and makes them one in the divine spirit. All else in Paul’s teaching he may come to regard as symbol or as legend. This is in essence the faith of the Apostles” (Lect. XV).

This solution sounds strange coming from such a source. Professor Royce’s volumes are a treatise in religious Social Psychology. A fundamental principle of this Psychology is “that religion springs from our conscious needs” and he expressly states

that "the religious needs of the modern man are different from any ever before experienced and still greater changes will come in the near future" (Vol. I, p. 387). Why not then give the redivivus young Greek a course in religious Social Psychology and prepare him not only to accept a changed Christianity, but to *look with suspicion* upon a Christianity that has not changed? Again Professor Royce teaches that the "person" or "self" is not "a datum," but "a life" or "a process" and applies the description to the individual self, the social self and the absolute self, of which the world-process is the expression. The social or common self — that is, the Community — is the basic idea in his treatise and has a marvelous richness of possible expansion without any limitation or interruption so far as the nature of the common self is concerned. Now both experience and science tell that growth or development is a law of life. On this doctrine of the self, I ask why does Professor Royce think that his young friend should be surprised or that he should regard the Pauline community as "a datum" or a fixture and not as "a life" or "a process"? In the emergency the simple and consistent course for the author is, not to forget his own philosophy, but to give a clear exposition of his theory of knowledge and of metaphysical idealism to his perplexed friend. Moreover, Professor Royce holds that interpretation is the ruling category of mental life and of the

world-process, and that it is of the nature of interpretation to create something new. Hence our mental life, our code of morality, everything about us, change at each succeeding moment, as also does the conscious time-stream change. He applies this principle to the Pauline community and says that this being, the Body of Christ, first discovered the three ideas constituting the Christian Doctrine of Life in the effort to interpret the Master's teaching, that these ideas were a "new revelation" and "a new beginning in the evolution of Christianity," and that, furthermore, the dogmas of the Trinity and of the Incarnation were only symbols whereby the Pauline consciousness attempted to set forth the relations between the Absolute, the Spirit of the Pauline community, and the human founder Jesus. Now the young man should be aware of this. The reader will be forced to conclude that the Greek was totally ignorant both of Professor Royce's philosophy and of the evolutive life of the Pauline Churches as he has described this life.

In presenting a symbolic interpretation of Christianity, Professor Royce is influenced by his theory of knowledge, which exhibits the "idea" as a conscious idea striving and by his metaphysical Idealism which considers the universe as an ideal evolution of an endlessly creative and conscious human spirit. This evolutive spirit he calls the Universal or the Beloved Community, namely,

the whole common consciousness of mankind. This is the one reality; all else are figures or symbols — partial embodiments of the reality. Hence God is a symbol for the community as a whole. The historical Church is a partial embodiment and the ideal Church is another name for the community. The ideas making up the Christian doctrine of Life, the parables of Jesus, the dogmas of the Church are symbols of the evolution process in whole or in part. The human individual Jesus is the incarnation of the Spirit or life of humanity, just as the Christian Church is the incarnation of the Spirit of Jesus, and as we ourselves are the incarnations of humanity's spirit or life, when, through loyalty, we become one with this life or, through heroic deeds, we atone for humanity's wrongs. Hence Professor Royce questions the historical truth of the Gospels and holds that the life of Jesus was "the object of many legendary reports so framed that they include a symbolism whereby a portion of the *true faith* is expressed."

This explanation is not new. He proposes for our acceptance the mythical theory of Strauss written not as a historian nor as a theologian, but as a disciple of Hegel's Idealism. Strauss viewed the Hegelian process in its subjective aspect, sought the basic truths of Christianity in the early Christian consciousness, regarded Christ of the New Testament as the outcome of this consciousness and held that legendary reports and embellish-

ments were merely symbols for spiritual ideas. But the theory was too fanciful, could not withstand the comparison of the truthful matter-of-fact character of the New Testament writings with the Apocrypha and was rejected by scholars. In *Old and New Faith*, 1870, Strauss confessed to disappointment at the outcome of his labors.

IV. *Criticism*

Professor Royce writes that he has "approached this study not as a historian, nor as a theologian, but as a philosopher." Therefore the criticism regards him as a philosopher only.

To him the *community* is the fundamental notion in the religious history of the race and in Christianity. The *community* is the *common self* and, he says, is constituted by a common consciousness. Thus the definition of the *community* is based upon the definition of the *self*. He holds that the *self* is constituted by conscious memory. Hence the individual is a *self* because he possesses a present unity of conscious memory ideally extended to the future. But the teaching that consciousness constitutes the *self* is an error in philosophy coming down from Locke and Kant. Conscious memory *makes me aware of* my personal identity and *presupposes* it. Memory or loss of memory does not change *me* or what *I* did. Forgetfulness, aphasia, dementia, delirium, sleep, do not change the per-

son or *self*, but produce different *states* of the same *self*. Hence a distinction should be made between *self* and the *states* of the *self*. Hence the notion of Professor Royce's *community* is radically erroneous.

Again, in describing the natural state of man, he adopts the teaching of Hobbes and Spencer. But in fact this teaching is only a *philosophical theory* and *not proved*. Rousseau and his followers hold the peaceful state of the natural man. This opinion is a *philosophical theory* also, and *not proved*. Therefore upon a philosophical theory not proved and not universally accepted by anthropologists he bases his doctrine of the origin of the *community*. What becomes of his criterion that the consensus of opinion is necessary for a scientific hypothesis?

From the notion of the *community* springs Professor Royce's doctrine of the Two *Levels*, which he claims to be the fundamental principle in religious history and in Christianity. Now in fact the careful reader distinguishes *three* levels — viz. the *individual*, the *community actually existing*, and the *ideal community*, namely, of ideal purpose. He draws on some current sociological psychology to show that actual communities have a mental and ethical unity of their own which makes them appear to the individual as "Suprapersonal beings." He leaves the reader to imply that all this applies to *ideal* communities. But this implication is not at all clear. True, actual communities

may not be made up of soul-mates or affinities, but they have a moral unity, or, to use the author's thought, a unity constituted by the spirit. Why then could not the individual find "his fulfilment and moral destiny" in devoted loyalty to actual communities? Furthermore, this current sociological psychology is based on the definition of the *self*, which was shown to be erroneous, and regards man as an animal progressively evolving a human nature — another philosophical theory not by any means proved.

The fundamental error of Professor Royce is his teaching concerning the nature of man and of mental life. In denying immediate perception he falls into Phenomenal Idealism which develops into a Metaphysical Idealism where *idea*, *spirit*, *humanity* are regarded as the only realities. But as a matter of fact these are only *personifications*. He does not seem to be aware that notion, judgment and reasoning are fundamental elements in our mental life. Finally he defines the "idea" in terms of will. But this is contrary to the testimony of consciousness. That intellect and will are different is an elemental fact of conscious experience. The intellect is the cognitive mode or form of our conscious life; whereas the will is the source of motive power. A psychologist would be no more justified in combining intellect and will than would be a physiologist in blending the afferent and efferent nerves in one act. Moreover, these faculties are unequal in the

individual. Intellect and will are called modes in which our soul-life is manifested. Hence, though distinct from each other, they are not separated in the sense that they are two entities, but unite in a unity by virtue of the spiritual principle — viz. the soul, whose modes of activity they are.

Thus the most noteworthy publication of the year on the philosophy of religion, carefully constructed and written in beautiful language with a wealth of illustration, is, in the last analysis, based upon an erroneous definition of the "idea" — the most fundamental and apparently the simplest element in mental life.

CHAPTER V

PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM

THE term Humanism is used by Professor Schiller to designate a movement which he proclaims to be a reform and an advance in Philosophy. This reform, he assures us, is made necessary by the collapse of current metaphysical systems and by the great progress in Physical Science. That the call for reform and reconstruction in Philosophy is urgent, no candid student of modern thought can deny. The truth of the reasons alleged is likewise patent to the ordinary mind. But the reform proposed demands attention. This is the purpose of the present study, viz. to show that the philosophy outlined by Professor Schiller is vitiated throughout by a method which, far from proving to be the harbinger of peace and reconciliation, tends directly to increase the warring confusion of contemporary philosophic thought.

I. Notion of Humanism

The term, Humanism, as employed by Professor Schiller, does not directly designate a philosophical

system; it rather is restricted to express an attitude of mind and a resultant method which tends by ever-increasing application to construct a system. Professor Schiller says that it is "in itself the simplest of philosophic standpoints, viz. the perception that the philosophic problem conceives human beings striving to comprehend a world of human experience by the resources of human minds" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 12), that "man's complete satisfaction shall be the conclusion Philosophy must aim at" (*ib.*, p. 13). Thus its starting point, its subject-matter, its aim is man or what is human, and by human is understood "human experience." The world is known only and in so far as it enters into and is colored by this "human experience." On these grounds Humanism is and has been rightly called Personal Idealism.

In manipulating this world of experience Humanism accepts and applies the Pragmatic method. Its central principle therefore is "the purposiveness of human thought and the teleological character of its methods" (*Humanism*, Pref., p. xiii). Hence it turns from beginnings with their first principles and self-evident truths and looks to the end singly and alone. The purpose of the act alone is and can be the test and gauge of its worth. Pragmatism restricts this method to the theory of knowledge; whereas Humanism extends it to every phase and feature of human life. Thus "Pragmatism will seem a special application of Humanism to the

theory of knowledge," and Humanism involves "the expansion of Pragmatism." Hence Humanism is "more universal" as possessing "a method applicable universally, to ethics, to æsthetics, to metaphysics, to theology, to every concern of man, as well as to the theory of knowledge" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 16). In this light Pragmatism is "the forerunner and vice-regent" of Humanism (*Humanism*, Pref., p. xix), or "an aspect of our Humanism" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 437).

Pragmatism, therefore, is concerned directly with human thought, Humanism with human life in every form and under every aspect. But if we bear in mind that with Pragmatism and Humanism alike thought is experiencing, and experiencing is conduct or life, any real difference fades away. Hence Pragmatism and Humanism are terms designating the same thing, e.g. human experience, considered under different viewpoints. Pragmatism sets forth a method of thought; Humanism accepts this method, but lays special stress on its contents. From these contents our thought takes human form and color. Humanism, writes Professor Schiller, "insists on *leaving in* the whole rich luxuriance of individual minds, instead of compressing them all into a single type of 'mind' feigned to be one and immutable" (*ib.*, p. 13).

The constituent element in Humanism, therefore, is a psychological method. This it has in common with Pragmatism. In essence this method is: *all*

mental life is purposive (*ib.*, p. 10). Hence mental life is described in voluntarist terms, i.e. in terms of will (*ib.*, p. 128). As a method Humanism is defined "as a conscious application of a teleological psychology, which implies, ultimately, a voluntaristic metaphysic" (*ib.*, p. 12). Professor Schiller, however, is reluctant to consider Humanism a metaphysic. Neither Pragmatism nor Humanism, he says, "necessitates a metaphysic; both are methods" (*ib.*, p. 16). Yet he admits that "if we have the courage and persistence in thinking to the end, we should arrive at Voluntarism" and that "Pragmatism may, somewhat definitely, point to a metaphysic" (*ib.*, p. 11). The reasons for his reluctance are that "we may stop" without thinking to the end, but this would be at the cost of courage or consistency; and that "metaphysics is the science of the final synthesis of *all* the data of our experience. But *de facto* these data are insufficient and individual" (*ib.*, p. 17). This only shows that Humanism is not a metaphysical system perfected in every detail. Hence in its basic principle, in its working and in its structure, Humanism is essentially a metaphysic. Professor Schiller is aware of this truth, for he writes that "though Pragmatism and Humanism are only methods in themselves, it should not be forgotten that methods may be turned into metaphysics by accepting them as ultimate" (*ib.*, p. 19); that "methods may have metaphysical affinities," thus, e.g. Prag-

matism is conceived as derivative from "a voluntarist metaphysic," and "Humanism may be affiliated to metaphysical personalism" (*ib.*, p. 19); that "methods may point to metaphysical conclusions," e.g. "Pragmatism may point to the ultimate reality of human activity and freedom, to the plasticity and incompleteness of reality, to the reality of the world-process in time," and "Humanism, in addition, may point to the personality of whatever cosmic principle we can postulate as ultimate and to its kinship and sympathy with man" (*ib.*, p. 19).

The character of this Voluntarist Metaphysic is revealed through an analysis of its basic principle, viz. all mental life is purposive. This principle must be regarded not in the abstract but in the concrete. Thinking therefore is willing, and willing on and in the contents of experience is conduct or conduct in the making. In this light Humanism is essentially a philosophy of human life. It aims at man's complete satisfaction, and by satisfaction is understood harmony. Hence it "takes as the sole essential problem of philosophy the harmonizing of a life" (*ib.*, p. 227) through "the all-pervading purposiveness of human conduct" (*ib.*, p. 128) and reinstates "conduct as the all-controlling influence in every department of life" (*Humanism*, p. 4).

In the light of such a teleological psychology, decisive weight is given "to the conceptions of Purpose and End," i.e. "the purposiveness of

all our actual thinking and the relation of all our actual realities to the ends of our practical life." Now such a metaphysic is essentially ethical. It means "the sway of human valuations on every region of our experience." Hence Logic and Metaphysics are subordinated to Ethics and "thus rejuvenated." "The ethical conception of *Good* assumes supreme authority over the logical conception of *True* and the metaphysical conception of *Real*." "Our apprehension of the *Real*, our comprehension of the *True*, is always effected by beings who are aiming at the attainment of some *Good*, and choose between rival claimants to reality and truth according to the services they render" (*ib.*, p. 8). "Neither the question of *Fact*, therefore, nor the question of *knowledge* can be raised without raising also the question of *Value*. Our "'Facts' when analyzed turn out to be 'Values,' and the conception of 'Value' therefore becomes more ultimate than that of 'Fact.' Our valuations thus pervade our whole experience, and affect whatever 'fact,' whatever 'knowledge' we consent to recognize." Hence as "there is no *knowing* without *valuing*" and as "knowledge is a form of *value*, or, in other words, a factor in a *Good*," "the foundations of metaphysics have actually been found to lie in ethics" (*ib.*, p. 10).

Humanism, therefore, may be described as a Personal Idealism conceived as a Metaphysical Voluntarist Ethics. To Professor Schiller such a

metaphysic is "an ideal, the theory of a perfect life" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 21).

II. *A Personal Idealism*

The starting point and subject-matter of Humanism is "Experience." For this reason it claims to be an Empiricism (*Humanism*, p. 229). But its use of the term "Experience" does not imply that things exist in themselves apart from our knowing. This Professor Schiller expressly denies. He holds that "before there can be a real for us at all, the Real must be *knowable*," that "the true formulation therefore of the ultimate question of metaphysics must become *what can I know as real*," and that "hence Ontology, the theory of Reality, comes to be conditioned by Epistemology, the theory of Knowledge" (*ib.*, p. 9). Hence reality is what is "known as" and "in so far as known as." For "the fact we start from, and must continue to start from, is *not* a 'reality' which is 'independent' but one which is *experienced*"; and hence reality "is never extra-mental" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 482).

Humanism is, therefore, not a Real but an Ideal Phenomenalism. Fact is not independent, but dependent and relative to our knowing (*ib.*, p. 181). Professor Schiller distinguishes two meanings of "fact." "In the wider sense everything is 'fact' *qua* experienced, including imaginings,

illusions, errors, hallucinations." "In the stricter sense facts are products of this experience obtained by processes of selection and valuation" initiated and controlled "by interests, desires and emotions" and therefore "immensely arbitrary" (*ib.*, pp. 186, 187, 188). Hence he speaks of "the individual variations as to the acceptance of fact," says that "our neglect of facts really tends to make them unreal" and that "without a process of selection by us, there are no real facts for us" (*ib.*). In this sense he writes "facts are far from being rigid, irresistible, triumphant forces of nature; rather they are artificial products of our selection, of our interests, of our hopes, of our fears. The shape they assume depends on our point of view, their meaning on our purpose, their value on the use we put them to; nay, perhaps, their very reality on our willingness to accept them" (*ib.*, p. 371). The distinctions of "fact," "truth," "reality" are distinctions made within experience. The "objective" is "that which he aims at and from" (*ib.*, p. 189), likewise within experience. Hence the starting point, the data, the aim, the results of the process are all based on and within experience.

Thus "in the end our world is human experience" (*Humanism*, p. 346). A world which we neither did nor could experience would not be one which we need argue or trouble about. This is the doctrine of Personal Idealism and leads directly to Solipsism. Indeed Professor Schiller

says that "Solipsism is intellectually quite an entertaining doctrine, and not *logically* untenable; it is only practically uncomfortable" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 472). Therefore whereas "the fundamental dictum of Idealism must be formulated as being that *Reality is 'my' experience*" (*ib.*, p. 469), still it "is not pragmatically workable and must be expanded and subjected to a modification which amounts to a correction" (*ib.*, p. 470). Thus he speaks of "reality largely 'ejected' or extruded from my very consciousness and endowed with an 'independent' existence or 'transcendent' reality" and of "the fact that we refused to accept as *ours* the whole of our experience" (*ib.*, p. 470).

Again the basic principle of Humanism is the famous saying of Pythagoras that "man is the measure of all things." Professor Schiller accepts it in the individual and in the generic sense, including man and men. He holds that the principle is "most important" because "it emphasizes the subjective factor," that "whatever appear to each, that really *is* to him and also to *others* in so far as they have to deal with him and his ideas," that "reality is for us relative to our faculties," that "truth is a valuation" hence "subjective judgments vary in value and a selection of the more valuable and serviceable is made." These judgments of the individual, or "subjective truth," are ratified by other men, i.e. by society, and this ratification or social selection constitutes "ob-

jective truth." Hence arise "growing bodies of objective truth shared and agreed upon by practically all" (*ib.*, pp. 33-35).

This teaching Professor Schiller expresses more clearly in what he terms Idealistic Experientialism, "a clumsy phrase," he says, used "to designate the view that 'the world' is primarily 'my experience,' *plus* (secondarily) the supplementings of that experience which its nature renders it necessary to assume, such as e.g. other persons and a 'real' material world" (*Humanism*, p. 366). Thus "the world, in which we suppose ourselves to be, is, and always remains, relative to the experience which we seek to interpret by it, and if that experience were to change, so necessarily would our 'real' world. Its reality was guaranteed to it, so long as it did its work and explained our experience; it is abrogated so soon as it ceases to do so" (*ib.*). Thus "in dreams we pass into a new world; we wake in a more 'real' world, in the *ex post facto* judgment of which the dream-world is fleeting chaotic and unmanageable" (*ib.*). But "the philosophic critic cannot presume the theoretical correctness of our ordinary judgment. To him all modes of experience are, in the first instance, real. He can find no standing-ground outside experience whence to judge it" (*ib.*, p. 367). Hence "all our distinctions between the 'real' and the 'unreal' are *intrinsic*: it is the dream-world's character itself that leads us to condemn it" (*ib.*, p. 367) as

not being "a *real explanation*" of our world (*ib.*, p. 195). Yet "if in our dreams we found ourselves transported into worlds more coherent, more intelligible, more delightful than that of daily life, should we not gladly attribute to them a superior reality?" (*ib.*, p. 367). Hence "if the whole world be experience, *new worlds* may be found by psychical transformation, as probably and as validly as by physical transportation" (*ib.*, p. 368).

But Professor Schiller is somewhat sane, even though inconsistent, and he comes down from the airy flight to earth, if such a thing really exists for the Pragmatist or is merely a supposition for convenience' sake, by "appealing to the great social convention whereby we postulate (for practical purposes) a common world which is experienced by us all. Even during life that convention is maintained only at the cost of excluding from reality all such experiences as are personal, or divergent, or incapable of forming a basis for common action. At death it breaks down altogether, and the long-suppressed divergence between the world of 'my' experience and the 'objective' world, which is nobody's experience but is supposed to account for everybody's, dominates the situation" (*ib.*, p. 371). Does not this mean that Humanism leads directly to a Solipsism of the most fanciful kind, that the Humanist avoids the consequences during life by the "supposition" of a "social convention," and that at death he becomes a solipsist pure and

simple? If Humanism be a "philosophy of life" for "practical purposes," why can it not work its way along on its own principles without making "artificial" and "contradictory" suppositions to avoid a breakdown? The assumption of "a common world" is "a convention" maintained only at the cost of "excluding from 'reality' all that is personal," yet the essential contention with Humanism is "*leaving in* the whole rich luxuriance of individual minds . . . the psychological wealth of every human mind and the complexities of its interests, emotions, volitions, aspirations" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 13). Here also it may be asked how the Humanist can postulate on "external world" of "other men" or "society" or a "social convention" without having a previous knowledge of them and how does he obtain this knowledge?

Finally Professor Schiller tells us that "Psychology is a *descriptive* science, whose aim is the description of mental processes as such," that it embraces "the whole realm of direct experience," that "it recognizes a *psychological side to everything that can be known*, inasmuch as everything known to exist must be connected with our experience, and known by a psychical process. In so far as any real is known, a process of experiencing is involved in it, and this process appertains to the science of Psychology. Thus all physical objects and questions become psychological, so soon as we

ask how they can be experienced" (*ib.*, p. 75). This teaching he pushes to logical conclusion and proposes "Hylozoism or (better) Panpsychism" as "at bottom merely forms of Humanism, — attempts to make the human and the cosmic more akin, and to bring them closer to us, that we may act upon them more successfully" (*ib.*, p. 443). This teaching is amazing when we reflect that it rests upon confounding the ideal representation of a thing in the mind with the thing itself.

III. *Criticism*

The radical defect in Professor Schiller's Humanism is that he exposes a Metaphysics of *reflective* thought. In like manner Professor Dewey gives a Logic of reflective thought. Reflective thought is necessary, but it must always be tested by contact with and application to existing things distinct and separate from ourselves. This test neither Professor Schiller nor Professor Dewey can adopt because their doctrines are based on the Phenomenal Idealism of Sensism. We see Professor Schiller at his desk buried in profound reflective thought. For the time, he forgets the chair in which he sits, the desk before him, the pen and paper. He is not concerned with things as they exist, he is reflecting on their intra-mental representations. His meditation is interrupted at times by facts which "are thrust upon him," "unpleasant novelties," as e.g.

an unwelcome interruption, but though "facts may at times coerce, it is yet more essential to them to be accepted" and hence what was "*de facto*" thrust upon him" "becomes *de jure* willed" (*ib.*, pp. 189-220).

Back again therefore he is in reflective thought. Now "ejections" or "extrusions of reality" from his own "consciousness" take place, which are "endowed with an independent existence or transcendent reality" (*ib.*, p. 470). They pass and he settles down to reflective thought and views them as representations in his experience. He may remember *the fact* that at a time he "refused to accept as his own, the whole of his experience" (*ib.*) and "so postulated an extra mental reality" (*ib.*, p. 471). Now, however, all that is a part of his experience. He is aware that there is a difference between discovering a reality and making a reality, for he writes on the paper "a reality is said to be discovered and not made, when its behavior is such that it is practically inconvenient or impossible to ascribe its reality for us entirely to our subjective activity. . . . To wish a chair (or note-paper) and find one, and to wish for for a chair and make one, are experiences which it is not easy to confuse and which involve very different operations and attitudes on our part. In the one case we have merely to look around and our trusty senses present to us the object of our desire in effortless completion. In the other a

prolonged process of construction is required" (*ib.*, p. 430).

Evidently Professor Schiller has opened his eyes. He now admits that "primary reality may, certainly, in a sense, be called independent of us" (*ib.*, p. 187); that "he may prefer to sacrifice a cherished prejudice rather than to deny e.g. the evidence of his senses" (*ib.*, p. 189); that "the 'correspondence-with-reality' view of truth" is "most plausible and least inadequate in its *sensationalistic* form, as referring thoughts to the test of perceptions" and "indeed, it is plainly descriptive of processes which actually occur in our knowing" (*ib.*, p. 177); that "in ordinary life we deal directly with an 'external world' perceived through the senses; in science, with the same a little less directly; in either case, our hypotheses appeal to some overt visible and palpable fact, by the observation of which they are adequately verified" (*ib.*, p. 362); that "the actual limitation of our power to produce movements to bodies directly touched by our organism is wholly empirical" (*ib.*, p. 380); that "among the major difficulties of Absolutism" is "what may be called the *imperiousness* and *mutual exclusiveness* of minds, which seem capable of communicating with each other only by elaborate codes of signalling and the employment of material machinery" (*ib.*, p. 266); that "the laws of nature, however they may be thought to originate, are *de facto* the established habits of

things, and their constancy is an empirical fact of observation" (*ib.*, p. 409).

Now Professor Schiller closes his eyes and in reflective thought beholds "the flux of human reality" through experience. He distinguishes facts forming "coherent systems of interpretation," which he calls "facts of science" (*ib.*, p. 370) from other facts which he calls "crude facts" (*ib.*) or "sheer, brute uncomprehended" facts (*ib.*, p. 414). He does not ask why they cannot be interpreted or how they came into experience, for "Pragmatism is *not* laying stress on their origin" (*ib.*, p. 245). In fact he ascribes "novelties in experience" as due to "a providential interposition" or as an "accidental variation." "Metaphysically these explanations are equivalents" (*ib.*, p. 244). But why resort to Metaphysics when by opening his eyes he can see how things enter into experience and can understand that things unexplained in nature are also unexplained in experience.

Professor Schiller in an acute criticism of Herbert Spencer's "strange see-saw in regarding equilibration now as universal death, now as perfect life" accuses Spencer of speaking "with a double voice throughout" (*Humanism*, p. 219). But this is the great fault with Professor Schiller himself. Now he speaks with his eyes open and is dealing directly with things. Now he speaks with his eyes shut and is dealing with the presentations of things as they appear in reflective thought. He

insists on subordinating the former to the latter; and as to the latter, he is not concerned with their origin but only with the devices which will cause them to coalesce into a harmonious unity of a perfect life. He does not seem to be aware that the harmony he tries to establish is not a harmony among "things" but a harmony among "conceptions" "beliefs" and "imaginings."

CHAPTER VI

PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM (*continued*)

WHILE the basis of Humanism is a Personal Idealism, its integrating principle is an ethical Voluntarism.

I. *An Ethical Voluntarism*

Humanism conceives "experience" as active, i.e. as purposive (*Studies in Humanism*, pp. 11, 130). Thus it is distinguished from the Empiricism of Bain and Mill. Its main principle is the "purposiveness of human thought and experience" (*ib.*, p. 230). The purposiveness of human thought reveals its teleological nature (*ib.*, p. 271), i.e. the relation of all our actual experience to the ends of our practical life (*Humanism*, p. 8). Desire and will give the initiative, direction and decisive weight to mental action. Hence thought is expressed in terms of will and is the purposive tendency to an end. This Voluntarism implies "the intrinsic coherence and potential harmony of the whole of experience" (*ib.*, p. 346), and is based on the assumption "that the elements of our experience admit of being harmo-

nized, that the world (i.e. of our experience) is truly a *cosmos*" (*ib.*, p. 349), "not because we have any formal and *a priori* assurance of the fact, but because we desire it to be so and are willing to try whether it cannot become so" (*ib.*, p. 189). Its aim is the harmonizing of our experience through our own efforts until we attain complete satisfaction (*ib.*, p. 200). We start with immediate experience (*ib.*, p. 192) which is plainly not as yet harmonious (*ib.*, p. 193) and by purposive action for subordinated ends realized in and through the time-process, we attain ever-growing and ever-wider control of experience (*ib.*, p. 105).

The conceptions of Purpose and of End, therefore, are dominant factors in experience and "assert the sway of human valuations over every region of our experience" (*ib.*, p. 8). Thus the "Real" is our experience manipulated under the influence of purpose; and the "True" is what is of value for an end (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 152) conceived as the means or the instrument of the manipulation. Hence the distinction rests on the various behavior of things in experience.

Professor Schiller discriminates between "propositions which claim to be true" and "valid truths." The "claims" he conceives as "ambiguous truth" and "may turn out to be true or false" (*ib.*, p. 144). They only become "valid truths" when verified and they are verified by use. Thus "claims" are tested by their *consequences*;

i.e. what follows from their truth for any human interest and especially for the interest with which they are directly concerned, is what establishes their *real* truth and validity (*ib.*, pp. 5, 148, 154). For truth is conceived as human, and "human interest is vital to the existence of truth." Truth is "truth *for man*," i.e. "has a bearing upon some human interest," "its consequences must be consequences *to* some one *for* some purpose"; they must be "*practical*" and "*good*" (*ib.*, p. 5). Hence "the objects of our contemplation when valued as *true* become *facts*" and "*truth* is value in the apprehension of *fact*" (*Humanism*, p. 57). As the valuation depends on reference to an end "the *true* and the *false* are intellectual forms of the *good* and the *bad*" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 154). Thus e.g. "a truth is what is useful in building up a science; a falsehood what is useless or noxious for the same purpose"; "a science is good if it can be used to harmonize our life; if it cannot, it is a pseudo-science or a game" (*ib.*). Moreover "the same predication may be true for me and false for you, if our purposes are different," "success in validating a truth is relative to the purpose with which the truth was claimed," "a truth in the abstract, relative to no purpose is plainly unmeaning" (*ib.*, p. 193), and "we declare an old truth false because we are able to find a new one which more than fills its place." Hence "our truth is not merely being *falsified*, but also being *verified* in one

and the same process; it is corrected only to be improved. And so the Humanist can recognize necessary errors as well as necessary truths, errors which are fruitful of the truths which supersede them." "Our *errors* were *truths* in their day. For they were the most adequate ways we then had of dealing with our experience. They were not, therefore, valueless. Nor were they gratuitous errors. More commonly they were natural or even indispensable stages in the attainment of truth." Truth, therefore, is "flexible" as "adjusting itself to the demands of life" (*ib.*, pp. 211, 212, 213).

But man is a social being and truth is not merely an individual but "to a large extent a social product" therefore "it has to win social recognition." This is effected by "the use-criterion" which selects the individual truth-valuations and constitutes thereby the objective truth which obtains social recognition. Hence "in the fullest sense" "Truth is the useful, efficient, workable, to which our practical experience tends to restrict our truth-valuations" and "social usefulness is an ultimate determinant of truth" (*Humanism*, pp. 52-60; *Studies in Humanism*, pp. 152-153). In this light Professor Schiller conceives Humanism to be "a conscious application to the theory of life of the psychological facts of cognition as they appear to a teleological Voluntarism" (*Humanism*, p. 8).

Now inasmuch as "a theory of life" and its

method of "teleological valuation" are "the special spheres of ethical inquiry," this Voluntarism is essentially ethical. For "our apprehension of the *Real*, our comprehension of the *True*, is always effected by beings who are aiming at the attainment of some *Good* (i.e. an end) and choose between rival claimants to reality and truth according to the services they render." Hence "the ethical conception of the *Good* has supreme authority over the logical conception of the *True* and the metaphysical conception of the *Real*." Therefore just as the question *what is truth*, is dependent on the particular *purpose* and *end*, in like manner "the ultimate question for philosophy becomes — What is reality *for one aiming at knowing what?* 'Real' means real for what *purpose?* to what *end?* in what *use?* in what *context?* in preference to what alternative belief? The answers always come in terms of the will to know which puts the question. This at once yields a simple and beautiful explanation of the different accounts of reality which are given in the various sciences and philosophies. The purpose of the questions being different, so is their purport, and so must be the answers" (*ib.*, pp. 8-10). But as Ethics is the "science which gives an orderly account of the ends of life that are or should be aimed at" it follows "that our ultimate metaphysic must be ethical" (*ib.*, p. 105) or "*quasi ethical*" (*ib.*, p. 13).

II. *The Making of Truth and of Reality*

Voluntarist Metaphysics, therefore, exhibits experience as a purposive evolutive integration. Its essence is "the doctrine that the world is "in process" that "changes" and "novelties occur." The evolutive process is purposive and thus differs from Spencer's which is "physical" and "static" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 226). Its fundamental principle is the assumption that "human action is endowed with real agency and really makes a difference alike to the system of truth and to the world of reality" (*ib.*, pp. 391, 392). Here are set forth the central teachings of its metaphysic, known as "the Making of Truth" and "the Making of Reality."

The evolutive process starts with the uncritical acceptance of whatever seems to be, i.e. with the assumption "whatever is, is real." This is "primary reality" or "appearance," and "at its level, conceived as *purely* cognitive, everything would be, and remain, in an unmeaning, indiscriminated flow." "If we were purely cognitive beings, we should also stop with this." But we are "interested and purposive and desirous of operating and controlling the primary reality" (*ib.*, pp. 220, 221). "The felt unsatisfactiveness of the immediate experience" elicits the purposive action (*Humanism*, pp. 192, 199), for "all actual thinking is impelled by interest" (*ib.*, p. 52) and "purpose may be conceived

as a concentration of interest" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 82). Thus "we are neither disposed nor able to accept our immediate experience as it *appears* to be," but "are compelled to discount it and treat it as an appearance of something ulterior which will supplement its deficiency" (*Humanism*, p. 193).

So we "proceed to distinguish between *appearance* and *reality*, between *primary* and *real* reality" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 221). "The immediate experience," therefore, "is the symbol of a higher reality whereof it partly manifests the nature" (*Humanism*, p. 193). The nature of the purposive action is selective, for "it selects part of the immediate experience as of special interest to be operated on or aimed at" and "is, in fact, a biological function" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 10). Moreover it selects or makes inferences, assumptions, postulates, which function on the selected part of primary reality with a view to control it for the special purpose. If these assumptions do the work, they are called "higher realities." Their reality must be made to depend throughout on their *efficiency* (*Humanism*, p. 199). Professor Schiller tells us that "the realities of ordinary life and science, such as 'the external world' and the existence of other persons are all of this secondary order. They rest upon inferences from our immediate experience which have been found to work." "We then *declare real* the conception which served our purpose,

may more real, because more potent, than the immediate experience for the satisfaction of our desire" (*ib.*, p. 193). Yet he adds "that the immediate experience is after all in a way *more real*, i.e. *more directly real*, than the 'higher realities' which are said to explain it" (*ib.*, p. 195).

These "higher" or "secondary" realities are said to control the "primary" or "immediate" reality, when they "interpret" it (*ib.*, p. 51), "explain," "transfigure" it (*ib.*, p. 195), "transform," "elucidate," "transmutate" it (*ib.*, p. 199), "alter" it (*ib.*, p. 193, note; *Studies in Humanism*, p. 31), by preparing it for "assimilation" (*ib.*, p. 371) through the "conceptual manipulation" (*Humanism*, p. 199), "cognitive elaboration" or "cognitive functioning of experience" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 426). Our actual minds possessing some prior knowledge are conceived as the "starting points" of the process or the "platform" from which we operate on the situation that confronts us. The actual procedure is "inductive, experimental, postulatory, and tentative" which issues in an *act*. "If the consequences are satisfactory, the reasoning employed is deemed to have been *pro tanto good*, the results *right*, the operations performed *valid*, while the conceptions used and the predications made are judged *true*" (*ib.*, pp. 184, 185).

Thus real fact is evolved out of primary fact by a process of selection (*ib.*, p. 187). What we judge

to be *true*, we take to be *real* and accept as *fact*. Hence there is no antithesis of *truth* and *fact*, but reality is conceived as something which grows up in the making of truth, for in the cognitive elaboration of experience the making of truth and the making of reality seem to be *fundamentally* one (*ib.*, p. 426). Hence it is that we regard the false as a "term attached to an earlier phase of the process which has evolved the truth" and "see the new truth continuously growing out of the old, as a more satisfactory way of handling the old problems" and "maintain that our errors were truths in their day" (*ib.*, p. 212), for truth is a valuation as "a successful operation on reality" (*ib.*, p. 118).

In like manner "facts which can be excluded from our lives, which do not interest us, which mean nothing to us, which we cannot use, which are ineffective, which have little bearing on practical life, tend to drop into unreality" (*ib.*, p. 188), for "*real* and *unreal* are really distinctions of value *within experience*, the *unreal* is what may safely be ignored, the *real* what is better to recognize" (*ib.*, p. 480).

As "the predication of truth" is "dependent on relevance to a proximate purpose" and as "what is true and serviceable for one purpose is not necessarily so for another" (*ib.*, p. 156), and as successful predication proves or "reveals" what is real, while unsuccessful predication or "functioning" reveals

what is unreal, it follows that the designations of "true" and "false," of "real" and "unreal" are commonly interchangeable; for "*reality* is reality for us and known by us, just as *truth* is truth for us" (*ib.*, p. 426).

In the process of "conceptual manipulation of experience" not only is the immediate experience "interpreted" and "changed," but "the platform" whence the action starts is conceived as changing, for "it is not anchored to the eternal bottom of the flux of time; it *floats*, and so can move with the times, and be adjusted to the occasion" (*ib.*, p. 190). Thus "the actual situation is a case of interaction, a process of cognition in which the 'subject' and the 'object' determine each the other, and both 'we' and 'the reality' are involved, and, we might add, evolved" (*Humanism*, p. 11, note). Hence "knowledge arises out of pre-existing knowledge" and "the development of mind is a thoroughly *personal* affair" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 186).

As the process is elicited by interests and carried on by purposive selection, Professor Schiller holds that it is intensely "human" (*ib.*, p. 182), "painful and laborious" (*ib.*, p. 222), "immensely arbitrary" (*ib.*, p. 188) and as a result "in general, the world, as it now appears to us, may be regarded as the reflection of our interests in life" (*ib.*, p. 200). Moreover the process is continuous; it "is as unending as the pursuit of happiness" (*ib.*, p. 222) and is conceived as "an integral part of the great

cosmic striving towards satisfaction and harmony and equilibrium" (*Humanism*, p. 188). "*Looking forward* the making of truth is clearly a continuous progressive and cumulative process. For the satisfaction of one cognitive purpose leads on to the formulation of another." "*Looking backwards* the situation is less plain," but we are bound "to conceive, if possible, the whole process as continuous," for "we can never get back to truths so fundamental that they cannot possibly be conceived as having been made. There are no *a priori* truths which are indisputable" (*Studies in Humanism*, pp. 195-197).

Pragmatism therefore expressly teaches that "the beginning of knowledge is wrapped in mystery" and in justification holds that it is not really concerned with the "explanation of the past" but "to know how to act with a view to the future." Yet "there would seem to be no actual end in sight" (*ib.*, p. 198) to the time-process, created by our conceptual functioning, in and through which our individual ends were realized (*Humanism*, pp. 105, 106, 109). The absolutely real does not "already exist"; it is an ideal and "will be that which fulfils our every purpose and which therefore we do not seek to alter but only to maintain" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 321); for it is conceived "as capable of including and harmonizing all the lower realities" and "the struggle to attain a glimpse of such an Ultimate Reality forms the perennial

content of the drama of philosophy" (*Humanism*, p. 194).

Thus Humanism takes "the great thought of Fichte and Hegel that thought and reality, logic and metaphysics belonged together and must not be separated," accepts "the cosmic process as one with the thought process," but corrects the defect of their thought-process by *humanizing* it (*Studies in Humanism*, pp. 422-424). The postulate of purposive selection reveals the correlative basic postulate of the evolutive cosmic or time process, viz. the conception of reality as "plastic, growing, incomplete" (*ib.*, p. 427). True, "we find a world made for us" because "we are the heirs of bygone ages, profiting by their work, and it may be suffering for their folly," but "we can, in part, remake it, and reform a world that has slowly reformed itself" (*ib.*, p. 320). Even "we ourselves are made by a long series of ancestors and these in their turn were inevitably generated by non-human forces — of a purely physical kind" (*ib.*, p. 393). Hence "a really evolving and therefore as yet incomplete reality involves the conception of a determinable indetermination in nature at large" (*ib.*, p. 392). "Previous to our trial" the nature of things "is indeterminate, within limits which it is our business to discover. It grows determinate by our experiments" (*Humanism*, p. 11, note).

Hence "the determinate nature of reality does *not* subsist *outside* or *beyond* the process of knowing

it" (*ib.*). This "universal flux of reality sways the world of ideas" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 205), hence "human truth not absolute, fluid not rigid, chosen not inevitable, born of passion and sprung from desire, incomplete not perfect, fallible not unerrant, absorbed in the attaining of what is not yet achieved, purposive and struggling towards ends" (*ib.*, p. 208). "To what extent," however, "and in what direction the world is plastic and to be moulded by our action, we do not know as yet. We can find out only by the trying" (*Humanism*, p. 12).

To Professor Schiller the assertion that "reality is utterly plastic to our every demand is a travesty of Pragmatism" (*ib.*, p. 11, note), yet he says that as "an obvious methodological principle we must regard the plasticity of fact as adequate for every purpose" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 445). To the objection that "not all the responses are indeterminate," he replies "that it is easy to regard them as having been determined by other experiments" (*Humanism*, p. 12, note), or holds that the principle is methodological not ontological (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 446), or while admitting that "even on the epistemological plane the making of truth seemed to recognize certain limitations," yet "the exact nature of these, being unable to pursue the subject into the depths of metaphysics, we were not able to determine" (*ib.*, p. 426), or "it seems clear that we are *not* the *sole* agents in the world,

and that herein lies the true explanation of those aspects of the world, which we, the present agents, i.e. our empirical selves, cannot claim to have made. There is no reason to conceive these features as original and rigid. Why should we not conceive them as having been made by processes analogous to those whereby we ourselves make reality and watch its making" (*ib.*, p. 446). As a consistent Idealist how can Professor Schiller recognize "other agents" and "analogous processes"?

Nevertheless, Professor Schiller's principle demands complete plasticity for "a *partial* plasticity would be nugatory and unworkable" (*ib.*, p. 445). In confirmation he appeals to human freedom. Freedom is a postulate of the Humanist making of reality, and "if human freedom is real, the world is really indeterminate" (*ib.*, p. 411). For "the laws of nature may be regarded as the habits of things, and these habits as behaviors which have grown determinate, and more or less stable, by persistent action, but as still capable of further determinations under the proper manipulation," and "there are no stringent reasons for confining freedom, and the plastic indetermination of habit, on which it rests, to man alone. It may well be a feature which really pervades the universe." Now to the Humanist, freedom is the capacity for change. As to change in the universe Physical Science gives a decided answer. Thus Professor Schiller teaches *actual plasticity* and is compelled to

fall back on a *hope* in a *latent plasticity* (*ib.*, pp. 446-448).

Though expounding a metaphysical theory Professor Schiller enjoys poking fun at Metaphysics. He shies it, ostensibly on Pragmatic grounds, when brought face to face with a difficulty of his own making. Yet we cordially assent to the statement, "Metaphysics, though adventurous and so hazardous, are not unbecoming or unmanly . . . what alone renders metaphysics offensive and dangerous are the preposterous pretensions sometimes made on their behalf. . . . You must not, therefore, grow fanatical about your metaphysics, but hold them with a candid and constant willingness to revise them, and to evacuate your positions when they become untenable" (*ib.*, pp. 437, 438).

As a matter of fact Humanism recognizes limitations in the making of truth and of reality. Thus Professor Schiller tells us that "we do not make truth out of nothing, of course" and that "our truths were made out of previous truths, and built upon pre-existing knowledge; also that our procedure involved an initial recognition of fact" (*ib.*, p. 186). Here is a difficulty, for "although any particular *fact* can always be conceived as having been *made* by a previous cognitive operation, this latter in its turn will always presuppose a prior basis of fact. Hence, however rightly we may emphasize the fact that *what we call reality* is bound up with our knowing and depends

on our manipulations, there will always seem to be an insuperable paradox in the notion that *reality can, as such and wholly, be engendered by the consequences of our dealing with it.*" Professor Schiller recognizes the difficulty and evades it by "fighting shy of metaphysics," by conceiving on the Pragmatic method "the making as *merely subjective*, as referring only to our *knowledge of reality*, without affecting its actual existence," by an appeal to chaos, by the admission that his method cannot give a solution, by maintaining that the Pragmatic method "is not disposed to regard initial facts or truths as specially important, even if they could be ascertained," by holding that "even though the Pragmatic method implies a truth and a reality which it does not make, yet it does *not* conceive them as valuable" but "only as indicating limits to our explanations, and not as revealing the solid foundations whereon they rest" (*ib.*, pp. 428-435). But to *explain* reality is to *change or make* it, and a *limit to our explanations* is *ipso facto* a *limit to our making*.

Nor can Professor Schiller escape the difficulty by distinguishing between the *knowledge of reality* and its *actual existence*, without giving up the basic principle of his system, for Humanism is essentially an Idealist philosophy, and how can *knowledge* and *reality* be separated in a system whose central principle is that *truth* and *reality* grow up in the

one and same act? It is strange that in explaining the vital teaching of Humanism, he should be compelled to give up what is distinctive in his Humanism.

Again Professor Schiller is forced to make a distinction between "discovering" reality and "making" reality and writes "to wish for a chair and find one, and to wish for a chair and make one, are experiences which it is not easy to confuse" (*ib.*, p. 430). Moreover he assures us that "if the objective making of reality should prove illusory, you can take refuge in the subjective making of reality which the Pragmatic method has quite clearly established" (*ib.*, p. 438) "and so it may be denied that we *make* reality metaphysically, though not that we *make* it epistemologically" (*ib.*, p. 429).

Thus all that Professor Schiller said about *plasticity* and the *purposive evolutive process* was not to be taken seriously after all, and he assures us "that it is quite possible to be a good Pragmatist, without attempting to turn one's method into a metaphysic" (*ib.*, p. 430). But the "making of Reality" is a metaphysic and the real trouble is: the metaphysic *will not work*. As a consistent Pragmatist, on *methodological* grounds, he should discard his system. Furthermore *primary reality* is not made even though Professor Schiller holds that it has a "dubious independence" (*ib.*, p. 201).

Again when Professor Schiller is asked to explain "the *real world* of common sense, in which we find

ourselves, and which we do not seem to have made in any human sense," he realizes that his "theory of knowledge is confronted with something that claims ontological validity," but complains that "it is requested to turn itself into a metaphysic to answer it. This, of course, it may well refuse to do" (*ib.*, p. 200). On pragmatistical grounds he admits that the view of ordinary Realism and of Humanism are "pragmatically valuable truths" (*ib.*, p. 201), yet speaks of "a pragmatically real world" which, "even though it was not made by us" yet "was developed by processes closely analogous to our own procedure" (*ib.*, p. 203). Again we are told that "if we question amiss, nature will not respond and we must try again" (*ib.*, p. 10). But this assumes not that our desires can make a change in things, but that our knowledge is conditioned by the world outside us. Furthermore we read that there is "sheer brute uncomprehended fact" (*ib.*, p. 414), but "uncomprehended fact" is a fact "without meaning and meaning depends on purpose, hence not referred to a purpose and so not changed."

When forced to admit "rigid facts," Professor Schiller seems content to hold that "they are still such that we *want* to alter them" (*ib.*, p. 371), or says that there is no reason in this for abandoning our principle, for as "the principle is methodological, it would *not* affect or undermine the *stability* of fact wherever *that* was needed for our action"

(*ib.*, p. 446). But if a fact "were needed for action" it would be because it came under the influence of a purpose and as purposive selection effects the change in reality, we should in this case have a fact not changed and nevertheless changed, which is an open contradiction.

Finally Professor Schiller admits that the making of truth and reality is "the conceptual manipulation of experience" hence wholly subjective, and even then subject to limitations, for the subjective manipulation of experience is actually tested by reference to the ontologically real, though we are asked to close our eyes to this. Professor Schiller may not have been conscious of the humor in the statement when he wrote that there was "not much harm in metaphysics, provided they are not made compulsory, that no one is compelled to advance into them farther than he likes and that every one perceives their real character, and does not allow them to delude him" (*ib.*, p. 437).

III. *Experience and Experiment*

In setting forth the doctrine that *experience* is *active*, Humanism not only views experience as *purposive experiencing*, it also includes the manner in which the experiencing takes place. From this point of view experience means *experiment*. Thus the evolutive process exists in and is carried on by experimentation on its contents (*Studies in Hu-*

manism, p. 191). We have before us a mental situation which we try to explain. We explain it by experimenting upon it. Hence we make certain assertions suggested by our practical experience in the hope and expectation that they will prove of value in elucidating the situation with the view to fulfil the special purpose. The experiment is initiated by the purposive selection of the *situation* and is carried on by the purposive selection of the *assertions* so as to attain the proposed end. The test of the experiment is the *use-criterion*. If the assertions are *useful* for the proposed end, they are of *value* and in so far *true*. If they are *useless*, they have no value and in so far are false. To find out whether an assertion is true or false, we give it a trial. As we make the selection, make the assertions and make the experimental application, we are said to make their truth if the assertions prove useful, or to make their falsity if they prove useless (*Humanism*, pp. 35, 38, 58; *Studies in Humanism*, p. 212).

Hence "truth is essentially a valuation, a laudatory *label*" given to the experimentation process when successful (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 211). The "success" of the operation is a term "relative to the purpose." "The *same* predication may be *true* for me and *false* for you, if our purposes are different" (*ib.*, p. 193).

Furthermore, "experiments are rarely quite successful," for "we may have had to purchase the

success we attain by the use of artificial abstractions, or even downright fictions, and the uncertainty which this imports into the *truth* of our conclusions will have to be acknowledged" (*ib.*). Here it might be asked, How are these *artificial abstractions* or *fictions* known as such, if they be useful? For Professor Schiller does not admit absolute truth, i.e. "immutable" truth. On the contrary, he holds "as a general principle that (truths), just because they are human, cannot be absolute," but "need correction" (*ib.*, p. 207). Hence "we shall conceive ourselves to have attained, not complete truths," i.e. experimentations so perfect that they are held to be immutable, "but only 'approximations to truth' and 'working hypotheses,' which are at most 'good enough for practical' purposes" and therefore "we shall not have found a *truth* which fully satisfies even our immediate purpose, but shall continue to search for a more complete, precise, and satisfactory result" (*ib.*, pp. 193, 194). And in the search "the Humanist can recognize necessary errors as well as necessary truths, errors, that is, which are fruitful of the truths which supersede them" (*ib.*, p. 202).

Thus truth "grows" with the increase of efficiency in the experiment and with the change or enlargement of the purposes (*ib.*, p. 211). With this growth there is a concomitant growth in knowledge and reality, for "facts are products of our modes of valuation" (*Humanism*, p. 163),

i.e. of the experimentations considered as useful. If "experiments fail, we shall try again with variations in our methods and assumptions" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 194). Hence truth is "variable" (*ib.*, p. 278), "progressive" (*ib.*, p. 276), of "indefinite variety" (*ib.*, p. 277) and "will admit of degrees" (*ib.*, p. 158), because the experimentation is of such a character.

The *use-criterion* is not so clear and simple as it looks. The consequences may be in doubt. Professor Schiller recognizes the difficulty and tries to solve it by saying that it "is not necessary to contemplate absurdities, e.g. the intrusion of ethical or æsthetical motives into the estimation of mathematics." But if "Humanism be a philosophy of life" and there is "a psychological side" to everything known, and Psychology is essentially ethical, so that the "conception of the Good reigns supreme," why should not mathematics be ethical? Again he writes that "these differences already exist and are in no wise created by their being recognized and explained"; or, they "may be settled by enlarging our notions of what constitutes relevant evidence"; or, they may be "composed by an appeal to the supreme purpose which unifies and harmonizes all our ends," i.e. to an "ineffable ideal" of which "in practice we are hardly aware, nor agreed as to what it is." Finally he complains that "the blame, surely, attaches to the distracted state of our thoughts

and not to the pragmatic analysis of truth," for "it would surely be preposterous to expect a mere theory of knowledge to adjudicate upon and settle offhand, by sheer dint of logic, all the disputed questions in all the sciences" (*ib.*, pp. 155-158). The reason of the breakdown is apparent. The use-criterion of an ideal experimentation, in itself alone, is not sufficient to guarantee truth. The whole process must be supplemented and tested by an appeal to the existence and operations of things existing outside and independent of the mind.

The assertions, made with the view to achieve the purpose proposed, Professor Schiller calls "instruments" although he prefers to consider them as "the functioning" of experience. They are "postulates" or "assumptions" "assumed *before* they can be proved" and because "they were desired" (*Humanism*, p. 231) and useful as a means to an end! Hence "first principles" are "mere starting-points, variously, arbitrarily, casually selected, from which we hope and try to advance to something better" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 432). And "necessary truths" mean "needful," for "necessity is always dependent and so hypothetical" (*Humanism*, p. 36). These postulates are "the product of our volitional activity" and an act of "faith" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 357). Thus "we start from the postulates of faith and transmute them slowly into the axioms of reason"

(*ib.*, p. 362), and "all the ultimate assumptions of our knowledge are acts of faith," "the exercise of our *will to believe*" (*Humanism*, p. 153). All that is required is "that they work" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 432). A "really *a priori* truth, i.e. a claim which really preceded all experience, would be as likely to be false as true when it was applied" (*ib.*). It would be abandoned when it had "ceased to be of the slightest possible use" (*ib.*, p. 398), though truths so called "may continue to be serviceable even after they have been discovered to be false" (*ib.*, p. 397). Hence they are true "because and in so long as they work" (*ib.*, p. 264). Self-evidence in no way "is a complete guarantee of truth," but only "seems an accident of our state of mind," for "to none do so many things seem so strongly self-evident as to the insane" (*Humanism*, p. 36). But Professor Schiller forgets to tell why they are called "insane." "No science," therefore, "deals with plain facts or rests on absolutely certain principles. Its *facts* are always relative to its principles, and the principles always really rest on their ability to provide a coherent interpretation of the facts." Thus "all proof is a matter of degree and accumulation, and no science is more than a *coherent system of interpretations*, which, when applied, will work" (*ib.*, p. 386).

Now such doctrines lead inevitably to Scepticism. The breakdown of Humanism is due to its basic principle of Idealism. Shut up within the con-

finer of mental life, the Humanist cannot recognize a reality apart from him by which he can test his mental operations. If at times he appeals to the truths of Physical Science or admits the partial truth of the "correspondence-theory-of-truth," he does so only by acting inconsistently with his idealistic basis.

Then regarding mental life as essentially a purposive tendency to an end which is the offspring of desire, the Humanist is compelled to regard the particular tendency as "a working hypothesis" whose truth is measured by its capacity to achieve the result. In this he confounds truth with falsehood, and does violence to the principles and methods of reason shown in ordinary life as well as in scientific procedure. The truths of life and of science are not simply "working hypotheses," as Professor Schiller would recognize if he should open his eyes and accept the testimony of his "trustworthy senses." We can and do use "working hypotheses" but everyone clearly admits their tentative nature. But Professor Schiller has a method and the method leads him to hold that the "anthropomorphic humanism of our whole treatment of experience is unavoidable and obvious" (*ib.*, p. 13). The fault is with the method and the principles which it postulates or assumes. He is a caustic critic of other philosophers, but forgets that some of his criticisms may be applied to himself, as e.g. "the philosopher is a

very strange being. He is in the world, but not of it, residing mainly in a 'cloud-cuckoodom' of his own invention" (i.e. make), "which seems to have no relation to the actual facts of life, and makes no difference to anything or anybody but the philosopher himself" (*ib.*, pp. 351, 352).

CHAPTER VII

PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM (*concluded*)

WITH the knowledge that Personal Idealism is the basic principle of Humanism, that Ethical Voluntarism is its integrating principle, the reader is prepared for an evaluation of the constituent principle or essence of Humanism, viz. its peculiar doctrine as to mental life.

I. *What We Know*

Humanism teaches that it "may fairly claim to be the philosophic working out of common sense" (*Humanism*, Introd., p. xxi), for it "starts with the unanalyzed conceptions of crude common sense" (*ib.*, p. xxiii), viz. "immediate experience and experienced self" (*ib.*, p. xxii). But in fact the starting points for Humanism and for common sense are not the same; they are widely divergent and Humanism can by no means claim to be the philosophic development of common sense, although it wishes to be regarded as such (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 439). For with Humanism the "immediate experience" does not mean the

act of perceiving external things but the *subject-matter* of our thought. The former is the basis of Common-Sense Realism which holds that things exist apart and independent of us; the latter is the Phenomenal Idealism of Sensism which teaches that we do not deal with *things* but with the *subjective experiences* of things. Thus the Humanist considers not God but belief in God, not things but the conceptions or ideal representations of things.

Humanism uses the terms *object* and *objective* but in a meaning peculiar to its own theory. The word *object* has two meanings: the *subject-matter* we discuss and the *aim* or *purpose*, i.e. the *objective point* of the discussion. The Humanist uses the terms in the latter meaning. Thus "the objective is that which he aims at or from," not that which he considers (*ib.*, p. 189). With Humanism therefore "the external world is the pragmatically efficient part of our total experience, to which the inefficient parts such as dreams, fancies, illusions etc. can, for most purposes be referred" (*ib.*, p. 202). "The realities of ordinary life and science, such as the 'external world' and the existence of other persons" are not existing things grasped immediately by the mind, but are "inferences," "postulates," "assumptions" of our experience to be used "for the satisfaction of our desire" and in their nature are "conceptions" (*Humanism*, p. 193). Hence to the Humanist the distinction between "subjective" and "objective" is "inter-

subjective," for "it is the usefulness of some ideas which leads to their (intersubjective) recognition as true and objectively valid and effectively discriminates them from the vagrant fancies that are regarded as worthless and therefore remains *merely subjective*" (*ib.*, p. 258). Thus "the objectivity of perceptions is essentially *practical* and *useful* and *teleological*" (*ib.*, p. 31). This test of teleological usefulness applies not only to individual but also to social objective truth (*ib.*, p. 55). The "independence" ascribed to certain realities is false as "a metaphysical dogma," for "it does not transcend the cognitive process" and "only means that *in* our experience there are certain features which it is convenient to describe as 'independent' facts, powers, persons etc. by reason of the peculiarities in their behavior" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 461).

Things are as they are *known-as*. Thus the Idealism necessarily implies the relativity of knowledge. "Reality is to each man what appears to him" and furthermore "each man perceives" things in a fashion peculiar to himself. Hence "it is foolish even to inquire whether we perceive the same." Our perceptions are individual and cannot be compared. For "I cannot carry my perception into your soul nor you yours into mine, and so we cannot compare them, nor see how far they are alike or not." And even if I could, "*my* comparing" would not be "the same as *your* comparing them" (*ib.*, p. 317-319). *Sameness* therefore

does not refer to things but to the experience of things, and the question as to *sameness* in experiences is inscrutable and unmeaning" (*Humanism*, p. 31).

By *the same* Professor Schiller does not mean the "indistinguishable," a doctrine which he ascribes to Professor Bradley. To him "logical identity is a postulate" due to selection and assumed for its practical use. "It is a conscious act of purposive thinking, performed in spite of observed differences" and "ultimately one of the devices we have hit upon for dealing with our experience" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 85). For, Professor Schiller writes, "by a divine chance" some human beings were "endowed with the ability to agree and act together in some partial ways," and this common action proved of "great advantage," as that they were "enabled to join together and to form a community in virtue of the communion they had achieved," which would make them "stronger by far than those who did not *perceive the same*," with the result that they would "profit in proportion as they could *perceive the same*" and so "a world of common perception and thought" would "thus gradually grow up" (*ib.*, p. 318). Initially, therefore, the *same* means "a claim that, for our purpose," perceptual "differences may be ignored and the terms treated alike" (*ib.*, p. 85). As a *claim* it may be true or false; if useful, it will be true, and the use is determined by the consequences. Hence

"perceiving the same" is "perceiving in such a way that we can act together" it "is not the cause of the common action, but its effect," "not a starting-point, but a goal, which in some matters we have *almost*, and for some purposes we have *quite* reached," for "we agree about the things which are needed for bare life" (*ib.*, pp. 318, 319) and "this agreement is both difficult, partial and derivative. It is the fruit of much effort and of a long struggle, and not an original endowment" (*Humanism*, p. 31). Thus "the objectivity of our perceptions is essentially *practical* and *useful* and *teleological*," for "sense-perceptions have come to exist as *the same*" (*ib.*), and "logical identity is always made" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 118).

The causes of this lamentable breakdown are *Idealism* and the *purposive character* of thought. When we seek from Professor Schiller for the grounds of his Idealism we are told that Idealism is one of "our fundamental assumptions" "assumed tentatively" on "the pragmatic test" as "to how it works." Should he not, therefore, as a good Pragmatist put it aside? He tells us that the belief in the world theory of ordinary Realism "has indisputably worked and philosophic arguments are impotent against it" (*ib.*, p. 474). On Pragmatic grounds therefore he should be a Realist. But he rejects Realism not as a Pragmatist but as a psychologist for the reason that "the independent reality" "is not after all independent of experience,

but relative to the experience which it serves to harmonize" (*ib.*, p. 474) and, abruptly changing position, proposes an Idealistic Realism not as a starting ground but as a goal, i.e. an ideal towards which the whole conceptual manipulation of experience tends and where complete harmony is found (*ib.*, p. 486).

II. *Thought as Purposive Volition*

The central principle of Pragmatism is "the purposiveness of our thought and the teleological character of its methods" (*Humanism*, Pref., p. xiii). Thought, therefore, is purposive *thinking* for an end of our practical life. Now as Humanism is "a philosophy of life," such an end is always moral, and "every cognition" in "potentially a moral act" as having "a practical purpose and value" (*ib.*, p. 15). Hence thought or *thinking* is conceived "as a mode of conduct, as an integral part of active life" (*ib.*, p. 4). Thus to the Humanist the theory of knowledge is in reality a theory of Ethics.

Again "purpose may be conceived as a concentration of interest" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 82). Hence "interest starts, propels, sustains and guides the *movement* of our thought," "effects the necessary selection among the objects of our attention" and is "the cause of logical coherence" (*Humanism*, p. 54). Thus the end of our thinking depends

on interest, as also do the means we employ. These means are "hypothetical assumptions," "the product of our volitional activity" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 357). Hence "at the very roots of *reason*, we must recognize an element of *faith*." *Faith*, therefore, is "pre-eminently an attitude of will," i.e. a "willing to take upon trust valuable and desirable beliefs, *before* they have been proved *true*, but in the hope that this attitude may promote their *verification*" (*ib.*), "a personal affair, an adventure which originates in individual opinions, in choices" (*ib.*, p. 361). Thus "all the ultimate assumptions of our knowledge rest upon an act of faith," which is "the exercise of our will to believe," as e.g. "the principle of contradiction" (*Humanism*, p. 153), "the existence of God" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 362) and "the principle of causality" (*ib.*, p. 467). This *will-to-believe*, therefore, is "the willingness to take the risks involved and to abide by the results of subsequent experience" and it takes the risks prompted by "emotional interest and practical value" (*Humanism*, p. 5). Our principles are "postulates," our thoughts are "wishes," to be explained by "interest" and "desire" (*ib.*, p. 245), i.e. they "originate as subjective demands" (*ib.*, p. 468). The conception of thought as purposive volition is based upon the assumption that mental life is an evolution in the time-process (*ib.*, ch. vi), i.e. is in a state of Becoming (*Studies in Humanism*, ch. ii).

Although Humanism is adverse to dealing with beginnings Professor Schiller writes that the human mind "initially commences its career in a jumble resembling a chaotic rag-bag" (*ib.*, p. 233). Now the perception of this condition is an act, and how reconcile this with the statement that "the purposive character of mental life generally must influence also our most remotely cognitive activities"? (*Humanism*, p. 8). In fact he says that only two views can be held as to the origin of anything, "a providential interposition" "or we may reluctantly recognize it as an *accidental variation*. Metaphysically these explanations are equivalents." Or maintain "nothing has occurred that was not fully contained in and determined by its antecedents." The former is the view of Humanism (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 244). But how explain purpose in a chance origin from chaos?

In explaining the mental process of Becoming Professor Schiller uses the terms "functioning" and "adaptation." Reason is "like the rest of our equipment, a weapon in the struggle for existence and a means for achieving adaptation." Hence "the use which has developed it, must have stamped itself upon its inmost structure," and "a reason which has not practical value for the purposes of life is a monstrosity, a morbid aberration or failure of development, which natural selection must sooner or later wipe away" (*Humanism*, pp. 7, 8). Furthermore, we are told that "reason

is *not a faculty*. It stands for a group of habits which men (and to some extent some animals) have acquired, and which we find extremely useful, nay necessary, for the successful carrying on of life," and "thinking or judging is one of these habits" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 356).

Hence *thought, thinking, concepts, first principles, judging* are results. Thus "knowledge grows in extent and trustworthiness by successful functioning" (*ib.*, p. 194). Considered in the process, however, *mind* is viewed as a potential unity, i.e. a unity which becomes so (*ib.*, p. 185). The distinction between *subject* and *object* is "teleological and is rooted in feeling" (*ib.*, p. 221). *Soul* also is a potential unity and a result (*ib.*, p. 75) as is also the *self*, for "our true self is not what underlies thought, will and feeling, but what embraces them in a perfect harmony" (*Humanism*, p. 225), and "we are not rounded-off and self-complete souls" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 379), and "conscious persons of a definite kind" are to be regarded "as mere efficient, though imperfect, concentrations of our being upon the practical purposes of normal life" (*ib.*, p. 378). Man himself is an evolutive product, for "we are made by a long series of ancestors, and these in their turn were inevitably generated by non-human forces, of a purely physical kind" (*ib.*, p. 393), and "historically man was a knowing being long before he was an ethical being, . . . both in time and in

urgency, perceptual adaptation to the physical order took precedence over ethical adaptation to the social order" (*Humanism*, p. 348).

Professor Schiller says that "the analysis of psychic process into *thinking*, *willing* and *feeling*, in order to justify the restriction of logic to the first and the exclusion of the two latter is unwarranted" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 98) and holds that "all three faculties are at bottom only labels for describing the activities of what may be called indifferently a unitary personality or a reacting organism" (*ib.*, p. 129).⁷ He rejects soul-substance as useless (*Humanism*, p. 223) and says "the activity is the substance" (*ib.*, p. 225). Now Scholastic Philosophy maintains the soul to be a substantial activity and avoids the confusion of regarding "indifferently a unitary personality or a reacting organism" as the source of this activity.

III. Criticism

In criticism we hold that the basic principle on which rests the Humanist description of mental life, viz. that all thought is purposive, is not true. As a matter of fact all thought is not here and now purposive. The principle of selection, considered by Humanism as so necessary to the purposive operation of thought, is clear proof. For the selective attention picks out some from a more extensive psychical material (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 95). The material selected enters into the

psychic process, the material not selected remains outside the process. It is not an answer to hold that only the elements entering into the process deserve the name of *thought*, whereas the elements remaining outside are not to be called *thought*. That is a quibble with words. The fact is we *know* the elements without and the elements within the process, with this difference that the former are not here and now purposive but may become so, and the latter are here and now purposive but may cease to be so, if they cease to be useless or the purposes change. Hence both are the subject-matter of thought.

This distinction is repeatedly made by Professor Schiller, as e.g. when he says that "differences may be ignored" so we may perceive "the same" (*ib.*, p. 85), that "selection is arbitrary, in that it ignores all the rest of the situation given" (*ib.*, p. 191), that "the worthless elements are neglected" whereas "the useful are kept" (*ib.*, p. 233), that "every logical process is essentially a *selection from* and *valuation of* a more extensive psychical material" (*ib.*, p. 95); or when he speaks of "the subjective" as not in the process and "the objective" as in the process, or of the "real" and the "unreal." How does he describe them unless he know them, and the knowing is an act of thought. He therefore distinctly admits that not all the subject-matter of thought is here and now purposive. But this is the teaching of Scholastic Philosophy,

which holds that all elements of thought are not here and now purposive, and that what is not here and now purposive may become so.

In describing the manner in which the functioning and adaptation of human thought takes place, Humanism makes use of the "working hypothesis." The working of science, it claims, has slowly brought to light the working of thought (*ib.*, p. 64). It is true that the "working hypothesis" is a favorite method of science employed in the effort to explain the nature of physical things. Yet it is essentially tentative, problematic and hypothetical — a pure assumption used only in those cases where no certain or probable indications are given of the fact we wish to explain. Humanism takes this method and employs it exclusively to explain mental life. The purposiveness of mental life shows thought to be a means to an end (*Humanism*, p. 52, n.); the functioning of mental life shows the elements of the thought-process to be tools or instruments in their nature. Thus the judgment is an instrument and functions in an experimental manner. It "refers sooner or later to a concrete situation which it analyzes," and "to be tested, must be acted upon" (*ib.*, pp. 191, 192). Its "actual meaning" lies in use, i.e. "in its adjustment to a particular case" (*ib.*, p. 171), and "its *objective validity* depends on its adaptation to our world" (*ib.*, p. 90). "The concept," likewise, is an instrument by which a "one" controls a "many" (*Studies in Humanism*,

p. 52), "is not unalterable and only relatively constant, being essentially a tool slowly fashioned by a practical intelligence for the mastery of its experience" (*ib.*, p. 64). Universals are formed by "abstracting from the particular nature of the psychological imagery" because "identity of meaning overpowers diversity of imagery" (*ib.*, p. 94) and "all meaning depends on purpose" (*ib.*, p. 9). In actual use they are "all *concrete*, for they are applied to a concrete situation," and are "*always particulars*, i.e. they are applied to a *this* in a *here* and *now*" (*ib.*, pp. 172, 173). These fancies can be reduced to the one source: the purposiveness of human thought. Thus the working of this principle in its idealistic setting gives in the last analysis a false conception of the idea, the most fundamental and apparently the simplest element in mental life.

Such is a brief summary of Humanism. Starting out with the avowed purpose of reforming Philosophy, it leaves upon the mind only a deeper conviction of the necessity of a reform. Based on pure assumptions, its fundamental principle and essentially arbitrary method lead to partial, confusing, often contradicting, and erroneous explanations. A generation ago writers strove in every possible way to eliminate *design* from Philosophy, and in the premature transition from Psychology to Sociology, Ethics was passed over.

Humanism grasps the place and importance of *design* and of Ethics, but goes to the opposite extreme. The reason is that Humanism is an idealistic philosophy of life, dealing only with ideal experience which is to be controlled and adapted by human purposes for human ends. Its logical conclusion therefore is that human purpose sways the world (i.e. of ideal experience) and Ethics reigns supreme. Its characteristic teaching, whence it derives the term Humanism, is that human knowledge is human.

There is an element of truth in this teaching, but it is distorted and exaggerated beyond all bounds by the method employed and the arbitrary assumptions made. It is a common fact of ordinary daily life, and a central truth of Scholastic Psychology, that while the material of thought enters the mind from the outside world through the senses, yet the mind analyzes, compares, arranges, classifies this material and reasons upon it. As a result the material to a certain extent assumes a mental form, but this form is dependent on the external nature of the material for its content and on the native character of mental principles. To the Humanist, ideal experience is real, and the real world of ideal experience is made by mental action. But we are told that to make reality is *not to create* it, that *primal reality* is assumed as *not made*, that the making of reality in fact means the *remaking* of it (i.e. the rearrange-

ment). Again we read that the effort is not to make *objective reality*, but only *subjective*, for the "making of reality" is "the conceptual manipulation of (ideal) experience." Even then this conceptual manipulation meets with obstructions as "independent," "brute" "crude" facts, and all this in spite of the most gratuitous assumptions and arbitrary means employed. Surely as good Pragmatists we should discard a system like Humanism because it does not *work*, and assume on Pragmatic grounds alone the Scholastic Philosophy which sets forth so clearly and so logically the position of Common-Sense Realism.

CHAPTER VIII

PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION

THE Philosophy of Tendency has reached its extreme and most fanciful form in the system outlined by Professor Bergson. Unlike Professor Schiller and in line with Professor Royce he aims directly and expressly at setting forth a metaphysic. His purpose is to show that *Theory of Knowledge* and *Theory of Life* are inseparable, that the clear grasp of this principle "replaces intellect in the general evolution of life," teaches us "how the frames of knowledge have been constructed" and "how we can enlarge and go beyond them," shows us "the formation of the intellect, and thereby the genesis of that matter of which our intellect traces the general configuration" (*Creative Evolution*, Intro., p. xiii). As a result "we cannot and must not accept the relation established by pure intellectualism between the theory of knowledge and the theory of the known, between metaphysics and science" (*ib.*, p. 194). Thus Metaphysics is identified with the theory of knowledge, and like other systems of Pragmatism, though in a form far more radical, the basis and nature of the doctrine is "psychological."

Professor Bergson like Professor Schiller and all true Pragmatists is modest. He "simply desires to define the method," not to construct a complete system. In fact he tells us that such a system "will only be built up by the collective and progressive effort of many thinkers, of many observers also, completing, correcting and improving one another" (*ib.*, p. xiv), that "the metaphysic, if possible, can only be a laborious and even painful effort" (*An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 55), for in building it up we must "invert the habitual direction of the work of thought" (*ib.*, p. 70).

Forewarned, therefore, we may expect to find imperfections, nay even positive errors. In truth, a careful reading shows that his exposition is radically erroneous and needs corrections on vital points, especially Idealism, Evolution, and the theory of Mental Life.

I. *The Fact of Change*

The fundamental problem which Professor Bergson attempts to solve is the meaning of "existence" (*Creative Evolution*, p. 1.). For data he appeals to "experience." Here at the outset he sets forth the doctrine of the twofold experience, i.e. *external* and *internal*, which is the basis of his method and system.

By *external* experience is understood "something *thought*" (*ib.*, p. 9), and it is supposed to include

not merely the data which come from the senses but more especially what we acquire through the intellect. For the intellect "is a special function of the mind essentially turned toward inert matter" (*ib.*, p. 206) and is "formed to act on matter from without," thus presenting "external views only," i.e. "parts external to parts" (*ib.*, p. 250). With intellect must be included "consciousness," not consciousness in the wide acceptance of the word, but its product, "the narrowed" or "distinct consciousness" or "retrospective vision," which "is the natural function of the intellect" and therefore concerned with "the *already made*" (*ib.*, p. 237), i.e. with the "static" or "stable" (*ib.*, p. 163). Thus external experience gives knowledge which is "phenomenal" (*ib.*, p. 360), "relative" (*ib.*, p. 199) or "external and superficial" (*ib.*, p. 1).

By *internal* experience, on the contrary, is understood "something *lived*." "Internal and profound," it furnishes real knowledge. For real knowledge is internal. It means the ability "to grasp from within" (*ib.*, p. 358), and supposes the internality of subject in object (*ib.*, p. 307). Hence internal experience presents a ground which "intellect does not cover" (*ib.*, p. 359). For it is "the most removed from externality and the least penetrated with intellectuality," and "in its depths we feel ourselves most intimately within our own life" (*ib.*, p. 199).

On the basis of this twofold experience Professor Bergson explains the meaning of the word "exist." He looks into his inner life and sees looming up large the great fact of "change." The more deeply he penetrates into the depths of his being, the more profound and radical is the change. The change is not merely from state to state, e.g. warm or cold, merry or sad; a state itself is a change, for there is no feeling, no idea, no volition, which is not undergoing change every moment. Even the perception of a motionless external object changes, for memory conveys something of the past into the present, and so the state I have now is not the same it was a moment before. If a mental state ceased to vary, its duration would cease to flow. Thus the mental state, as it advances on the road of time, is continually swelling with the duration which it accumulates, rolling upon itself as "a snowball on the snow." Hence we change without ceasing, and the state itself is nothing but a change, although "it is expedient to disregard this uninterrupted change, and to notice it only when it becomes sufficient to impress a new attitude on the body, a new direction on the attention. Then, and then only, we find that our state has changed" (*ib.*, p. 2).

Thus inner experience shows to Professor Bergson not only change but also facts of "discontinuity" in the change, e.g. states of consciousness. But this discontinuity, he says, is only apparent

and artificial, and is due to the intellect through interest fixing its attention upon them by a series of separate acts. In reality there is "a gentle slope," not "a broken line," nor "separate steps." The states or incidents are only designs made by the intellect on a continuous background. Each of them is borne by "the fluid mass of our whole psychical existence" and "is only the best illuminated point of a moving zone which comprises all that we feel or think or will — all, in short, that we are at any given moment" (*ib.*, p. 3).

With this notion of personality, Professor Bergson proceeds to reject the idea of personality as a link connecting states of consciousness. The conscious states, he says, appear as "distinct and solid colors"; in truth they are "a flux of fleeting shades merging into each other." They are set up as "independent realities"; in truth they are "artificial cut-outs" or "snapshots" made by the intellect on the "flux." There is no real separation; only an undivided flow. As the intellect separates the states artificially, so it unites them artificially by means of "a formless ego, indifferent and unchangeable." But this "colorless substratum," he adds, perpetually colored by that which covers it, is for us as if it did not exist, for we only perceive "what is colored," i.e. psychic states. It has "no reality" and is "merely a symbol intended to recall unceasingly to our consciousness the artificial character of the process by

which attention places clean-cut states side by side where actually there is a continuity which unfolds." With "an impassive ego" and "separate states," there is no duration, for "an ego which does not change, does not *endure*," and a state which does not change "does not *endure* either." The element of "real time" is eliminated and there is presented "only an artificial imitation of the internal life, a static equivalent, which lends itself to the requirements of logic and language." On the contrary, "the psychical life unfolding beneath the symbols which conceal it, we readily perceive" i.e. *feel* (*ib.*, p. 314).

Hence Professor Bergson concludes that psychic existence "progresses and endures in real time," "time is the stuff out of which it is made" (*ib.*, pp. 4, 240), and "the flux of time is the reality itself" (*ib.*, p. 344). By "time" he means not abstract or mathematical time. This is static, has no real efficacy and therefore "is nothing" (*ib.*, p. 39). But by "time" is understood "real time" or "concrete duration" (*ib.*, p. 4), which is "a kind of force" possessing "real efficacy" (*ib.*, p. 339) or "vital process" (*ib.*, p. 340), "means creation" (*ib.*, p. 343), and reveals its creative power in "a continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and swells as it advances" (*ib.*, p. 4). "The past is preserved by itself, automatically," and "the present is the condensation of the history that we have lived from our

birth," e.g. "*our character*" (*ib.*, p. 5); not by "memory" for "memory is not even properly speaking a faculty" (*ib.*, p. 4). Yet in other passages we read "immediate experience shows us that the very basis of our conscious existence is memory," i.e. "the prolongation of the past into the present, or, in a word, *duration*, acting and irreversible" (*ib.*, p. 17); "wherever anything lives there is open somewhere a register in which time is being inscribed" (*ib.*, p. 16), and "the evolution of the living being, like that of the embryo, implies an appearance, at least, of organic memory" (*ib.*, p. 19). Hence "the past, as a whole is made manifest to us in its impulse, it is felt in the form of tendency, although a small part of it only is known in the form of idea" for "we think with only a small part of our past, but it is with our entire past, including the original bent of our soul, that we desire, will and act" (*ib.*, p. 5).

The creative efficacy of duration is shown especially in our personality. Personality is a growth, "is being built up each instant," so that "each moment of our life is a kind of creation," is "something new, something unforeseeable," and "each of our states being indeed the new form that we are just assuming." Hence "this creation of self by self" is the great fact of our psychic existence. Therefore Professor Bergson concludes that "for a conscious being, to exist is to change, to

change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating ourselves endlessly" (*ib.*, pp. 6, 7).

Professor Bergson applies the same line of reasoning and the same conclusions to existence in general. He tells us that "succession is an undeniable fact even in the material world" where we behold "an unfolding like our own" (*ib.*, p. 9). The living being seems "to share with consciousness the attributes of continuity in change, preservation of the past in the present, real duration" (*ib.*, p. 23). This "duration is immanent to the whole of the universe," for "the whole has a duration, and so a form of existence like our own" (*ib.*, p. 11). Hence "each conscious being taken separately," "the organism which lives," "the universe as a whole" is "a thing that endures" (*ib.*, p. 15). He concludes therefore that "Duration is the foundation of our being, the very substance of the world in which we live" (*ib.*, p. 39).

II. *Change and Permanence*

In the above analysis of our inner life Professor Bergson rightly calls attention to the fact of change, but he errs radically by claiming that change is the only or the fundamental fact. In truth, we are aware of change, and also of another great fact, viz. permanence or personal identity. This fact of permanence is more fundamental than that of change, for without permanence, change is not

possible. We change, a thing changes; in the change there is a subject as well as a predicate. Professor Bergson ignores the subject and personifies the predicate, i.e. duration, yet in so doing he gives a partial and radically erroneous description of our inner life. So deep-seated is this fact of permanence that Professor Bergson is compelled to recognize it when he speaks of memory or duration "as a prolongation of the past into the present" (*ib.*, p. 4) and of the present as "a new state" or "form" which our (past) personality assumes. He may use words as he pleases, yet to him the present is the past personality with a new form.

There is an evident ambiguity in Professor Bergson's doctrine of *change*. At times he uses the terms "Duration," "continuous progress," "continuity of Life" and "Time" (*ib.*, p. 27), as abstract personifications. Again he describes *change* in the concrete, as e.g. when he speaks of the universe or each conscious being or the living organism as a thing that endures (*ib.*, p. 15) or of "the animal" in its most rudimentary form, or of the development of the embryo, as a perpetual change of form (*ib.*, p. 18) or of the "vegetable cell" (*ib.*, p. 108) or when he makes "continuity in change" an attribute of duration (*ib.*, p. 23).

But, as he is treating of concrete duration we must adopt the concrete form of expression and this shows a certain permanence in the change. More-

over the word "Duration" implies both permanence and change. Take e.g. his fundamental principle "to exist is to endure, and to endure is to change." Express this principle in the concrete and we have: "a living being (for here he is dealing with the living being) endures in its existence by developing changes through its process of growth." There is nothing startling in this statement, for we know that growth is a law of life, and as soon as the living being ceases to grow, i.e. to change, it ceases to live. Now to admit permanence even to the least possible degree in addition to change is to deny the fundamental principle of his system.

Again Professor Bergson tells us that "memory is the very basis of our conscious existence" and that it "conveys something of the past into the present." Now applying this *concrete duration* to myself, how can memory convey something of *my* past into *my* present, without supposing *my* permanence or personal identity? If "memory is the basis of *my* conscious existence," personal identity makes memory possible.

Furthermore Professor Bergson speaks of past, present and future as essential to duration, so that duration could not be conceived without them. Yet if we examine "past, present and future" in the concrete, we find that they could not be conceived without an element of permanence in addition to the element of change. Remove the element of permanence and we have only "an in-

stantaneous present"; the very criticism he levels at the systems of science (*ib.*, p. 22).

III. *An Ideal Pantheism*

With Professor Bergson, therefore, Duration is Reality, is the Absolute (*ib.*, p. 206). Thus "the Absolute is revealed very near us, and, in a certain measure, in us" (*ib.*, p. 299). It is "a flow," "a tendency," not a being. This Becoming or Duration "is the very life of things, the fundamental Reality" (*ib.*, p. 317). But Duration apart from permanence is an abstract personification. Hence the basic principle of his system, and which is Reality itself, is an abstraction, i.e. mental.

Now Professor Bergson holds that this fundamental reality is not given all at once, that its evolution presents "a ceaseless upspringing of something new." Under this aspect it is conceived as "action making itself" (*ib.*, p. 245) or "generating form" (*ib.*, p. 239). This creative action "which for want of a better word we have called consciousness," i.e. consciousness in the wide sense of the word as distinguished from "the retrospective vision" of the intellect, is "arrested" or "momentarily interrupted" or "distends." Now "the interruption of a cause being here equivalent to the reversal of the effect" (*ib.*, p. 237), the direction which this reality (i.e. action) takes, suggests the idea of "action unmaking itself," and as such is the prin-

ciple of matter and of extension. Hence the action "making itself" tends in the direction of life and of spirit; the action "unmaking itself" in the direction of materiality and of space (*ib.*, p. 212). Thus matter and spirit are of the same substance, viz. consciousness, and differ only in the fact that they are counter tendencies, i.e. matter is a counter or "inverse" tendency to spirit or life. The interruption or relaxing of the life-current causes it to *congeal* and the *congealed parts* are matter. Professor Bergson assures us that "we are not the vital current itself; we are this current already loaded with matter, that is with congealed parts of its own substance which it carries along its course" (*ib.*, p. 239).

Hence matter in its last analysis is conceived as something negative, i.e. the lack or withdrawal of positive action (*ib.*, p. 209). For illustration Professor Bergson appeals to mental life. "Suppose we let ourselves go and, instead of acting, dream. At once the self is scattered. Our personality thus descends in the direction of space and of extension. . . . Extension admits of degrees. . . . Sensations are the first steps in the direction of the extended. . . . Matter consists in this very movement pushed further." Therefore he concludes that "physics is simply psychics inverted" (*ib.*, pp. 201-202), that "the regression of the extra-spatial degrades itself into spatiality" (*ib.*, p. 207), that, "matter or mind, reality has appeared to us as a

perpetual becoming; it makes itself or it unmakes itself, but it is never something made" (*ib.*, p. 272), that the task of Metaphysics is "to remount the decline that Physics descends, to bring back matter to its origin, and to build up progressively a cosmology which would be, so to speak, a reversed psychology" (*ib.*, p. 208).

Furthermore, just as matter and mind are of the same nature, so are matter and intellect in their turn of the same nature. Matter and intellect belong to the *inverse* tendency (p. 208), for "the movement at the end of which is spatiality lays down along its course the faculty of induction as well as that of deduction, in fact, intellectuality entire" (*ib.*, p. 216). Hence "an identical process must have cut out matter and intellect, at the same time from a stuff that contained both" (*ib.*, p. 199), i.e. mind, or consciousness or life, for "mind overflows intellect" (*ib.*, p. 206). Thus intellect is a product, a "deposit" or "local effect" of the evolution of life, "a flame perhaps accidental," "an emanation" or "an aspect" of life; for it is "a more precise, complex and subtle adaptation of the consciousness of living beings to the conditions of existence that are made for them" (*ib.*, Intro., pp. ix, xiii).

Hence "intellect and matter have progressively adapted themselves one to the other in order to attain a common form" and "this adaptation has been brought about quite naturally, because it is the same inversion of the same movement which

creates at once the intellectuality of mind and the materiality of matter" (*ib.*, p. 206). The purpose of the adaptation is "to secure the perfect fitting of our body to its environment," "to represent the relations of external things among themselves," i.e. to "think matter." Hence "intellect traces the general configuration of matter," "is at home among inanimate objects, more especially among solids," "consequently triumphs in geometry, wherein is revealed the kinship of logical thought with the unorganized matter" (*ib.*, Introduction).

The function of the intellect, therefore, is practical, i.e. "relative or an appendage to action," prompted by interest for practical utility, "a light to our conduct" (*ib.*, p. 29). Yet we are told that "its eyes are ever turned to the rear" (*ib.*, p. 46), probably because it is in the inverse movement. But as "action is on the surface of things" (*ib.*, p. 46), so intellect "grasps the surface of things only" and "is formed to act on matter from without" (*ib.*, p. 250). It "is made to present to us things and states, rather than changes and acts." Yet in reality "there are no things, only actions." "Things and states are only views taken by the mind of becoming." They "result from a solidification performed by our understanding," which takes place "by the instantaneous cut which the understanding practises, at a given moment, on the flux of the real," and so "it is absurd to say that new things can join things already existing".

(*ib.*, pp. 248-249). "The distinct outlines and individuality of objects are the plan of our eventual action reflected as in a mirror. Suppress this action, and the outlines, i.e. main directions, disappear. Hence bodies we perceive are traced or cut out on the stuff of nature by perception" (*ib.*, pp. 11-12). Thus "the subdivision of matter into separate bodies is relative to our perception, while the building up of closed-off systems of material points is relative to science" (*ib.*, p. 12), whereas "matter looked at as an undivided whole is a flux rather than a thing" (*ib.*, p. 186).

Artificial systems are to be distinguished from "natural" or "real systems," e.g. the living body. Into the former enters the notion of *abstract time*, while the natural system "develops along *concrete time*" (*ib.*, p. 21). To the natural systems Professor Bergson refers when he speaks of created things as "manifestations" in which "life is scattered in proportion to its progress" (*ib.*, p. 103) and says that "the permanence of their form is only the outline of a movement" (*ib.*, p. 128).

Moreover we read that "law is a relation" (*ib.*, p. 228) or "a bond between two or more terms, established by the mind" (*ib.*, p. 356) and "no law of a physical world taken separately has objective reality," for "each of them is the work of an investigator who has regarded things from a certain bias, isolated certain variables, applied certain conventional units of measurement." Hence there

is "something artificial in the mathematical form of a physical law and consequently in our scientific knowledge of things" (*ib.*, p. 218).

As the intellect is by nature *static*, so when applied to living things it gives "symbols," i.e. it *translates* or *imitates*, not *transforms* (*ib.*, p. 226). Science merely "works into a new scheme of the whole the instantaneous and motionless views taken at intervals along the continuity of a movement" (*ib.*, p. 32). These systems which it cuts out within the whole "are not *parts* but *partial views* of the whole" (*ib.*, p. 31).

Finally Professor Bergson maintains that "the evolutionist theory, as far as it has any importance for philosophy, consists above all in establishing relations of ideal kinship, and in maintaining that wherever there is this relation of, so to speak, *logical* affiliation between forms, there is also a relation of chronological succession between the species in which these forms are materialized" (*ib.*, p. 25), and that "the whole of the universe is constructed or reconstructed by thought" (*ib.*, p. 15).

We therefore conclude that an examination into the definition of Reality proposed by Professor Bergson shows that his system of Creative Evolution is a Pantheistic Idealism of Manifestation based upon an abstract idea, i.e. duration, as regards existing things, combined with a Logical Idealism of Representation in relation to our in-

tellectual knowledge, whether the knowledge be viewed as that of common sense or of science.

IV. *Reality and Feeling*

The twofold experience, viz. of intellect and of life, gives a twofold knowledge of reality, the one coming from *intellect* and *senses* and expressed in common-sense and in science, the other coming from *living* or *feeling*. Now as "the function of the intellect is to preside over actions" and as "our activity leaps from *act* to *act*, it is necessary that matter should pass from *state* to *state*, for it is only in a state of the material world that action can fit a result, so as to be accomplished." "If matter appeared as a perpetual flowing, we should assign no termination to any of our actions," and in assigning an end to our actions, we do so in order that the idea may become an act, yet the end or idea explicitly is pictured to our mind, whereas "the moments constituting the action itself either elude our consciousness or reach it only confusedly" (*ib.*, pp. 299-300). Accustomed "to think the moving by means of the immovable, the intellect generally refuses to think true duration" (*ib.*), has no direct vision of reality (*ib.*, Intro. p. xiii); its object is what is singled out of reality (*ib.*, p. 46) for "practical interest, and so we cannot see the real evolution, the radical becoming," and "even when we speak of duration and be-

coming, it is of another thing that we are thinking" (*ib.*, p. 273). Thus what the intellect grasps of the real is *static, relative* (*ib.*, p. 198), *mechanical* and *symbolical* (*ib.*, p. 196). For with its eyes turned backwards, the intellect cannot grasp reality in *the making*, but only *as made*, i.e. in the past, and if it grasps real moments of duration and puts these partial static views of the past end to end, it would not give a real reconstruction of the whole, but only an approximation or rather an imitation of the indivisible motor principle (i.e. duration) whence the impetus proceeds (*ib.*, pp. 46, 98, 101, 200). But this is "the natural metaphysic of the human mind," and Professor Bergson warns us that we should be "on our guard against it" (*ib.*, pp. 20, 21), for it is the cause of a twofold illusion, viz. "to suppose we can think of the unstable by means of the stable, the moving by means of the immobile" and "to impart into speculation a procedure made for practice" (*ib.*, p. 277).

To get direct vision of reality, we must go from the experience of intellect to the experience of living, i.e. from *thought* to *feeling* (*ib.*, p. 46). Our intellect, being only a divergent product of life, "a part of the whole," is with its categories of unity, multiplicity, mechanical causality and intelligent finality, too narrow and rigid for the living" (*ib.*, Intro., p. 10). Hence we must "transcend intelligence" (*ib.*, p. 191). In the effort to do so "we must

break with scientific habits which are adapted to the fundamental requirements of thought, we must do violence to the mind, go counter to the natural bent of the intellect. But that is just the function of philosophy" (*ib.*, p. 30). For "the special object of philosophy is to speculate, i.e. to see" (*ib.*, p. 196) "with the spirit," i.e. "that faculty of seeing which is immanent in the faculty of acting" (*ib.*, p. 250) not with matter as intellect and science (*ib.*, p. 196). And as the experience of intellect moves in an opposite direction to that of living (*ib.*, p. 359) the faculty of spirit "springs up somehow by the twisting of the will on itself, when action is turned into knowledge" (*ib.*, p. 250).

Hence we transcend our consciousness, which is partial and retrospective, by making it coincide with something of its principle, i.e. life, or consciousness in the wide sense of the term. It does this by detaching itself from the *already made* and attaching itself to the *being-made*; i.e. "turning back on itself and twisting on itself, the faculty of *seeing* should be made one with the faculty of *willing* — a painful effort which we can make suddenly, doing violence to our nature, but cannot sustain more than a few minutes" (*ib.*, p. 237) and even then "it is an individual and fragmentary will that we grasp." But if "we not only put back our being into our will" but also "our will itself into the impulsion it prolongs, we understand, we feel, that reality is a perpetual growth, a creation pursued

without end" (*ib.*, p. 239). "To movement, then, everything will be restored and into movement everything will be resolved" (*ib.*, p. 250).

Such are the mental gymnastics which philosophy, according to Professor Bergson, must perform to get the vision of reality, in "an effort to dissolve again into the Whole" (*ib.*, p. 191), to attain "that most vast something out of which our understanding is cut" (*ib.*, p. 199). No doubt at all if we attempted bodily gymnastics of the kind we could see "stars" or as Professor Bergson prefers "the fiery path torn by the last rocket in a fire-works display" (*ib.*, p. 257). And he says that "these fleeting intuitions which light up their object only at distant intervals, philosophy ought to seize, first to sustain them, then to expand them and so unite them together" (*ib.*, p. 268), and that "philosophy ought to follow science, in order to superpose on scientific truth a knowledge of another kind, which may be called metaphysical. Thus combined, all our knowledge, both scientific and metaphysical, is heightened," for "it is reality itself, in the profoundest meaning of the word, that we reach by the combined and progressive development of science and philosophy" (*ib.*, p. 199).

CHAPTER IX

PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION (*continued*)

The Theory of Life

IN the Theory of Life is set forth Professor Bergson's characteristic doctrine of Creative Evolution. Our twofold experience reveals two opposite movements in the universe, "descent" and "ascent" (*ib.*, p. 111). The original movement was Duration, which by relaxation of tension *detends* in order to *extend*. This detension is conceived as an inversion of the original movement, and is at bottom a "suppression," or "interruption," or "diminution of positive reality" (*ib.*, p. 210). In illustration of the "detension" movement, he points to "the indivisible active will" relaxing so that we get "the feeling of extension" (*ib.*, p. 207); or he "sympathizes with the inspiration of the poet, follows it with a continuous movement which is, like the inspiration itself, an undivided act; then he relaxes the attention, lets go the tension that is in him, and the sounds, hitherto swallowed up in the sense, appear distinctly, one by one, in their materiality" (*ib.*, p. 209); or "the vision we have of the material world is that of a weight

which falls" (*ib.*, p. 245), or he appeals to a vessel full of steam at a high pressure; the steam thrown into the air is nearly all condensed into little drops which fall back, and this condensation and this fall represent simply the loss of something, an interruption, a deficit; and so "from an immense reservoir of life, jets must be gushing out unceasingly, of which each, falling back, is a world" (*ib.*, p. 247); or he "thinks of an action like that of raising the arm; and then supposes that the arm left to itself falls back" (*ib.*, p. 247). He finds, "in this image of a *creative action which unmakes itself*, a representation of matter" (*ib.*).

But these illustrations are not appropriate. They are valid only if we admit that the forces of attraction or of the living organism exist previous to the movement. The weight and drops of steam fall by virtue of attraction, the will relaxes by distraction or bodily fatigue, the idea of extension comes from our senses. Now he is dealing with Duration, the Absolute Reality, and he expressly bases "physical laws (p. 218), organization and extension on the inverse movement," i.e. the movement of detension. Hence while these are, according to his doctrine, the result of "the creative act unmaking itself," they are brought in deliberately to illustrate the *unmaking action*, and so exist before they are supposed to exist. The Scholastic idea of creation is simplicity and consistency itself compared to this.

I. *Creative Evolution*

However, it is not the original movement of Duration, i.e. prior to its detension, that finds an exclusive place in Professor Bergson's Creative Evolution. He needed the material world, or an explanation of its existence, and so he tells us that the Absolute "let himself go" with the result that the "letting go" is the tendency to materiality. But this "letting go" is not complete; the Absolute comes to himself, and tries to get back. So he completes the illustration given by saying that "a small part of the jet of steam subsists, uncondensed, for some seconds; it is making an effort to raise the drops which are falling; it succeeds at most in retarding their fall"; and after the arm has fallen back "there yet subsists in it, striving to raise it up again, something of the will that animates it" (*ib.*, p. 247). So he tells us "in vital activity we see, then, that which subsists of the direct movement in the inverted movement, a *reality which is making itself in a reality, which is unmaking itself*" (*ib.*, p. 248).

Now this is the sphere and purpose of Creative Evolution: a reality making itself in or across a reality unmaking itself. Hence we read that in the universe itself two opposite movements are to be distinguished, "descent" and "ascent." The first only unwinds a roll ready prepared. In principle, it might be accomplished almost instantaneously,

like "releasing a" spring. But the ascending movement, which corresponds to an inner work of ripening or creating, *endures* essentially, and imposes its rhythm on the first, which is inseparable from it (*ib.*, p. 11). Thus before Creative Evolution can get to work we are supposed to accept without question these idle and puerile assumptions. In reality we seem to read some old mythical cosmogony instead of the last word on philosophy by a writer of the twentieth century. Why should the Absolute distend, or be distending; how could He lose strength in the fall; why should He reascend so slowly, painfully and imperfectly? Why could He not reascend and absorb all of the downward movement, as I could in an instant raise my arm to the height it was before I let it fall?

The movement of "ascent" is called Duration, Time, Life; it *endures* of itself, is Absolute and tends in the direction of spirituality and freedom. The movement of "descent," on the contrary, goes in the inverse direction of materiality, necessity and space; it "endures only by its connection with that which *ascends*" (pp. 212, 369). Hence the Absolute is limited as to extent and power, is dependent and contingent (p. 235). The ascending movement is designated "a vital impetus" which is "a tremendous push"; its essence is "progress, i.e. creation or succession," i.e. "continuity of interpenetration" which is either the cause or the effect of the impetus; its aim is not to annihilate

matter or push it out of the way, but only to "magnetize" matter (*ib.*, p. 99) and use it for its own purposes. Hence Life in its entirety is "a Creative Evolution," "a continuous creative progress" (*ib.*, pp. 22, 223). The essential thing in Life, therefore, is "continuous progress" (*ib.*, p. 27); for this, creation is necessary, hence "the impetus of Life consists in a need of creation" (*ib.*, p. 251).

But creation had a beginning, for "at a certain moment, in certain points of space, a visible current has taken rise; this current of life traversing the bodies it has organized one after another, passing from generation to generation, has become divided among species and distributed among individuals" (*ib.*, p. 26). This visible current, nevertheless, is carried along by "an invisible progress" (*ib.*, p. 27). Yet the *need of creation* is made manifest to Life, "only when creation is possible. It lies dormant when life is condemned to automatism; it awakens as soon as the possibility of a choice is restored" (*ib.*, p. 261). "The truth is," Professor Bergson assures us, "that life is possible whenever energy descends the incline indicated by Carnot's Law and where a cause of inverse direction can retard the descent" (*ib.*, p. 256).

But if Life is condemned to automatism, where is its "tremendous push" (*ib.*, p. 99), and how can its current be described as "intensifying in proportion to its advance" (*ib.*, p. 206), and why

should Life be the resultant of or depending on the interaction of contrary movements of physical energy when it is presented as "an original internal impetus" and "its essence evolution" (p. 22)? We might conceive in Professor Bergson's theory that organization depended on Carnot's Law, but we cannot understand how this law can explain the beginning of Life. For Life is Duration, Time, the Absolute, and here we are told that Life had a beginning due to physical laws. The suspicion arises that Professor Bergson's cosmogony is really physical and that in this case is presented a particular illustration of his teaching that "physics is simply psychics inverted" (*ib.*, p. 202).

Now life evolves through creation. But the creation does not extend to matter, for matter is due to the inverse movement, whereas "the life that evolves on the surface of our planet is attached to matter," hence we see "in life an effort to remount the incline that matter descends" (*ib.*, p. 245). Nor does creation mean the creation of energy, for "at the root of life there is an effort to engraft on to the necessity of physical forces the largest possible amount of *indetermination*. This effort cannot result in the creation of energy" hence "all that the effort can do is to make the best of a pre-existing energy which it finds at its disposal" and "this effort itself possesses only the power of releasing" (*ib.*, pp. 114-115). Furthermore creation does not apply to physical laws, for

life "is riveted to an organism that subjects it to the general laws of inert matter. But everything happens as if it were doing its utmost to set itself free from these laws. It has not the power to reverse the direction of physical changes, such as the principle of Carnot determines it. It does, however, behave absolutely as a force would behave which, left to itself, would work in the inverse direction. Incapable of *stopping* the course of material changes downwards, it succeeds in *retarding* it" (*ib.*, pp. 245-246).

Thus Creative Evolution is concerned with the "creations of forms" only (*ib.*, p. 239). These "forms, which life cuts out on the action unmaking itself, are capable of being themselves prolonged into unforeseen movements, and represent the action making itself" (*ib.*, p. 248). The creative action is symbolized by a geyser (*ib.*, p. 247), a current (*ib.*, p. 26), a shell (*ib.*, p. 98), a sheaf (*ib.*, p. 117), a great blast raising eddies of dust, which are the living beings (*ib.*, p. 128), an invisible breath (*ib.*, 128), a full breath (*ib.*, p. 100), a stream (*ib.*, p. 29), by "a centre from which worlds shoot out like rockets in a fire-works display, — provided, however, that I do not present this centre as a *thing*, but as a continuity of shooting out" (*ib.*, p. 248). For it is an "illusion to think of *things* which are created and a *thing* which creates," "there are no things, there only are actions," and "God thus defined, has nothing of

the already made; He is unceasing Life, action, freedom" (*ib.*, p. 248).

The creative action does not progress in a straight course "like that of a solid ball shot from a cannon." "It suddenly bursts like a shell into fragments and these in turn burst into other fragments," i.e. "species and individuals," and "the way it breaks depends on the resistance it meets from inert matter and the explosive force due to an unstable balance of tendencies, which it bears within itself" (*ib.*, p. 98). Being "confronted with matter," i.e. the inverse tendency, "the impetus of life cannot create absolutely but it seizes upon this matter which is necessity itself and strives to introduce into it the largest possible amount of indetermination and liberty" (*ib.*, p. 257). It overcomes the resistance of matter "by humility, by making itself very small and insinuating, bending to physical and chemical laws, consenting even to go part of the way with them like a switch of a rail" (*ib.*, p. 98), not at all like a shell, or rocket. "Life had to enter thus into the habits of inert matter in order to draw it little by little, magnetized, as it were, to another track" (*ib.*, p. 99). As a result, matter, i.e. the inverse tendency, "becomes as if it were made of India-rubber," i.e. plastic (*ib.*, p. 252).

Hereupon creative Duration no longer acts like Rousseau's sagacious primitive; it changes into Hobbes' wild animal or hungry savage and "gnaws

on things, leaving on them the mark of its tooth" (*ib.*, p. 46) and thus shows "the need of creation." Matter so marked is organized. Or Professor Bergson cites the illustration of a current, and says that the result of the two currents running opposite to each other is "a *modus vivendi* between them, which is organization" (*ib.*, p. 250). Its principle is "the Becoming" (*ib.*, p. 237). Its real centre is the action and its nature is explosive (*ib.*, p. 92). But organisms are only accidental, "excrescences" or "buds caused to sprout by the former germ endeavoring to continue itself in a new germ," "the essential thing is the continuous progress" (p. 27); "life can progress only by means of the living, which are its depositaries" (*ib.*, p. 231), and the progression is explained either by Weismann's theory of the "continuity of the germ-plasm" or "at least by the continuity of genetic energy" contained in "sexual elements" (pp. 26-27). Thus Life is like "a current passing from germ to germ through the medium of a developed organism" (p. 27), and "the sprouting and flowering of these forms, i.e. organisms, are stretched out on an unshrinkable duration, which is one with their essence" (p. 341).

In illustration Professor Bergson appeals to the phenomena of growing old, "what is vital is the continual change of form, which implies a continual recording of duration" (p. 19) and says that "the evolution of life as a whole from its humblest origins to its highest forms constitutes through

the unity and continuity of the animated matter, which supports it, a single indivisible history" (*ib.*, p. 37). So essential is this change, so essential is the continuity that form is altogether relative to action, so that "everything changes inwardly and the same concrete reality never occurs" (*ib.*, p. 46), even "the organism reconstructs itself entirely for every new act" (*ib.*, p. 22). If sameness and repetition appear among living beings, this sameness and repetition are merely "accidental," inasmuch as "innumerable living beings almost alike have to repeat each other in space and time for the novelty they are working out to grow and mature" (*ib.*, p. 21). Action, therefore, is prior to organization (*ib.*, p. 174), and "the form of the organ only expresses the degree in which the exercise of the function has been obtained" (*ib.*, p. 96).

From the fact that organization is the *modus vivendi* between the two currents it follows that "adaptation is a necessary condition of evolution" (*ib.*, p. 101), not in the sense that "outer circumstances are the directing causes of evolution," but that they are "forces which evolution must reckon with" (*ib.*, pp. 101-102), for "the novelty of forms arises from an internal impetus which is progress or succession" (*ib.*, p. 341), and "life must create a form for itself, suited" however "to the circumstances that are made for it, i.e. make the best of these circumstances, respond to outer actions by building up a machine which has no resemblance

to them. Such adapting is not *repeating*, but *replying*" (*ib.*, p. 58), not passive but active (*ib.*, p. 52). In this sense form and adaptation are contingent; and an explanation is given for "set-backs," "arrests" and "conflict" (*ib.*, pp. 254-255). Hence "adaptation explains the sinuosities of the movement, not its general direction, nor the movement itself" (*ib.*, p. 102), for in the great river of life flowing through the body of humanity, "the movement of the stream is distinct from the river bed, although it must adopt its winding course" (*ib.*, p. 270), with this reminder that "evolution does not mark out a solitary route, it takes directions without aiming at ends, it remains inventive, i.e. creative, even in its adaptations" (*ib.*, p. 102).

II. *Transformism*

Hence the plasticity of matter and the general movement of life, which on divergent lines is creating forms ever new, reveal the basic doctrine on which Creative Evolution rests, viz. Transformism. Professor Bergson proposes this teaching. He claims that experience shows that the most complex has been able to issue from the most simple by way of evolution and this has been strengthened by scientific discoveries (*ib.*, p. 24). To him the doctrine is probable, not proved; he admits that it may even be wrong, yet maintains that we could and would

continue to establish between forms an *ideal* kinship and no longer a *material* affiliation; and that this would be sufficient, for evolution somewhere would still have to be supposed, and so "it would simply have been *transposed*, made to pass from the visible to the invisible" (*ib.*, pp. 24-26). So he decides to "stick to the letter of Transformism," the more so because it is "not opposed to special creation" (*ib.*, p. 26). He takes exception to the present forms of Transformism known as the Darwinian, Neo-Darwinian and Neo-Lamarckian as insufficient to solve the problem, not with the intention of rejecting them altogether, for "each of them, being supported by a considerable number of facts, must be true in its way. Each of them must correspond to a certain aspect of the process of evolution," whereas "the reality of which each of these theories takes a partial view must transcend them all, and this reality is the special object of philosophy which is not constrained to scientific precision because it contemplates no practical application" (*ib.*, pp. 84, 85).

To Professor Bergson, Transformism is not effected by passive adaptation to material forces. He holds that "the inner vital movement is transformation" (*ib.*, p. 32). He is forced to maintain, by his Philosophy of Change, that variations, i.e. changes, in the forms of life, i.e. organisms, are so increasing and constant that these forms are only accidental to the one essential thing, or fundamental

reality, viz. the continuity of Duration. And as "Duration is an effective action and a reality of its own" (*ib.*, p. 16), "is immanent to the whole of the universe" and "means invention, the creation of forms, the continual elaboration of something new" (*ib.*, p. 11), it follows that the real cause of the variations in form must be sought in the life impetus itself, for "life is a tendency, and the essence of a tendency is to develop in the form of a sheaf, creating, by its very growth, divergent directions among which its impetus is divided" (*ib.*, p. 99).

In illustration Professor Bergson cites "the evolution of that special tendency which we call our character." Our "child-personality, though indivisible, united in itself divers persons, which could remain blended just because they were in their nascent state. But these interwoven personalities became incompatible in course of growth, and, as each of us can live but one life, a choice must perforce be made. We choose in reality without ceasing; without ceasing, also, we abandon many things. The route we pursue in time is strewn with the remains of all that we began to be, of all that we might have been. But nature, which has at command an incalculable number of lives, is in no wise bound to make such sacrifices. She preserves the different tendencies that have bifurcated with their growth. She creates with them diverging series of species that will evolve separately. The

bifurcations on the way have been numerous, but there have been many blind alleys, beside the two or three highways; and of these highways themselves, only one, that which leads through the vertebrates up to man, has been wide enough to allow free passage to the full breadth of life" (*ib.*, pp. 99-100). Thus "while life, in its contact with matter, is comparable to an impulsion or an impetus, regarded in itself it is an immensity of potentiality, a mutual encroachment of thousands and thousands of tendencies which nevertheless are" thousands and thousands "only when once regarded as outside each other, that is, when spatialized. Contact with matter is what determines this dissociation" (*ib.*, p. 258). He says that "it is easier to define the method than to apply it," that its application "would be possible only if the history of the development of the organized world were entirely known," that "such is far from being the case," for "the genealogies proposed are generally questionable," "vary with their authors," "raise discussions which do not admit of a final settlement"; but as these discussions bear "less on the main lines of the movement than on matters of detail," so "by following the main lines as closely as possible, we shall be sure of not going astray," inasmuch as the "aim is only at defining the principal directions of the evolution of the species," and as "not all of these directions have the same interest for us" and "what concerns us particularly is the path

that leads to man"; therefore "our main business is to determine the relation of man to the animal kingdom, and the place of the animal kingdom itself in the organized world as a whole" (*ib.*, p. 108).

As matter is "a relaxation of the inextensive into the extensive and thereby of liberty into necessity" (p. 118), so "the rôle of life is an effort to engraft on to the necessity of matter, the largest possible amount of indetermination," i.e. "unforeseeableness, variety of creative forms" (pp. 96, 114, 116), "freedom" or "movement," for "the initial impetus of life is essentially directed toward free actions" (*ib.*, p. 254). This it does not by creating matter, nor by creating energy, but by making "the best of the pre-existing energy," i.e. "by securing such an accumulation of potential energy from matter, that it can get, at any given moment, the amount of work it needs for its action simply by pulling a trigger," i.e. by releasing (*ib.*, p. 115). Hence "the evolution of life really continues an initial impulsion and brings life to more and more efficient acts by the fabrication and use of more and more powerful explosives" which "represent a storing house of the solar energy, the degradation of which is thus provisionally suspended on some of the points where it was being poured forth" (*ib.*, p. 246). In this way "life is an effort to remount the incline that matter descends" although "life on our planet is attached to matter,

riveted to an organism that subjects it to the general laws of inert matter" (*ib.*, p. 245) and while "incapable of *stopping* the course of material changes downwards, it succeeds in *retarding* it" (*ib.*, p. 246).

Professor Bergson tells us that as a matter of fact "the principal source of energy usable on our planet is the sun" (*ib.*, p. 115), but warns us that the origin of energy is a problem which "remains insoluble as long as we keep on the ground of physics" and must be sought "in an extra-spatial process" (*ib.*, p. 244). Hence "all life, animal and vegetable, seems in its essence like an effort to accumulate energy and then let it flow into flexible channels, changeable in shape, at the end of which it will accomplish infinitely varied kinds of work" (*ib.*, pp. 253-254).

This is "what the *vital impetus* passing through the matter, would fain do all at once," but "the impetus is finite and has been given once for all. It cannot overcome all obstacles" (*ib.*, p. 254), it "soon exhausts itself in its very manifestations" (*ib.*, p. 142), for the most living form becomes frigid in the formula that expresses it, and is stifled if it fails to renew itself by a constant effort (*ib.*, p. 127), so that "evolution is not only a movement forward; in many cases it is a marking time and still more often a deviation or turning back" (*ib.*, p. 104), because it is "always opposed" (*ib.*, p. 254), "paralyzed by contrary forces" or "absorbed in the form it is engaged in taking, at the mercy of the material-

ity it had to assume" (*ib.*, p. 127), for "the act by which life goes forward to the creation of a new form and the act by which the form is shaped are two different and often antagonistic tendencies" (*ib.*, p. 29), so that "the evolution of the organized world is the unrolling of this conflict" (*ib.*, p. 253). Therefore in the process of creative evolution "two things only are necessary: (1) a gradual accumulation of energy; (2) an elastic canalization of this energy in variable and indeterminable directions, at the end of which are free acts" (*ib.*, p. 255). And while "life chooses the fittest means for this result in the circumstances with which it is confronted" (*ib.*, p. 256), so that "this twofold result has been obtained in a particular way on our planet," yet "it might have been obtained by entirely different means" (*ib.*, p. 255).

In its primitive contact with matter "life had to enter into the habits of inert matter, in order to draw it little by little, magnetized, as it were, to another track" (*ib.*, p. 99). Thus he holds that "of phenomena, in the simplest forms of life, it is hard to say whether they are still physical and chemical or whether they are already vital" (*ib.*), that "vegetable and animal are descended from a common ancestor which united the tendencies of both in a rudimentary state" (*ib.*, p. 113), that the two tendencies, viz. of gradual storing and of sudden use of energy, were "mutually implied in this rudimentary form" (*ib.*, p. 113), so that at first they "were

fused in one" (*ib.*, p. 116), that "the more the single original tendency grows, the harder it finds it to keep united in the same living being these two elements" (*ib.*), so that "of themselves, and without any external intervention, simply by the effect of the duality of the tendency involved in the original impetus and of the resistance opposed by matter to the impetus, the organisms turned some in the first direction," i.e. of storing energy, "others in the second," i.e. of exploding energy. "To this scission succeeded many others. Hence the diverging lines of evolution, at least what is essential in them" (*ib.*, p. 254).

With the "parting in two" arose "two divergent evolutions"; "the vegetable tending principally" in the direction of storing the energy and "the animal in the direction of exploding it" (*ib.*, p. 116). As the parting or scission was gradual "the animal cell and the vegetable cell are derived from a common stock, and the first living organisms oscillated between the vegetable and animal form, participating in both at once" (*ib.*, p. 112); therefore "the animal forms that first appeared were of extreme simplicity" (*ib.*, p. 99). In fact "no definite characteristic distinguishes the plant from the animal" (*ib.*, p. 105), so that "biologists enamored of clean-cut concepts have regarded the distinction between the two kingdoms as artificial" (*ib.*, p. 106), hence "the group must not be defined by the possession of certain characters, but by its tendency to em-

phasize them," i.e. "taking tendencies rather than states into account" (*ib.*), i.e. not a *static* but a *dynamic* definition (*ib.*, p. 107).

Now as Duration or movement is the basic reality, the guiding principle and the aim of Creative Evolution, it follows that the vegetable and animal kingdoms are distinguished in proportion to the movement they exercise. The vegetable takes the energy necessary for life with the principal purpose of storing it; the animal, on the contrary, takes the necessary energy with the main purpose of using it in explosive action. "The vegetable manufactures the organic substances directly with mineral substances" (*ib.*, p. 112), i.e. "especially carbon and nitrogen which it derives directly from the air and water and soil" (*ib.*, p. 106), and "this aptitude enables it to dispense with movement and feeling," so that "the vegetable may be defined by consciousness asleep and by insensibility" (*ib.*, p. 112), i.e. by comparative immobility (*ib.*, p. 130). The animal, on the contrary, must obtain energy in food from other animals or vegetables, and ultimately from vegetables. For this "the animal must be able to move" (*ib.*, pp. 106-108). "Between mobility and consciousness there is an obvious relationship" (*ib.*, p. 109), and "the more the nervous system develops, the more numerous and precise become the movements, among which it can choose; the clearer also, is the consciousness that accompanies them," so that "to choose vol-

untarily between several different courses of action, cerebral centres are necessary, that is, crossways from which paths start, leading to motor mechanisms of diverse form but equal precision" (*ib.*, p. 110). Hence "animals, which are obliged to go in search of their food, have evolved in the direction of locomotor activity, and consequently of a consciousness more and more distinct," and "from this standpoint we should define the animal by sensibility and awakened consciousness," i.e. by mobility (*ib.*, pp. 112, 130). Thus, "in the animal, all points to action, that is, to the utilization of energy for movements from place to place," so that "what constitutes animality, is the faculty of utilizing a releasing mechanism for the conversion of as much stored up energy as possible" into "explosive action," i.e. into movement (*ib.*, p. 120). As "the plant has stored up the energy chiefly by the chlorophyllian function, a chemicism *sui generis* of which we do not possess the key" (*ib.*, p. 253), as "the nervous system arises by a division of labor" (*ib.*, p. 110), for "in the beginning the explosion is haphazard and does not choose its course" (*ib.*, p. 120), and as "the nervous system is a veritable *reservoir* of *indetermination*" (*ib.*, p. 126) as also "the regulator of the organic life" (*ib.*, p. 123), Professor Bergson concludes: "the same vital impetus that has led the animal to give itself nerves and nerve-centres must have ended, in the plant, in the chlorophyllian function" (*ib.*, p. 114), and as, "from

the very first in making the explosive, nature had for object the explosion, then it is the evolution of the animal rather than that of the vegetable, that indicates, on the whole, the fundamental direction of life" (*ib.*, p. 116), for, in this way, "the evolution of life continues an initial impulsion which brings life to more and more efficient acts," i.e. movements, "by the fabrication and use of more and more powerful explosives" (*ib.*, p. 246).

A study of the animal kingdom, Professor Bergson holds, shows that the impulse of life to movement has gained the upper hand in two directions, viz. in the arthropods, whose culminating species is the insect, and in the vertebrates, which end in man (*ib.*, pp. 131-133). And as "instinct is nowhere so developed as in the insect world," so "the whole evolution of the animal kingdom has taken place on two divergent paths, one of which led to instinct and the other to intelligence" (*ib.*, p. 134), not in the sense that either "is ever found in a pure state," for they "always accompany each other"; "they are tendencies, not things," "complementary" yet "opposed" because they develop from a common origin along diverging lines, and so are "deposited by life along its course" (*ib.*, p. 136). In reality they "are two different methods of action on inert matter, two modes of psychical activity" by which "the life manifested by an organism obtains certain things from the material world" (*ib.*); instinct acting directly on the material world,

by creating *organized* instruments to work with, intelligence *indirectly* through an organism which, instead of possessing the required instrument naturally, will itself construct it by fashioning inorganic matter" (*ib.*, p. 142). Hence the essential feature of human intelligence is "the faculty of manufacturing tools, i.e. unorganized instruments of indefinite variety" (pp. 139-140).

While "instinct acts with wonderful precision," so that "most instincts are only the continuance, or rather, the consummation of the work of organization itself," yet "it retains an almost invariable structure and is necessarily specialized" (*ib.*); "the instrument constructed intelligently, on the contrary, is imperfect, costs an effort, is not easy to handle, but it can take any form, serve any purpose, confers on the living being a richer organization, being an artificial organ by which the natural organism is extended," and so "instead of closing, like instinct, the round of action within which the animal tends to move automatically, it lays open to activity an unlimited field into which it is driven further and further and made more and more free" (*ib.*, pp. 140, 141). Furthermore, the difference between man and animal is one of kind because "the human brain differs from other brains in this that the number of mechanisms it can set up and consequently the choice that it gives as to which among them shall be released, is unlimited. Now from the limited to the unlimited there is all the

distance between the closed and open" (*ib.*, p. 263). It is "this freedom that the human form registers. Man continues the vital movement indefinitely, although he does not draw along with him all that life carries in itself." Of the other tendencies "he has kept very little." So the evolution of life is "as if a vague and formless being, whom we may call, as we will, man or superman, had sought to realize himself, and had succeeded only by abandoning a part of himself on the way," i.e. "the rest of the animal world and even of the vegetable world" (*ib.*, p. 266). Therefore the process of Creative Evolution reveals vegetative torpor, instinct and intelligence as the elements that coincided in the vital impulsion common to plants and animals and which, in the course of a development in which they were made manifest in the most unforeseen forms, have been dissociated by the very fact of their growth (*ib.*, p. 135).

III. *A Voluntarism*

An analysis into the nature of the process shows that Creative Evolution is the evolution of a conscious will. Hence in concert with metaphysical Pragmatists Professor Bergson proposes a Voluntarism. He uses the term *consciousness* in two senses, consciousness in general, i.e. supra-consciousness, and consciousness in particular, i.e. organic consciousness, i.e. of the plant, animal or man. The

former is "Life" (*ib.*, p. 181) and is "coextensive with universal life" (*ib.*, p. 186). The latter is a particular manifestation or division or distribution (*ib.*, p. 181) of the supra-consciousness as revealed in the particular organism. In both senses the word is synonymous with *mobility, movement, action, choice, purpose, willing*. In fact we read that "the whole present study strives to prove that the vital is in the direction of the voluntary" (*ib.*, p. 224). Professor Bergson furnishes the proof by simply including the "vital" and the "voluntary" in "consciousness" and by enlarging the meaning of consciousness so as to embrace both. Thus "consciousness is the name for the rocket whose extinguished fragments fall back as matter" and is "the name for what subsists of the rocket itself, passing through the fragments and lighting them up into organisms" (*ib.*, p. 261). Hence it is the principle of distention, i.e. materiality, and is illustrated as "a relaxation of self-consciousness" (*ib.*, p. 207), "a falling and condensation of steam" (*ib.*, p. 247), "a relaxation of the arm" (*ib.*), as "expressing a deficiency of will" (*ib.*, p. 209).

Again, consciousness is presented as "the motor principle of evolution" (*ib.*, p. 182), and "the evolution of life" is presented "as if a broad current of consciousness had penetrated matter loaded, as all consciousness is, with an enormous multiplicity of interwoven personalities" (*ib.*, p. 181) or as "a rising wave" (*ib.*, p. 269) or as "the ripening of an

idea" (*ib.*, p. 346) or as "the evolution of a personality" (*ib.*, p. 257) or "of a consciousness" (*ib.*, p. 27) or "like conscious activity, is invention, unceasing creation" (*ib.*, p. 23), "a need of creation" (*ib.*, p. 261), and this "current that runs through this matter" is "a pure willing thing" (evidently not a *tendency*), "which we hardly feel, which at most we brush lightly as it passes" (*ib.*, p. 238).

Furthermore the purpose of Creative Evolution is to introduce consciousness into inert matter. For "the whole history of life up to man has been that of an effort of consciousness to raise matter and of the more or less complete overwhelming of consciousness by the matter that has fallen back" and this effort "was to create with matter, which is necessity itself, an instrument of freedom," but "everywhere, except in man, it has let itself be caught in the net of mechanical automatism" (*ib.*, p. 264). In this sense consciousness is designated as "mobility" (*ib.*, p. 163), "indetermination" (*ib.*, p. 114), "freedom" (*ib.*, p. 264), i.e. change, "the continual elaboration of something new" (*ib.*, p. 11), "unforeseeable" (*ib.*, pp. 126, 341), "a centre of action" (*ib.*, p. 262) and is represented as "unconscious" (*ib.*, p. 214), as having "had to fall asleep," e.g. in plants (*ib.*, pp. 113, 181), but as "recollections which may awaken" (*ib.*, p. 119), as "distributed among divergent lines of organisms" (*ib.*, p. 180), as "infinitely retarded and divided" (*ib.*), as the cause of "organization"

(*ib.*, p. 181) and "the animating principle of the organism" (*ib.*, p. 270), as suffering "fatigue" and "being fed with the converted solar energy," as "varying with the power of locomotion and deformation" (*ib.*, p. 26).

Thus Creative Evolution is described throughout as conscious striving action, the cause and the prolongation of the vital impetus (*ib.*, p. 239). The "Will to Believe" of Professor James here becomes the "Will to Act" and the *Will to Act* for a conscious principle implies the power of choice. The reason is that "the force immanent in life," i.e. *Duration, Vital Impetus, Consciousness, Will*, "is limited, and that it soon exhausts itself in its very manifestations. It is hard for it to go in several directions at once; it must choose" (*ib.*, pp. 141, 142). And so at first "it succeeded by dint of humility," "insinuating" itself into matter (*ib.*, p. 98), then "by ages of effort and prodigies of subtlety it induced a number of elements, ready to divide, to remain united; by division of labor knotted between them an insoluble bond" and "thus made them function" (*ib.*, p. 99); it "takes directions without aiming at ends," nay even "a mere glance at fossil species shows us that life need not have evolved at all, or might have evolved in very restricted limits, if it had chosen the alternative, much more convenient to itself, of becoming anchylosed in its primitive forms" (*ib.*, p. 102). Not satisfied with diplomacy, consciousness manufactures "powerful explosives"

and "pulls triggers." After such and more remarkable feats we should expect to find matter, which is explained by "the relaxation of will," thoroughly subdued. But no! The hard shell crabs caused "a sudden arrest of the entire animal world in its progress toward higher and higher mobility," "arthropods and vertebrates escaped, however, and to this fortunate circumstance is due the expansion of the highest forms of life" (*ib.*, p. 131). Strange that the disciples of Isaac Walton and the industrious housewife who seems bent on exterminating insects are not aware that they owe their very existence to the fact that in the long ago "fishes exchanged their ganoid breastplate for scales," and with the insects "supplemented the insufficiency of their protective covering by an agility that enabled them to escape their enemies and also to assume the offensive"! (*ib.*, p. 131).

Again, while life in its contact with matter is divided actually into "thousands and thousands of tendencies" (*ib.*, p. 258), yet "each of the species, through which life passes, falls into a partial sleep"; "of the four main directions along which animal life bent its course, two have led to blind alleys, and, in the other two, the effort has generally been out of proportion to the result" (*ib.*, pp. 128-129); and "even in its most perfect works it is at the mercy of the materiality which it has had to assume" (*ib.*, p. 127) and this in spite of the fact

that "the current intensifies as it progresses" (*ib.*, p. 26).

We might fancy that the lack of success is due to the fact that consciousness "has split up," "divided," "developed" on "diverging paths," but Professor Bergson's teaching on individuality is adverse to the assumption. He distinguishes *artificial* individuality, i.e. "the outlines which we see in an object as the plan of our eventual action" (*ib.*, p. 11), i.e. an intellectual snapshot, from *natural* individuality which is produced by contact of the vital tendency with matter, for "matter divides actually what was but potentially manifold," and so "individuation is in part the work of matter, in part the result of life's own inclination" (*ib.*, p. 258). He holds that "individuality is a characteristic property of life" (*ib.*, p. 12); that "the individual transmits the vital impetus" (*ib.*, p. 259), but it is "hard to decide in the organic world what is individual and what is not," for "individuality admits of any number of degrees and is not fully realized anywhere even in man" (*ib.*, p. 12); that "while the tendency to individuate is everywhere present in the organized world, it is everywhere opposed by the tendency towards reproduction," for life progresses by reproduction, which supposes a division and so "in nature there is no absolutely distinct individuality" (*ib.*, p. 42), i.e. a thing absolutely one, i.e. undivided. As "every individual organism, even that of man, is merely a bud that has sprouted

on the combined body of both its parents," it follows that "we shall find him solidary with his remotest ancestors, solidary with that little mass of protoplasmic jelly which is probably at the root of the genealogical tree of life," and also "solidary with all that descends from the ancestor in divergent directions." Hence "the life common to all the living, forms a single whole" (*ib.*, p. 43), for "the continuity of life implies a multiplicity of elements and the interpenetration of all by all" (*ib.*, p. 162), and "the individual is not sufficiently independent, or cut off from other things, to have a vital principle of its own" (*ib.*, p. 42). But this teaching is the Hylozoism or Panpsychism of Professor Schiller expressed in no less explicit terms.

His conscious purposive voluntarism constrains Professor Bergson to reject Radical Mechanism, as also Radical Finalism i.e. the carrying out of a pre-conceived plan. His reason is that both theories suppose "all to be given" and "previously arranged," "closes the future," so "time is useless if there is nothing unforeseen, no invention or creation," i.e. change (*ib.*, p. 39). For the same reason he rejects God (*ib.*, p. 196), yet he tells us "that the *vital impetus*, passing through matter, is finite and it has been given once for all" (*ib.*, p. 254). He says that Radical Mechanism explains "artificial systems," not the order of Life, and that while rejecting Radical Finalism, he accepts a Mitigated Finalism, for the reason

that the doctrine on which Finalism rests, i.e. "of final causes, will never be definitely refuted," is "so flexible" and "so comprehensive" that "one accepts something of it as soon as one rejects pure mechanism" (*ib.*, p. 40). So he proposes "external finality" which consists not only in "the co-ordination of the parts with the whole of the organism," but also, by reason of the solidarity of life, in the co-ordination of "each living being with the collective whole of all others" (*ib.*, p. 43), with this reservation, however, that, while life is a tendency to act on inert matter, the direction of the tendency is not predetermined. Life has no "end" in the sense that it is "the realization of a pre-existing model," it is not "an anticipation of the future contained in the present in the form of a represented end," for life "*endures* in time," i.e. changes, and "the road of life has been created *pari passu* with the act of travelling over it, being nothing but the direction of this act itself" (*ib.*, p. 51). Hence his Finalism is "a particular mode of viewing the past in the light of the present," for it teaches that while "the best interpretation" of the evolution process is "a psychological interpretation," yet "this explanation has neither value nor even significance except retrospectively," for the explanation is intellectual, whereas "life goes beyond intellect" (*ib.*, pp. 51-52).

After this manner Professor Bergson holds that his "philosophy of life claims to transcend both

mechanism and finalism" and yet "represents the organized world as a harmonious whole" (*ib.*, p. 50). This "harmony, or *complementarity*" is "rather behind us than before," it "is revealed only in the mass," in tendencies rather than in states, and is explained as due to "a *vis a tergo*," i.e. a kick behind, or to "a tremendous push" (*ib.*, p. 99), or to the fact that "life has taken its leap from a vast spring board" (*ib.*, p. 265). Hence in virtue of "the original *common* impetus," of the fact that the developing "tendencies were at first fused in one," these tendencies "must keep something in common in spite of the divergence of their efforts." Thus "harmony was complete at the start," is accounted for, not "by a common aspiration," nor by "reciprocal adaptations in course of progress," but by "an original identity," i.e. "an identity of impulsion" (*ib.*, pp. 50, 51, 103, 116). But Professor Bergson tells us that "the harmony does not exist in fact: it exists rather in principle," for while "each species and individual retains only a certain impetus from the universal vital impulsion, it tends to use this energy in its own interest" (*ib.*, pp. 50-51). Hence "an irremediable difference of rhythm" (*ib.*, p. 128). Besides, there are "scissions," "diverging lines of evolution," so "this discord among the species will go on increasing," "retrogressions, arrests, accidents of every kind," "numberless struggles," and "hence a discord striking and terrible, but for which," he con-

soles us by adding, "the original principle of life must not be held responsible" (*ib.*, pp. 103, 254, 255). Therefore the Theory of Life shows life to be "Creative Evolution," i.e. "true continuity, real mobility, reciprocal penetration" (*ib.*, p. 162), and the domain of life to be "reciprocal interpenetration, endlessly continued creation" (*ib.*, p. 178).

IV. *Criticism*

In criticising the Theory of Life proposed by Professor Bergson we believe that its exposition is the most telling criticism. To designate it as a fanciful cosmogony based upon an "ineffectual" abstraction, and full of assumptions, is to use mild terms.

Again the basic principle of Creative Evolution is Transformism, but he admits that Transformism is "not proved" and "may be wrong," in which case "the doctrine would not be affected in so far as it has a special interest or importance for us," for "the evolutionist theory, so far as it has any importance for philosophy, requires" only "an *ideal* kinship," i.e. "a *logical*" not "a *material* affiliation between forms," and "evolution would then simply have been *transposed*, made to pass from the visible to the invisible," i.e. we could not see the evolution, nor know it really to be in operation, but suppose that it does work (*ib.*, pp. 25-26).

Besides, the fundamental principle in the evolution process is that the evolution of life has taken place on lines similar to the evolution of a personality. Now this teaching, stripped of its peculiar words, is the theory of Ontogenesis and Phylogenesis, viz. that the individual in the course of development from the embryo assumes forms identical to those which appear in the successive evolution of the race. Thus Professor Bergson takes a biological theory proposed by Haeckel, not considered trustworthy by leading scientists of to-day, dresses it up in psychological phraseology and presents it as something new. Yet he cannot get away from its original biological nature, for he tells us that the energy is acquired by and in food, is stored in sexual elements, and that life is propagated along biological lines. At the same time the process is psychological because he says it is so, or even logical because logical affiliation suffices. This is *conceptual manipulation* of experience with a vengeance, far beyond what Professor Schiller has attempted.

Furthermore the fundamental principle of Professor Bergson's whole system is Duration, Mutation, Change. He says that Creative Evolution, in its essence, is the aim, on the part of Life, to introduce mobility or movement or change into inert matter, so that life in the external world would be presented as a process similar to the process of our inner life, as he conceives it, i.e. "constant change,"

"the continual evolution or creation of unforeseen forms." Now the term *movement* is used in two different senses. It may mean *mutation*, i.e. change, or it may mean *local motion*, i.e. *locomotion*, as Professor Bergson spells the word. So the strange fact is presented that organic life, as produced by Creative Evolution, is not determined by mutation or change but by the necessities of locomotion. Professor Bergson tells us that animals are distinguished from vegetables by *mobility*, but *mobility* here means *locomotion*, for he expressly states that "animals must go in search of food." In like manner the mobility that saved fishes and insects was "agility of movement." In animal and human life, also, the progress of the nervous system is represented as corresponding to the variety and precision of movement, and consciousness is said to awaken in proportion to movement. But the nervous system is a sensori-motor system regulating our animal and human locomotion. Therefore, locomotion is not mutation, and the intermittent use of the same word in two different meanings cannot be considered a strong argument; it rather exposes the falsity of his position. As for movement in the sense of change or creation of new species, Professor Bergson says "often this movement has turned aside; very often, too, it has stopped short; what was to have been a thoroughfare has become a terminus. From this point of view, failure seems the rule,

success exceptional and always imperfect" (*ib.*, p. 129).

Besides, Professor Bergson holds that "the law of the degradation (i.e. dissipation) of energy is the most metaphysical law of physics, since it points out without interposed symbols, without artificial devices of measurement, the direction in which the world is going. It tells us that changes that are visible and heterogeneous will be more and more diluted into changes that are invisible and homogeneous, and that the instability to which we owe the richness and variety of the changes taking place in our solar system will gradually give way to the relative stability of elementary vibrations continually and perpetually repeated" (*ib.*, p. 243). So Creative Evolution will have an end, as Professor Bergson says it had a beginning. Life will give way to death, mutation to local motion, for Creative Evolution means the "unceasing creation of new and unforeseeable forms," and how can these be possible when "homogeneous changes" and "elementary vibrations perpetually repeated" only exist.

Again Professor Bergson modifies the law of the conservation of energy. He holds that this "law cannot express the objective permanence of a certain quantity of a certain thing, but rather the necessity for every change that is brought about to be counterbalanced in some way by a change in the opposite direction," so that it "is concerned with

the relationship of a fragment of this world to another fragment rather than with the nature of the whole" (*ib.*, p. 242). These words would be true if Creative Evolution created new energy. But this Professor Bergson expressly denies. He tells us that Creative Evolution creates the *form* only, not the energy, and creates the form by converting the potential energy of matter into act.

Finally Professor Bergson teaches that man is the only thoroughfare, the highest product of evolution; and this success he expressly attributes to intellect, which keeps the path of life open and free. In the anthropods, on the contrary, "nature has frankly evolved in the direction of instinct" with the result that "stability" or "automatism" has ensued, which keeps the path of life "closed." But he holds that "intelligence and instinct are turned in opposite directions, the former towards inert matter, the latter towards life" (*ib.*, p. 176). Therefore, the Order of Life, i.e. Creative Evolution, when left to itself, closes automatically, and is kept open only by intellect, which, Professor Bergson teaches, pertains to the Order of Matter.

CHAPTER X

PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION: (*continued*)

The Theory of Knowledge

PROFESSOR BERGSON teaches that the Theory of Knowledge is inseparable from the Theory of Life. By Theory of Knowledge, however, he does not mean what philosophical writers universally have understood, viz. a treatise on the nature and operations of the intellect. His specific purpose is to show the genesis of intellect in and by the evolution of life, and so include the genesis of intellect in the Theory of Knowledge. Hence "it is necessary that these two inquiries, theory of knowledge and theory of life, should join each other, and, by a circular process, push each other on unceasingly," for "a theory of knowledge which does not replace the intellect in the general evolution of life will teach us neither how the frames of knowledge have been constructed nor how we can enlarge or go beyond them" (*ib.*, Intro., p. xiii; p. 186). In proposing to set forth the genesis of intellect he boasts that he has gone beyond Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Spencer and their followers, all of whom took the intellect without attempting to explain the construction of its forms.

The twofold experience of *thought* and of *feeling* give, as we have seen, "the two opposite movements of *descent* and of *ascent* in the universe" (*ib.*, p. 111); these in turn present a twofold evolution: "the automatic and strictly determined evolution of this well-knit whole is action which is unmaking itself; and the unforeseen forms which life cuts out in it, forms capable of being themselves prolonged into unforeseen movements, represent the action that is making itself" (*ib.*, p. 248); and this twofold evolution unfolds a twofold order: "that of the *inert* and *automatic* or mathematical" and "that of the *vital* or the *willed*" (*ib.*, p. 224). The former order is the order of the inorganic, is the proper sphere of the senses and of the intellect, and represents what is *thought*; the latter order is the order of the organic, is the sphere of instinct and of intuition, and represents what is *lived*, i.e. felt (*ib.*, p. 186). Thus order takes two forms: one is the "opposite" of the other (*ib.*, p. 111), the "inverse" of the other (*ib.*, p. 247), "contrary" to the other (*ib.*, p. 222), "contingent" to the other (*ib.*, p. 232), so that "the absence of the one consists in the presence of the other" (*ib.*, p. 233) and "the negation of the one consists in the affirmation of the other" (*ib.*, p. 222). This doctrine of the twofold order is fundamental to Professor Bergson's theory of Knowledge and explains the genesis of intellect, the illusions of the intellect, the relation of intel-

lect to instinct and consciousness, and place and scope of intuition.

I. *The Genesis of the Intellect*

The whole evolution of life proceeds from a current of existence and the opposing current (*ib.*, p. 182). The current of existence is original and fundamental; it is the order of life; by its *relaxation* or *diminution* or *detension* the opposing current arises. The contrary current, or movement of "descent," is "materiality" (*ib.*, p. 245), and contains "immanent" in itself "an order approximately mathematical which produces itself automatically" in proportion to the relaxation (*ib.*, pp. 218, 220). "The power of creation has only to be deviated from itself to relax its tension, only to relax its tension to extend, only to extend for the mathematical order of the elements so distinguished and the inflexible determinism connecting them to manifest the interruption of the creative act: in fact inflexible determinism and mathematical order are one with this very interruption" (*ib.*, p. 217). This order, called mathematical or "geometry, which is its extreme limit" (*ib.*, p. 223), is in reality only approximately mathematical, for as "matter is a relaxation of the inextensive into the extensive and, thereby, of liberty into necessity, it does not indeed wholly coincide with pure homogeneous space" (*ib.*, p. 218) which "is the ultimate goal of the mind's

movement of detension" (*ib.*, p. 212), "yet is constituted by the movement which leads to space, and is therefore on the way to geometry. It is true that laws of mathematical form will never apply to it completely. For that, it would have to be pure space and step out of duration" (*ib.*, p. 218).

The order of matter awakens ideas of inertia, passivity and automatism (*ib.*, p. 223). It represents a "deficiency of will" and presents "a system of negations, the absence rather than the presence of a true reality" (*ib.*, p. 208) because "duration is not the fact of matter itself, but of the life which reascends the course of matter" (*ib.*, p. 340). In like manner "the mathematical order is not a positive thing" and there are not "in matter laws comparable to those of our codes"; in fact, there is "no definite system of mathematical laws at the basis of nature," for "it is the form towards which a certain *interruption* tends of itself" (*ib.*, p. 219), and so "the idea that the mind forms of *pure* space is only the schema of the limit at which this movement would end" (*ib.*, p. 202).

Now the current of life ascends across the current of matter. Life, or consciousness or supra-consciousness or mind, "launched into matter, fixed its attention either on its own movement," i.e. turned in the direction of instinct and intuition, "or on the matter it was passing through," i.e. in the direction of intellect (*ib.*, pp. 181, 182), and hence "split up because of the need it had to apply

itself to matter at the same time as it had to follow the stream of life" (*ib.*, p. 178), so "the mind goes in two opposite ways" (*ib.*, p. 223). Thus we are told that "intellectuality and materiality are of the same nature and have been produced in the same way" (*ib.*, p. 219), for "the intellect and matter have progressively adapted themselves one to the other in order to attain at last a common form" (*ib.*, p. 206) inasmuch as "consciousness cannot pass through matter without settling on it, without adapting itself to it: this adaptation is what we call intellectuality" (*ib.*, p. 270) and "this adaptation has been brought about quite naturally, because it is the same inversion of the same movement which creates at once the intellectuality of mind and the materiality of matter" (*ib.*, p. 206).

Moreover, by adaptation is understood "consolidation," for we read that "within the evolution of life and consciousness, the progressive determination of materiality and intellectuality appears by the gradual consolidation of one with the other" (*ib.*, p. 369). In this sense, intellect is said to be "cut out of mind" or consciousness, for "mind overflows intellect," to be "a by-product of evolution" (*ib.*, p. 49) or "a local effect" (*ib.*, Intro., p. x), to be "detached from a vastly wider reality" (*ib.*, p. 193), compared to which it is "like a solid nucleus formed by means of local concentration" (*ib.*, p. 191) or of "condensation" (*ib.*, p. 193).

Therefore, not only is the genesis of intellect and the genesis of material bodies correlative, "for we cannot make the genesis of the one without making the genesis of the other" inasmuch as "both are derived from a wider and higher form of existence" (*ib.*, p. 187), but the very nature of the intellect is set forth, for "matter is determined by intelligence and there is between them an evident agreement" (*ib.*, p. 199). This agreement is shown in the action of intellect on matter. For while the material order unfolds automatically, yet intellect expands it, for "the more intelligence busies itself with dividing, the more it will spread out in space, in the form of extension adjoining extension, a matter that undoubtedly itself has a tendency to spatiality, but whose parts are yet in a state of reciprocal implication and interpenetration" (*ib.*, p. 189). Thus intellect is said "to create order by analyzing the object" and "the more complexity intellect puts into the object by analyzing it, the more complex is the order it finds there," for "the order grows with the complexity, since it is only an aspect of it" (*ib.*, pp. 208, 209).

As mind is the principle of both orders, of the vital by *tension* and of the material by *detension*, so "in general reality is *ordered* exactly to the degree in which it satisfies our thought," and order is "mind finding itself in things." From this viewpoint order is said to be "a certain agreement between subject and object" (*ib.*, p. 223). In the second

place the agreement between matter and intellect is shown in the form and action of the intellect. The intellect is "originally fashioned on the form of matter" (*ib.*, p. 160) and bears upon itself "the general configuration of that matter" (*ib.*, Intro., p. xiii); hence "it treats everything mechanically" (*ib.*, p. 165).

Intellect itself and its two main functions, viz. "deduction and induction are governed by the properties of matter" (*ib.*, p. 212). All its operations tend to geometry as the goal where they find their perfect fulfilment; but geometry is necessarily prior to them, for these operations do not construct space but take it as given; hence there is a latent geometry immanent in our idea of space which is the mainspring of our intellect and the cause of its working (*ib.*, p. 210). Thus "logic and geometry engender each other"; "it is from the extension of a certain natural geometry that natural logic has arisen," and "geometry and logic are strictly applicable to matter" (*ib.*, p. 161).

Hence the moulds of intellect are fashioned on matter, "its chief object is the unorganized solid" (*ib.*, p. 153); and "it is never at home except when working upon inert matter. It is extended; it presents to us objects external to other objects, and, in these objects, parts external to parts" (*ib.*, p. 154). "Its habits and views are static" (*ib.*, pp. 298, 300); it "looks from the outside and grasps the ready-made" (*ib.*, p. 200). Constructed as an

instrument of action, i.e. "to act and to know we are acting," it is guided and ruled by the special "work that is being accomplished" (*ib.*, p. 191), hence "the cerebral mechanism is arranged just so as to drive back into the unconscious almost the whole of the past, and to admit beyond the threshold only that which can cast light on the present situation or further the action now being prepared — in short, only that which can give *useful* work" (*ib.*, p. 5). And as action goes "by leaps, and to act is to readjust oneself" (*ib.*, p. 330), the intellect "regards the object in hand as *provisionally* final and treats it as a unit" and is directed through the interests of action "to *actual* or *future* positions of the object and not to the *progress*" (*ib.*, p. 194).

Hence "of the discontinuous" and of "immobilities alone" does the intellect form "a clear idea" (*ib.*, pp. 154, 155). "It forms the idea of mobility by constructing movement out of immobilities put together, i.e. by substitution, but does not pretend to reconstruct the movement such as it actually is; it merely replaces it with a practical equivalent." Thus "the actual forms which it uses are artificial and provisional" (*ib.*, pp. 155, 156). It cannot grasp reality, i.e. Duration, for "reality appears as a ceaseless upspringing of something new, which has no sooner arisen to make the present than it has already fallen back into the past; at this exact moment it falls under the glance of the intellect, whose eyes are ever turned to the rear" (*ib.*, p. 47).

Even this past it perceives abstractly, i.e. from Duration, by taking snapshots, considering parts outside of parts, although in touch with Duration. Hence its knowledge is abstract, mechanical and artificial and is itself, Professor Bergson says, "an abstract view of the cause of its own being" (*ib.*, p. 53). In like manner it "considers the future abstractly" (*ib.*, p. 53), for "only that is foreseen which is like the past" (*ib.*, p. 28). In this sense it is "the faculty of connecting the same with the same, of perceiving and also producing repetitions" (*ib.*, p. 52).

Hence "the division of unorganized matter into separate bodies is relative to our senses and to our intellect," for "matter looked at as an undivided whole is a flux rather than a thing" (*ib.*, p. 186); yet he says that "the knowledge of matter which it gives us appears as approximative, but not as relative" (*ib.*, p. 206); that "the qualities of matter are so many stable views that we take of its instability"; that "the form is only a snapshot view of a transition" and that "our perception manages to solidify into discontinuous images the fluid continuity of the real" (*ib.*, p. 302). When applied to life, intellect "brings us and moreover only claims to bring us a translation in terms of inertia. It goes all around life, taking from the outside the greatest possible number of views of it, drawing it into itself, instead of entering into it" (*ib.*, p. 176) with the result that

it fails to grasp "the very substance" of things, i.e. Duration, and "the manifold causes and elements" which it attributes to vital phenomena are "only views of the mind" (*ib.*, p. 226).

From the fact that the intellect in its operations is "discontinuous," and that "it applies forms that are indeed those of unorganized matter," we are enabled to understand the nature of "the concept." "Concepts, in fact, are outside each other, like objects in space; and they have the same stability as such objects, on which they have been modelled. Taken together, they constitute an 'intelligible world,' that resembles the world of solids in its essential characters, but whose elements are lighter, more diaphanous, easier for the intellect to deal with than the image of concrete things; they are not, indeed, the perception itself of things, but the representation of the act by which the intellect is fixed on them. They are, therefore, not images, but symbols. Our logic is the complete set of rules that must be followed in using symbols. As these symbols are derived from the consideration of solids, as the rules for combining these symbols hardly do more than express the most general relations among solids, our logic triumphs in that science which takes the solidity of bodies for its object, that is, in geometry" (*ib.*, pp. 160, 161). Therefore, the knowledge of intellect is external, phenomenal and symbolical.

In illustration of intellectual action, Professor Bergson points to the cinematograph. The mechanical contrivance of "moving pictures," he holds, enables us to understand "the mechanism of our thought" (*ib.*, p. 306). In the mechanism of moving pictures we have each colored *form* or *picture* distinct and separate, i.e. snapshot views, i.e. qualities, forms, positions, intentions (*ib.*, p. 308), and the movement is in the apparatus. This movement consists in juxtaposing form to form or supraposing form on form so rapidly that the movement appears to be articulated internally to the forms or pictures. But this is an illusion. The movement is not in them, for they are "so many stable views" (*ib.*, p. 302), but in the machine. It is external, mechanical, artificial, and gives not real movement itself but merely an imitation of movement. Thus he adds, "perception, intellection, language so proceed in general" (*ib.*, p. 306).

The criticism which Professor Bergson makes of intellectual knowledge in general, he applies to science in particular, for "positive science is the work of pure intellect." Hence "science can only act by means of inert matter," "makes use of this by mechanical inventions" and "gives an *a priori* mechanistic conception of nature" (*ib.*, pp. 105, 196). Although "inert matter enters naturally into the frames of the intellect" and so science, e.g. physics, in regard "to its general form may touch the absolute" (*ib.*, p. 198), yet in regard to "the particular

cutting out," it "is contingent and relative, relative to the variable it has chosen, relative to the order in which it has successively put the problems" (*ib.*, p. 219).

Furthermore "matter is a tendency to constitute *isolable* systems which can be treated geometrically. In fact we shall define matter by just this tendency. But it is only a tendency. Matter does not go to the end, and the isolation is never complete. If science does go to the end and isolates completely, it is for convenience of study" (*ib.*, p. 10), and its systems are, therefore, called "artificial" (*ib.*, p. 31) and "abstract," for the systems we cut out within the whole would, properly speaking, not then be *parts* at all; "they would be *partial views* of the whole" (*ib.*), for "the most radical progress a science can achieve is the working of the completed results into a new system of the whole, by relation to which they become instantaneous and motionless views taken at intervals along the continuity of a movement," i.e. it "translates" (*ib.*, pp. 31, 32), and is *mechanical* for the result would be "a pure mechanism over which Duration glides without penetrating" (*ib.*, p. 37).

For like reasons science deals with the "*same*," with "*repetitions*" (*ib.*, p. 29), and its knowledge is "negative," for it is based on the material order, which is negative, and though it "appears to deal with a positive reality," yet it is concerned with "the absence rather than the presence of a true

reality" (*ib.*, p. 208), and with the "abstract," i.e. with "what is withdrawn, by hypothesis, from the action of real time" (*ib.*, p. 29), and so "considers them in the abstract" (*ib.*, p. 342).

Therefore "physical laws" are *negative*, for they express "this merely negative tendency"; they are *abstract*, for "none of them, taken separately, has objective reality"; and *artificial*, for "each is the work of an investigator who has regarded things from a certain bias, isolated certain variables, applied certain conventional units of measurement" (*ib.*, p. 218). As with the intellect, so the knowledge, which science has of the living, is *symbolical*, for "here the use of conceptual frames is no longer natural" and "it is by accident — chance, or convention, as you please — that science obtains a hold of the living analogous to the hold it has on matter" (*ib.*, p. 198).

II. *Illusions of Intellect*

In the doctrine of the twofold order, *automatic* and *willed*, Professor Bergson holds we have a ready and sure solution for what he calls the "illusions" of the intellect.

The first of these illusions is the idea of *Disorder* (*ib.*, p. 274). This idea, he says, is met in the fundamental problem of knowledge, but he adds that the idea of *Disorder* is an illusion, a pseudo-idea, that in reality there is no such thing as *Disorder*. For, as the two orders are contrary and complementary,

so that "the absence of the one means the presence of the other," it follows that "only order is real, and disorder is one of two orders for which we were not looking." Hence "the idea of disorder is entirely practical. It corresponds to the disappointment of a certain expectation and does not denote the absence of all order, but only the presence of that order which does not offer us actual interest." This idea is due to "the fundamental illusion of our understanding that we go from absence to presence, from the void to the full," whereas in itself it is "a word" and no more (*ib.*).

The second illusion is the idea of *Nothing*. This idea Professor Bergson says is "the hidden spring of philosophical thinking," for it suggests the inquiries into the origin of existence inasmuch as "existence appears like a conquest over naught" (*ib.*, p. 275). But he tells us that the idea of *nothing* "is a pseudo-idea and the problems that are raised around it are pseudo-problems" (*ib.*, p. 277). He says that the idea of nothing implies "the annihilation of everything," but "while the mind can represent any particular thing as annihilated, yet the idea of the annihilation of everything presents the same character as that of a square circle: it is not an idea, it is only a word," for "there is no absolute void in nature," and the annihilation of a thing means really the *absence* of that thing and the *presence* of another thing in its place.

Thus the idea of *nothing* corresponds to the idea of *absence*, and there is absence only for "a being capable of remembering and forgetting." All that is expressed negatively by such words as "naught" or "void," therefore, is "not so much thought as feeling, or, to speak more exactly, it is the tinge that feeling gives to thought." Hence "the idea implies on the subjective side a preference, on the objective side a substitution, and is nothing else but a combination of, or rather an interference between this feeling of preference and this idea of substitution" (*ib.*, pp. 281, 282).

This idea of nothing is due to a fundamental illusion of the intellect, for "every human action has its starting point in a dissatisfaction, and thereby in a feeling of absence. Our action proceeds thus from 'nothing' to 'something,' and its very essence is to embroider 'something' on the canvas of 'nothing.' The truth is that 'nothing' concerned here is the absence not so much of a thing as of a utility" (*ib.*, p. 297). Therefore, he tells us, that "the question: 'why does something exist?' is consequently without meaning, a pseudo-problem raised about a pseudo-idea," and is due to "the fact that the forms of human action venture outside their proper sphere" and "it is in order to act that we think" (*ib.*, pp. 296, 297), for "intellect is relative to the needs of action. Postulate action and the very form of the intellect can be deduced from it. This form

is therefore neither irreducible nor inexplicable" (*ib.*, p. 152).

A third illusion is "that the mind imitates, by its instability, the very movement of the real" (*ib.*, p. 308) or, in other words, the belief that "we can reduce things, i.e. becoming, to ideas" (*ib.*, p. 315). But there is "*more* in a becoming than in the forms passed through in turn, *more* in the evolution of form than the forms assumed one after another" (*ib.*, p. 316). Hence we "cannot construct changes out of states." It "implies the absurd proposition, that movement is made of immobilities" (*ib.*, p. 308). But "he who installs himself in becoming sees in duration the very life of things, the fundamental reality." So "from duration we can derive the forms," not vice versa. The illusion is due to the cinematographical mechanism of the intellect, which attempts to derive duration from the forms (*ib.*, pp. 316, 317).

Another illusion, akin to the former, is the attempt to impose on vital phenomena the categories of the intellect, viz. "unity, multiplicity, mechanical causality, intelligent finality" (*ib.*, Intro., p. x). Now the vital order, we are told, consists in the tendential unfolding of countless potentialities immanent in the vital impulse and is characterized by *continual creation*, *freedom*, i.e. *change*, *unforeseeability*, whereas the intellect is in the material order, being configured to matter, regards the past, and has *static* forms and habits. Hence

the illusion is due to a confusion of the two orders and to an attempt at explaining the evolution of life by a *by-product*, or part of the evolution, i.e. by the intellect.

A final illusion is presented in "the idea of a *general order of nature*, everywhere the same, hovering over life and over matter alike" (*ib.*, p. 226). We conceive this idea, according to Professor Bergson, because phenomena of matter and of living beings *repeat themselves*, and reveal characters of *likeness* and of *sameness* in form and in function, which enable the mind to *generalize*. Hence, he adds, "our habit of designating by the same word and representing in the same way the existence of *laws* in the domain of inert matter and that of *genera* in the domain of life" (*ib.*). This illusion is due to "the confusion of the geometrical order and the vital order," for "in both ancient and modern philosophy the idea of 'generality' is an equivocal idea, uniting in its denotation and in its connotation incompatible objects and elements. In both there are grouped under the same concept two kinds of order which are alike only in the facility they give to our action on things. We bring together the two terms in virtue of a quite external likeness which justifies no doubt their designation by the same word for practice, but which does not authorize us at all, in the speculative domain, to confuse them in the same definition" (*ib.*, p. 227). The likeness between the orders is, there-

fore, *external* and *accidental*, for "the vital order, which is essentially creation, is manifested to us no less in its essence" (i.e. creation) "than in some of its accidents, those which *imitate* the physical and geometrical order; like it, they present to us repetitions that make generalization possible, and in that we have all that interests us." These "accidents" are "the innumerable living beings, almost alike, that have to repeat each other in space and in time for the novelty they are working out to grow and mature" (*ib.*, p. 231). Hence "the repetition which serves as the base of our generalizations is essential in the physical order, which is 'automatic,' accidental in the vital order" (*ib.*). By a like confusion of the two orders Professor Bergson explains the concepts of *chaos*, *chance* and *anarchy* (*ib.*, p. 237).

CHAPTER XI

PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION: (*concluded*)

The Theory of Knowledge

I. *Intellect and Instinct*

THE doctrine of the Two Orders is also the basis of Professor Bergson's teaching on the relation of intellect to instinct. He calls intellect and instinct "two tendencies," opposite "and complementary" (*ib.*, pp. 135, 136). They "at their origin interpenetrated each other" (*ib.*, p. 175), i.e. "the original psychic activity included both at once," and "if we went far enough back, we should find intelligence and instinct, in this elementary condition, prisoners of a matter which they were not able to control" (*ib.*, p. 141). Now the purpose of Creative Evolution is to introduce indeterminateness into matter, yet "the force immanent in life is limited and must choose between two ways of acting on inert matter," for "it is hard for it to go far in several directions at once" (*ib.*, pp. 141, 142); and we are also told that "it is no less true that nature must have hesitated between two modes of psychical activity — one assured of immediate success, the other hazardous" (*ib.*, p. 143). The reader may not understand all this; however, the choice was

made. So the force chose to act on matter *directly*, i.e. by *instinct*, which is "the faculty of creating organized instruments," and *indirectly*, i.e. by *intellect*, and this indirect action is effected through the medium or instrumentality of "an organism which fashions unorganized, i.e. artificial instruments."

In the first case "the same principle, i.e. the original psychic activity, remains within itself" (*ib.*, p. 168). Therefore instinct "is turned to certain determinations of life" (*ib.*, p. 186), is regarded as "completing the work of organization," so that "there is no sharp line between the instinct of animals and the organizing work of living matter" (*ib.*, p. 140), and is in the Order of Life. In the second case the original psychic activity "steps out of itself and becomes absorbed in the utilization of inert matter" (*ib.*, p. 168); therefore intellect "is moulded on the configuration of matter" (*ib.*, p. 186), is regarded as artificially extending the work of organization and is in the inert or Material Order. They are tendencies, therefore "diverge more and more from each other, as they overlap, but are never entirely separated from each other" (*ib.*, p. 142), and "it is at the extremity of principal lines of evolution that we find intelligence and instinct in forms almost pure" (*ib.*, p. 174).

Although of a common origin, Professor Bergson says that instinct and intelligence differ. They differ because "they represent two divergent solu-

tions, equally fitting, of one and the same problem," i.e. as "means of defence against enemies" (*ib.*, p. 143). But this is a strange mixture of Professor Bergson's cosmogony and the Darwinian theory. Again we are told that they differ "profoundly in internal structure." They "imply two radically different kinds of knowledge" (*ib.*, p. 143): "this knowledge is rather *acted* and unconscious in the case of instinct, *thought*, and conscious in the case of intelligence. But it is rather a difference of degree than of kind" (*ib.*, p. 145), for "knowledge and action are here only two aspects of one and the same faculty" (*ib.*, p. 150). The reader of *Creative Evolution* is aware that Professor Bergson is apt to be violent and somewhat unfortunate in the use of figures of speech. Here the fault is found in his use of adjectives, for it is difficult to understand how a "radical difference" is merely one "of degree."

The "essential difference," however, "from the psychological point of view" is found in "the two *objects* upon which they are directed." Both are "inherited functions, therefore innate." Instinct is "the innate knowledge of a *thing*," it "implies the knowledge of a *matter*," and "this kind of knowledge is formulated in what philosophers call *categorical* propositions." Intellect, on the contrary, is "the innate knowledge of relations," implies "the knowledge of a *form*," i.e. something external or the outward aspect of a thing, and

"this kind of knowledge is always expressed *hypothetically*" (*ib.*, pp. 145-149).

Finally "this entirely *formal* knowledge of intelligence has an immense advantage over the *material* knowledge of instinct. A form, just because it is empty, may be filled at will with any number of things in turn, even with those that are of no use. So that a formal knowledge is not limited to what is practically useful, although it is in view of practical utility that it has made its appearance in the world. An intelligent being bears within himself the means to transcend his own nature. He transcends himself, however, less than he wishes, less also than he imagines himself to do. The purely formal character of intelligence deprives it of the balance necessary to enable it to settle itself on the objects that are of the most powerful interest to speculation. Instinct, on the contrary, has the desired materiality, but it is incapable of going so far in quest of its object; it does not speculate." Hence the ultimate difference is: "There are things that intelligence alone is able to seek, but which, by itself, it will never find. These things instinct alone could find; but it will never seek them" (*ib.*, p. 151).

In criticism it may be noted that intellect is said "to be configured to matter" and "in the automatic order," yet can *speculate* and has *formal* knowledge. Now the word *formal* may be taken in the concrete and in this sense it belongs to the

Order of Life, for the purpose of Creative Evolution is the creation of *form*, or it may be taken in the abstract. In the latter sense we have intellect, essentially existing only as a configuration of matter, yet possessing in itself "empty forms" which "may be filled at will with any number of things in turn." From this teaching it is inferred that the "forms" are part and parcel of intellect and are prior to the particular action of the intellect. Yet this is flatly contradicted by Professor Bergson who says: "Knowledge becomes relative, as soon as the intellect is made a kind of absolute. We regard the human intellect, on the contrary, as relative to the needs of action. Postulate action, and the very form of the intellect can be deduced from it. This form is therefore neither irreducible nor inexplicable" nor "independent" (*ib.*, p. 152), and "the needs of action" are the needs of "a practically useful end" (*ib.*, p. 155).

Moreover instinct is placed in the Order of Life, yet "retains an almost invariable structure, since a modification of it involves a modification of the species," is "therefore necessarily specialized, being nothing but the utilization of a specific instrument for a specific object" (*ib.*, p. 140); whereas "the intellect is placed in the order of matter, makes its instrument of unorganized matter" and this "can take any form whatsoever, serve any purpose, free the living being from every new difficulty that arises and bestow on it an unlimited number of

powers" (*ib.*, p. 141). Yet the Order of Life is, by hypothesis, the order of freedom, while the Material Order is the order of necessity (*ib.*, p. 236). Finally contact with matter is set forth as the determining principle of individuation (*ib.*, p. 258).

As instinct and intelligence are developed from the same principle, i.e. *consciousness* or *supra-consciousness* or *mind*, they are said to have "the same background, i.e. consciousness which "is coextensive with universal life" (*ib.*, p. 186), and instinct is presented as "not within the domain of intelligence and not beyond the limit of mind" (*ib.*, p. 175). This consciousness is "a rudimentary and vague activity diffused throughout the mass of the organized substance." It is connected with mobility and is "the cause of movement since it has to direct locomotion" and is the effect of movement, "for it is the motor activity that maintains it, and, once this activity disappears, consciousness dies away or rather falls asleep." Hence "the humblest organism is conscious in proportion to its power to move *freely*" (*ib.*, pp. 109, 111). It is described as "the light that plays around the zone of possible actions or potential activity which surrounds the action really performed by the living being. It signifies hesitation or choice" (*ib.*, p. 144) and "is proportionate to the power of choice" (*ib.*, p. 179). But "neither this mobility nor this choice nor consequently this consciousness involves as a necessary condition the presence of a nervous

system; the latter has only canalized in definite directions and brought to a higher degree of perfection the vague activity" "by giving it the double form of reflex and voluntary activity" (*ib.*, p. 110). For, "the nervous system marks out reflex lines on which action will run" and "by their development and configuration indicate more or less extended choice" so that "the awakening of consciousness is the more complete the greater the latitude of choice allowed to it and the larger the amount of action bestowed on it" (*ib.*, pp. 252-262).

It is natural to suppose therefore that consciousness develops with the development of organization, which is the work of Life. On the contrary "to find probable cases of vegetable consciousness we must *descend* as low as possible in the scale of plants"; "to find the best specimens of consciousness in the animal we must *ascend* to the highest representatives of the series" although in some animals "the progress of organization must have localized all the conscious activity in nervous centres" with the result "that consciousness is even weaker in animals of this kind than in organisms much less differentiated"; (*ib.*, pp. 111, 112). Yet we read that "intelligence points to consciousness, instinct," which is in the Order of Life "to unconsciousness" (*ib.*, p. 145) and in fact "instincts are more or less conscious in certain cases, unconscious in others" (*ib.*, p. 143).

In the living being, Professor Bergson tells us "consciousness does not spring from the brain, but brain and consciousness correspond because equally they measure, the one by the complexity of its structure and the other by the intensity of its awareness, the quantity of *choice* that the living being has at its disposal" (*ib.*, p. 262), and again, "the consciousness of a living being is inseparable from the brain in the sense in which a sharp knife is inseparable from its edge: the brain is the sharp edge by which consciousness cuts into the compact tissue of events, but the brain is no more coextensive with consciousness than the edge with the knife. Thus from the fact that two brains, like that of the ape and that of the man, are very much alike, we cannot conclude that the corresponding consciousnesses are comparable or commensurable" (*ib.*, p. 263).

But here Professor Bergson changes the metaphor and, by changing, causes confusion of thought. For if the brain or the nervous system canalizes a vague activity diffused throughout the organism, it forms or moulds or consolidates the knife itself. Professor Bergson holds that the brain of man and that of the animal differ not only in size but also in function, for "in the animal, the motor mechanisms that the brain succeeds in setting up, or, in other words, the habits contracted voluntarily, have no other object nor effect than the accomplishment of the movements marked out in these habits,

stored in these mechanisms. But, in man, the motor habit may have a second result, out of proportion to the first: it can hold other motor habits in check, and thereby, in overcoming automatism, set consciousness free," and attributes this to "the cerebral mechanisms that correspond to words" (*ib.*, p. 183).

But *inhibition* cannot be explained in a mechanical manner on materialistic grounds. Again, to explain *inhibition* by *localization of function* runs counter to the process of Creative Evolution, for the localization of speech points to automatism, not to free activity (*ib.*, p. 264).

Finally, the *self* is explained by consciousness, for it is "the concentration of the different parts of our being in a point, or rather a sharp edge pressed against the future and cutting into it unceasingly," "if we let ourselves go, and, instead of acting, dream, at once the self is scattered" (*ib.*, p. 20), and this concentration is "the tension of an indivisible active will" (*ib.*, p. 207). The tension itself is explained by the interests of action, for "each of our acts aims at a certain insertion of our will into reality" (*ib.*, p. 306).

II. *Nature of Intuition*

The doctrine of the Two Orders enables us to grasp the place and scope of intuition in the theory of knowledge.

Intuition is the characteristic doctrine of Professor Bergson's epistemology and is considered by him as opposed to, yet complementary of, intellect. The fundamental reason of this opposition and complementarity is that intellect and intuition "represent two opposite directions of the work of consciousness: intuition goes in the very direction of life, intellect goes in the inverse direction and finds itself in accordance with the movement of matter. A perfect humanity would contain both forms," but with us "intuition is almost completely sacrificed to intellect," it is "a lamp almost extinguished" (*ib.*, p. 267).

A conception of the nature and function of intuition is obtained in its twofold relation to instinct and to intelligence. Now instinct is defined as "sympathy," "a divining sympathy" that creates organized instruments and brings the consciousness of the living being into direct relation with a specific object (*ib.*, p. 175). Hence instinct is *feeling* specialized, i.e. canalized in specific modes of action. Hence instinct is in the order of life and intuition is nothing more than instinct purified, for "by intuition I mean instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting on its object and enlarging it indefinitely" (*ib.*, p. 176), i.e. "independent of the interest it has for us" (*ib.*, p. 274); in other words, *feeling* not specified.

The relation of intuition to intellect is grasped when we bear in mind how intellect is formed.

The intellect is the adaptation of consciousness to matter. The result of this adaptation is that consciousness is configured to matter, and the configuration is presented as a "luminous nucleus" (*ib.*, p. 177) "formed out of the real," i.e. consciousness or feeling, "by condensation" (*ib.*, p. 46). Feeling is "an indistinct fringe which fades off into darkness" and which "surrounds the bright nucleus in the centre," i.e. "the intellect" (*ib.*). The "indistinct fringe" is also described as "a fluid surrounding intellect" or "an ocean of life," i.e. feeling (*ib.*, p. 191), so that intellect does not radically differ from the fluid (*ib.*, p. 193). Just as the intellect is "the bright nucleus," the condensation of "darkness into light," or "of the ocean of life" into a particular form, so "intuition is the vague fringe that surrounds our distinct, i.e. our intellectual representation," and "this useless fringe is that part of the evolving principle that has not shrunk to the peculiar form of organization, but has settled around it unasked for, unwanted" (*ib.*, p. 49).

Now intellect and intuition furnish us with the opposite and complementary knowledge of the opposite and complementary parts of reality. Intellect enables us to grasp the real in its inverse or material tendency, i.e. matter; intuition gives the knowledge of the real in its creative or vital tendency, i.e. spirit and life. The knowledge of intellect is called the knowledge of common sense

or of science. The knowledge of intuition is called the knowledge of Philosophy or of Metaphysics. In comparison one to the other, Professor Bergson holds that intuition, i.e. the "fringe," is "of more importance for philosophy than the nucleus," i.e. intellect, which "it surrounds," for its "presence enables us to affirm that the nucleus is a nucleus, that pure intellect is a contraction, by condensation, of a more extensive power" (*ib.*, p. 46), whereas intuition is this wider power uncondensed. Again, intuition is in the Order of Life, represents positive creative action and leads us "to the very inwardness of life." Intellect, on the contrary, is in the Inverse Order, represents a "letting go," i.e. a relaxation of creative action, and is occupied with external views of things only.

Hence the basic teaching in the Theory of Knowledge is found in the twofold order which sets forth a twofold experience, viz. that of intellect, i.e. of *thought* which in its nature is *feeling condensed*, and that of intuition, i.e. of instinct purified, which in its nature is *feeling vague* and *uncondensed*. With these two elements furnished by the twofold experience the Theory of Knowledge must be formulated. As twofold experience gives two sources of knowledge opposite and complementary, it is evident that the Theory of Knowledge cannot be based on intellect alone. For the intellect gives only half of the real, and the half it gives is the real viewed as negative, i.e. as relaxing. The intellect is a "by-

product" of evolution and therefore, as a part, cannot offer a knowledge of the whole.

Again, intellect cannot reach the other half of the real, i.e. fundamental reality, for "it is characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life," i.e. "it proceeds mechanically" (*ib.*, p. 165). "Life has not employed all the psychical potentialities it possesses in producing pure understanding, i.e. in making geometricians. The line of evolution that ends in man is not the only one. In other paths divergent from it, other forms of consciousness have been developed, which express something that is immanent and essential in the evolutionary movement." "If these were brought together and amalgamated with intellect, the result would be a consciousness as wide as life" (*ib.*, Intro., p. xii). Hence parallel to physics, i.e. intellectual knowledge, "a second kind of knowledge ought to have grown up, which could have retained what physics allowed to escape" (p. 342). To intellect therefore should be added intuition.

The process by which this other kind of knowledge is acquired is somewhat complicated. It is, on the one hand, "developing intuition" and, on the other, "expanding" or "transcending" intellect. Professor Bergson tells what is necessary: "If in evolving in the direct line of the vertebrates in general and of man in particular, life has had to abandon by the way many elements incompatible with this particular mode of organiza-

tion and consign them to other lines of development, it is the totality of these elements that man must find again and rejoin to the intellect proper in order to grasp the true nature of the vital principle." And "we shall probably be aided in this by the fringe of vague intuition" (i.e. the unshrunk part of the vital principle) "that surrounds our distinct, i.e. intellectual, representations." It is "there, accordingly, that we must look for hints to expand the intellectual form of our thought; from there we shall derive the impetus necessary to lift us above ourselves" (*ib.*, p. 49). In particular, we can work on instinct, for instinct is sympathy, and intuition is instinct disinterested, hence "if this sympathy could extend its object and also reflect upon itself, it would give us the key to vital operations — just as intelligence, developed and disciplined, guides us into matter" (*ib.*, p. 176).

But Professor Bergson cannot mean distinct, specialized instinct, for "instinct retains an almost invariable structure, since a modification of it involves a modification of the species, is therefore necessarily specialized, being nothing but the utilization of a specific instrument for a specific object" (*ib.*, p. 140). So he must refer to vague instinct, but he forgets to tell us the "object" of this instinct, or how it can "reflect upon itself." Therefore both the general and the particular methods present as the ultimate groundwork of the process "a vague fringe" around the intellect, i.e. around our

distinct representations, and "a vague instinct." Now these are not different, for Professor Bergson identifies the one with the other when he writes that "the intellect is the luminous nucleus, around which instinct, even enlarged and purified into intuition, forms only a vague nebulosity" (*ib.*, p. 177). And as "nebulosity" means what is "cloudy" or "hazy" or "foggy," the process really consists in showing how to pass from the luminous brightness of intellect to a state of cloudiness or haziness or fog represented by intuition. No wonder we read that it is "an infinitely difficult enterprise and which passes the powers of the intellect alone" (*ib.*, p. 207). But as the enterprise is not only possible but even necessary for the Theory of Knowledge, and as Professor Bergson points out the means, we shall briefly set them forth.

The first means suggested is the cultivation of the æsthetic sense, so pronounced in the artist or the poet. As a result we shall see not from without and for practical interests but from within, so that reality will appear as a continuous creation of unforeseeable forms (*ib.*, p. 177).

Another means is the cultivation of "sympathy." For while "knowledge properly so called is reserved to pure intelligence," yet "intuition will suggest to us the vague feeling, if nothing more, of what must take the place of intellectual moulds." "Then by the sympathetic communication which it establishes between us and the rest of the living, by the

expansion of our consciousness which it brings about, it introduces us into life's own domain, which is reciprocal interpenetration, endlessly continued creation." And "though I hereby transcend intellect, it is from intellect that has come the push that has made it rise to the point it has reached. Without intelligence it would have remained in the form of instinct, riveted to the special object of its practical interest and turned outward by it into instruments of locomotion" (*ib.*, pp. 177, 178). Hence in "sympathy" we have "the feeling of duration," which is "the actual coinciding of ourself with itself," and by this feeling "we get back into duration and so transcend intellect" (*ib.*, p. 200), for "the veil between consciousness and ourselves is removed" (*ib.*, p. 272). Thus "sympathy" assumes its proper place, i.e. "before perception and knowledge" (*ib.*, p. 174). But Professor Bergson has said that "specialized instinct" cannot be transformed or freed from its object, and that intellect is "charged with matter" and created only for matter, that intellect in reality has no "push" in itself, being only something *negative*, i.e. a relaxation of consciousness. Yet here intellect is presented as pushing instinct into a broader life. Again intellect and instinct represent *diverging* and *opposite* tendencies, and how can one push the other?

The cultivating of sympathy is described as a "squeezing," for we read that "intellect is charged

with matter, instinct (i.e. sympathy) with life. We must squeeze them both together in order to get the double essence from them" (*ib.*, p. 178), and this because as "the nucleus has been formed out of the rest by condensation, the whole must be used, the fluid as well as, and more than, the condensed in order to grasp the inner movement of life" (*ib.*, p. 49).

But to squeeze divergent tendencies, they must be brought together, and for this Professor Bergson advocates more violent measures. So we are told that we must awaken "the consciousness that slumbers in instinct" (*ib.*, p. 165). Strange that instinct, which is in the Order of Life, should fall into such a profound sleep! We might have supposed that intellect would do this according to Professor Bergson's principles, but, on the contrary, intellect seems to be very wide awake. However, we are not told how to awaken instinct. Possibly the "push" of the intellect does this. Secondly we must place ourselves within the vital impetus; this impetus or current of will is at the basis of our being, but we seem to be outside of it, for "we hardly feel it" and when we do "we only grasp an individual and fragmentary will." "To get it, we must put back our being into our will and our will into the impulsion it prolongs," i.e. the "*vis a tergo*." Thus "when we contract our whole being in order to thrust it forward," we get "the consciousness of becoming" (*ib.*, pp. 237, 239).

The great obstacle in a performance of this kind is the intellect. Life in general, or consciousness in general, is *will*, i.e. the *vital impetus*, but intellectual consciousness is not *will*, but *thought*. And *thought* is consciousness in general adapted to matter. Professor Bergson says that "consciousness in man is pre-eminently intellect," i.e. thought; "it might have been, it ought to have been, also intuition" (*ib.*, p. 267), i.e. *will* or *feeling*, but it is not. Now how can *thought* become *will*, i.e. how can human consciousness, which is a product of consciousness in general, be made to coincide with its principle? This can be done by getting it away from matter, i.e. "by making it transcend itself," and this is possible because "intellect and feeling are of the same nature." So we read, "in order that our consciousness should coincide with something of its principle, it must detach itself from the *ready-made* and attach itself to the *being-made*. It needs that, turning back on itself and twisting on itself, the faculty of seeing should be made to be one with the act of *willing* — a painful effort which we can make suddenly, doing violence to our nature, but cannot sustain more than a few moments" (*ib.*, p. 237).

Thus in *transcending* intellect, i.e. getting it out of matter, we also *expand* intellect, i.e. make it coincide with something of its principle. The ideal state implies a complete expansion which would give "a consciousness as wide as life." This is

obtained by *amalgamation*, for "if the other forms of consciousness," developed on other paths diverging from the line of evolution ending in man, "were brought together and amalgamated with the intellect, the result would be a consciousness as wide as life. Such a consciousness, turning around suddenly against the push of life it feels behind, would have a fleeting vision of life complete" (*ib.*, Intro., p. xii).

The difficulty for the reader in this explanation is to locate the "push." On the original hypothesis the "push" is the vital impetus, and is not so "tremendous" after all, for it becomes atrophied and goes to sleep, e.g. in instinct. Also this push comes from behind, for it is a "*vis a tergo*." Also the intellect is described as having "its eyes ever turned to the rear," therefore it ought to see something of the "push," for while in its own nature it is a relaxation or "letting go" (*ib.*, p. 161), yet as a matter of fact we are told that "the relaxation is never complete." Strange to say, the intellect does not see the push. The result of the amalgamation of other forms of consciousness with intellect turns the intellect around in the direction of life. In this position of looking forward, intellect cannot see the "push," which on hypothesis comes from behind. So it must turn around again and is rewarded with "a fleeting vision."

Professor Bergson calls the "amalgamation" a "mixture," for, when explaining the nature of re-

flex and voluntary actions, he says we must *mix* both so as to get "the fluid reality which has been precipitated in this twofold form and which probably shares in both without being either" and this fluid is found in the "undifferentiated protoplasmic mass" and is "the original simple activity," but "became diversified through the very construction of mechanisms like those of the spinal cord and the brain" (*ib.*, p. 366).

While the hints for expanding intellect come from "the vague fringe," yet Professor Bergson says that "the intellect possesses a means by which it can transcend itself," viz. its formal knowledge, for "a form, because empty, may be filled with any number of things in turn." But the intellect gives us only abstract knowledge, i.e. snapshot views of duration, whereas intuition gives us concrete knowledge, i.e. of the real or duration itself. The intellect by its nature is incapable of grasping the real, i.e. duration, and the filling of the forms will only give "snapshot views." No manipulation of abstract forms filled with abstract knowledge, i.e. "events detached from the living whole" (*ib.*, p. 342), will enable us to pass from the abstract to the concrete, as is Professor Bergson's aim, when no element of the concrete, i.e. duration, by hypothesis enters into this abstract knowledge.

The result of the process is, from Professor Bergson's point of view, twofold. First we have

the true reconciliation of Science and Philosophy, inasmuch as Philosophy or Metaphysics is presented as "the true continuation of science" (*ib.*, p. 371). Science, the work of intellect, dealing with the surface of things and engrossed with practical results, directs our action on things, i.e. gives a workable knowledge useful for the actual needs of practical life. Philosophy, calling upon intellect "to renounce its most cherished habits" and "certain natural aspirations," seizes "the vague fleeting intuitions, in order to sustain, expand and unite them together." The knowledge it gives "is practically useless," it "will not extend our empire over nature," but it possesses "reality itself" (*ib.*, pp. 342, 343). The second result is that Philosophy, in grasping what is below the surface of things, enables us to judge the value of intellectual knowledge, and in expanding intellect into a consciousness as wide as life, becomes "an effort to dissolve again into the whole" (*ib.*, p. 191), which is Duration, "the unceasing creation of new and unforeseeable forms" (*ib.*, p. 239).

III. *Criticism*

In criticising the theory of Knowledge set forth in *Creative Evolution* we premise by observing that, although Professor Bergson writes philosophy in the French language, yet he is not a French philosopher. The characteristic trait of the French

mind is clearness of thought and lucidity of expression.

Creative Evolution includes "a certain conception of knowledge, also a certain metaphysics, both of which imply each other" (*ib.*, p. 185). Now the metaphysics, i.e. the theory of Life, is radically erroneous, and as this is the basis of the theory of Knowledge, the latter falls with the former.

In the theory of Knowledge "science and metaphysics are two opposed but complementary ways of Knowing" (*ib.*, p. 344) in the sense that "each of these two lines of thought leads to the other; they form a circle and there can be no centre to the circle but the empirical study of evolution" (*ib.*, p. 179). But the evolution described is fundamentally erroneous. Therefore there is no centre to the circle and consequently no circle. Besides, the knowledge which intellect and science possess is an abstract artificial mechanical construction of reality. On hypothesis they do not grasp reality itself, i.e. Duration. Intuition alone is supposed to reach reality and the knowledge of intuition consists in "vague fleeting visions" of a vague feeling. But this is Sceptical Idealism with a vague feeling as the only avenue of escape.

This conclusion is strengthened when we bear in mind that the *working-hypothesis*, so dear to Pragmatists, is extended by Professor Bergson to include not only the operations of the intellect but the very nature and construction of the intellect.

So intellectual knowledge by its very nature is *abstract, artificial* and *hypothetical*. In fact Professor Bergson admits that "our habitual manner of speaking, which is fashioned after our habitual manner of thinking, leads us to actual logical deadlocks. But," he adds, "we are not anxious because we feel confusedly that we can always get out of them: all we have to do is to give up the cinematographical habits of our intellect" or "revise the bent of our intellectual habits" or "make complete abstraction of the mechanism," i.e. change the nature of the intellect by "abstraction" or by "installing yourself within change" (*ib.*, pp. 308, 314). But this is easier said than done as the reader understands upon recalling the means proposed to *transcend* the intellect.

Furthermore in defining the intellect as a mechanism and in describing its working by the mechanism of *moving pictures* Professor Bergson reveals the basic error in his theory of Knowledge, i.e. he confounds intellect with imagination. A classic illustration in Scholastic Philosophy is to compare the imagination to a canvas on which the impressions of the senses and the ideas of the intellect are pictured. But the picturing canvas is not all there is to the mental operation. Together with the pictures is the eye of the intellect which sees, criticises, analyzes, compares and reasons on them. So Professor Bergson omits the most important element, viz. the intellect, without which, in fact,

he could not see the pictures. Thus, whereas the imagination is compared to the pictures, the intellect is compared to the audience. Therefore, according to Professor Bergson, we have on supposition a moving picture show, but no one present to say whether the movies are there or not, and no one to tell what the pictures were, not even an operator, for he expressly teaches "there are no things, only tendencies" and things are artificial "cut-outs" from Duration, so the operator would be, in his hypothesis, a part of the moving pictures, not distinct from them.

Finally, Professor Bergson confounds intellect with imagination, because he confounds the *image* with the *idea*. Thus he says that "the idea is the stable view taken of the instability of things" and is the "quality" or "form," "which is a moment of becoming," or "the *intention*, which is nothing else than the *material design*, traced out and contemplated beforehand, of the action accomplished," or "the *essence*, which is the mean form (i.e. image) above and below which the other forms are arranged as alterations of the mean." These ideas or images are "cut out of duration, pure abstractions of the moving reality, snapshots taken at intervals of the flowing, relative to the mind that takes them, and have no independent existence." "These forms the mind isolates and stores up in *concepts*; their intellectual equivalent is artificial and symbolical" (*ib.*, pp. 315, 317).

Hence in representing the *idea* as a *detached image* of a moving reality, i.e. Duration, Professor Bergson naturally appealed to the cinematograph as the best illustration of the nature and operation of the intellect. Therefore, in the last analysis Creative Evoluton is based on an erroneous conception of the idea, the most fundamental and apparently the simplest element in mental life.

CHAPTER XII

PRAGMATISM AND SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY

THE preceding studies of Pragmatism as set forth and developed along various lines by its principal exponents, show clearly that the constituent elements of the system are Idealism, Evolution and a Theory of Mental Life. Idealism is the basic element; Evolution is the integrating element and the Mental Theory may be called the formative element inasmuch as it gives to Pragmatism a peculiar form and character. These three problems, therefore, present a well-defined issue to point out the attitude of Scholasticism toward the latest modern school of philosophic thought.

I. *Perception of External Things*

Some forms of Pragmatism, e.g. the systems elaborated by Professor Royce and Professor Bergson, teach a Pantheistic Idealism of Manifestation. But this Idealism is a part of their peculiar metaphysics and cannot be regarded as characteristic of Pragmatism properly so called.

The Idealism which is distinctive of the system itself and which forms the basic element common to all of its exponents, including Professor Royce

and Professor Bergson, is the Idealism which is connected with the perception of external things. This Idealism is called the Phenomenal Idealism of Sensism or Mediate Perception. Thus Pragmatism teaches that the perception of external things is not the perception of the *things themselves*, but the perception of our *ideas* of the things or the perception of our *feelings* about things, so that, to reach the things, reasoning or induction is required. Hence thought is concerned directly and primarily with modifications or sensations purely subjective. The result is a Sense-Idealism. And as these sensations are viewed as means by which through reasoning we attain the knowledge of things, we have Mediate or Indirect Perception. In the last analysis this doctrine is a form or rather the fundamental principle of Agnosticism, for external things are really the *unknown cause* of our sensations and the *ego* is the unknown recipient, for Pragmatism does not admit a soul and regards the ego as the resultant of our activities or as present knowledge personified.

On this point the issue between Scholastic Philosophy and Pragmatism is clear and marked. Scholastic Philosophy rejects Mediate Perception as a fundamental psychological error, and maintains the doctrine of Immediate Perception, i.e. we directly and immediately know existing *things themselves*. This doctrine of the Immediate Perception of bodies by the external senses is a primitive

fact clearly attested by consciousness, confirmed by common teaching embodying the experience of the whole human race, viz. that we see with the eyes, hear with the ears, touch with the hands, taste with the tongue and palate, smell with the nose, and that what we see, hear, etc. are things independent of us in their existence and activities. This primitive fact and the Scholastic theory based upon it are simple and natural, not forced or artificial.

Scholastic Philosophy holds that, for the perception of external objects, three conditions are necessary: a *subject perceiving*, which it teaches is not the soul only, nor the sense-organ only, but the animated organ or organism, i.e. the conscious living human being, an *object perceived* and a *contact* or *union* of the subject and object. This contact or union consists in the action of the object on the sense-organ.

The most elementary psychological observation tells us that we are in incessant contact with external agents of nature which in their impressions upon us make us aware of their actions and of themselves. Sometimes these agents which come into contact with us are the external bodies themselves, as e.g. in the sense of touch. In the other senses we grasp the vibrations of the air or ether resulting from the actions of the bodies. In both cases we directly and immediately perceive objects and their activities external to us. There

is no intermediary between the external object and the sense-organ other than the action of the external object upon the organ of sense. In this action the contact consists and is described as a union of the object perceived with the subject perceiving.

St. Thomas Aquinas explains this contact or union by the familiar illustration of a seal ring impressed in wax. The act of impressing the ring in the wax leaves upon the wax the impressed likeness of the ring. In like manner the contact of the object with the organ leaves an impressed likeness of the object upon the organ according to the specific nature of the organ, whether it be sight, hearing, smell, taste or touch. This impressed likeness is called the *species impressa*. The result of the impression is the conscious reaction of the sense-organ to the object or agent making the impression. This conscious reaction is the perception of the object, just as the wax, if conscious, would react to the impression of the ring and so would perceive the ring making the impression upon itself. The sentient subject perceives the object therefore, and in so doing, expresses in the imagination a likeness of the object perceived. The conscious expressed likeness of the object perceived made by and in the reaction of the sentient subject to the impression is called the *species expressa*, i.e. the expressed likeness of the object perceived, or the *image* of the object. Hence the *species impressa*, i.e. the impressed likeness of the

object on the organ of sense, is *not what is perceived* in the act of sense cognition, but is the disposing or determining cause by which the organ is placed in sentient contact or union with the object perceived. For example, in the case of sight the sentient contact of the organ with the object is effected by and in the impressed likeness of the object upon the retina, so that an eye without the retina could not see the object because it could not be placed in the sentient contact with the object which is necessary for the sense of sight. But the particular impressed likeness is not *what* we see; it is in itself a qualitative modification of the retina and as such is the cause which disposes or determines the eye to the *act* of seeing, and *what* we see is the object or agent making the impression. As a necessary modification determining the organ to the act, e.g. of seeing, the *species impressa* co-operates with the organ antecedently to the act itself and so cannot be considered as an intermediary between the act and the object. Likewise the *species expressa* or the expressed *image* of the object is not *what* is perceived nor is it an intermediary between the organ and the object, for it is the result of the whole process, inasmuch as it is the *expressed likeness* of the perception itself and thus follows on the perception.

From the illustrations of the impression on the retina and of the action of the ring on the wax it is clear that the impression of the ring on the wax or

of the object on the retina, i.e. the *species impressa*, is the one same individual act with the reception of the impression. It is the same indivisible act which the one gives and the other receives. The act therefore is *common* to both; the giving and receiving is the same act having different relations, i.e. to the agent and to the recipient. As the act of sensation is a conscious act, consciousness grasps the twofold element of the *not-me* and the *me* in the one indivisible act: of the *not-me* as something from without producing the impression and of the *me* as receiving the impression. It thus perceives the *not-me* and the *me* as distinct and exclusive one of the other. Thus e.g. I touch an object which resists; in this one indivisible act I am in contact with or united to the object; in the tactile perception, I am immediately conscious of the *not-me* and the *me* known together and known in mutual opposition; I am conscious of two existences by the same indivisible intuition. Thus consciousness gives, as an ultimate fact, a primitive duality, an original antithesis. Hence in every act of sensation we have a twofold knowledge, external, i.e. of the *not-me*, and internal and subjective, i.e. of the *me*.

Now the sentient organ is in its nature indeterminate, i.e. it cannot determine itself by itself to perceive this or that object. The determination which disposes it to the *act* of perception comes from the action upon it of the external object. Hence the sentient subject is conscious primarily of the ob-

ject impressing it, i.e. of the external knowledge. Herbert Spencer admits this fact, for he teaches that the external knowledge precedes the internal knowledge of our sensations (*Psychology*,¹ II, p. 369). Hence the world is not the unknown cause of our sensations, nor are our sensations confined to internal subjective ideas, feelings or states. Sense-perception consists in the operations of external bodies on the sense-organs. These bodies acting upon us we directly and immediately perceive.

The error of Pragmatism is that it neglects the distinction between the external knowledge, i.e. of the object impressing us, and the internal knowledge, i.e. of the subject modified; or rather it denies the former, and holds the latter to be the only knowledge. Yet the distinction is experimental. The external knowledge is *representative*; the internal is *affective*. The former is prior to the latter. Again their objects are different: the internal knowledge consists in noting the subjective modifications of the *me*, i.e. the effect of the action on me; the external knowledge embraces the extended, luminous actions which have modified the *me*, i.e. the cause or agent of the subjective feelings. Besides, they accompany or succeed each other in inverse ratio; one gains in strength and precision what the other loses, i.e. the stronger the organic impression, the more obscure is the external perception and vice versa, as, e.g. a light too brilliant prevents

¹ Ed., N.Y., 1877.

me from seeing the object and causes pain to the eyes.

Furthermore, in the normal act of sense-perception it is the determining cause or external agent which we primarily and directly grasp. Pragmatism holds that we primarily and directly perceive the subjective element, that we ought to project these subjective feelings without us and then correct them by reasoning. But, in fact, this never takes place and besides is clearly impossible. Finally, the same external cause can produce different effects, e.g. pain or pleasure, and in very variable degrees according to temperament, habits and dispositions.

Thus the objective element is clearly grasped and distinguished from the subjective element, as elementary consciousness testifies. Therefore, Scholastic Philosophy holds that the world is not the unknown cause of our sensation, that what we perceive in the act of sense-perception is not the subjective feeling only, but primarily the external bodies acting upon our sense-organs; and in this teaching confirms the knowledge of common-sense as well as furnishes a sure basis for the edifice of the experimental sciences.

II. *Evolution*

The integrating element of Pragmatism is Evolution. This element is essential to all its forms, but

takes on local color from the subject-matter and special aim of the writers. As regards Evolution, Scholastic Philosophy is at direct issue with Pragmatism.

First of all, Scholastic Philosophy teaches that Evolution is based upon a simple fact of ordinary daily experience, viz. the fact of *growth*. It teaches that growth is a law of life; that every living being, inasmuch as it lives, grows. Jesus refers to this law in the Gospels, e.g. the parable of the sower; a classic phrase in Christian asceticism is "growth in holiness"; and Cardinal Newman in the Essay on Development of Doctrine applies the law to the teachings of the Christian religion. But living beings do not grow in the same way; their specific nature influences their development, as ordinary experience shows. The study of the nature and development of living beings in the world around us is the special object of the Natural Sciences. Thus Botany deals with the laws which govern the development of plant-life. These laws differ from the laws which guide the growth of the human body, as set forth in Physiology, and these in turn differ from the laws of mental development, whose special object is Psychology. Now Evolution is not concerned with the laws of growth as observed in the individual or in individuals of the same species. It goes much farther and strives to show the origin of species by maintaining that species grow out of or develop from other species, which in turn de-

velop from others until we reach the beginnings of life. As such, Evolution appears in a twofold form: a scientific hypothesis and a philosophical speculation.

As a scientific hypothesis, Evolution investigates the genetic relations of systematic species, genera and families and endeavors to arrange them according to natural series of descent. It strives to prove the descent of present from extinct species and thus is opposed to the constancy or immutability of species. It is not concerned with the origin of life, nor with the act of creation. The attitude which Scholastic philosophers hold to scientific Evolution is twofold: as to principle and as to fact.

As to the principle, Scholastic Philosophy teaches that ultimately all organisms owe their existence to the Creator, as is set forth in the Biblical account of creation, that the concrete *how* does not enter into the proposition of faith regarding creation, with the exception of the human soul which, being spiritual in its nature, cannot be transmitted through matter, but requires the creative act. Since, therefore, there is no objection, as far as Catholic faith is concerned, to assuming the descent of all plant and animal species from a few original forms, the question resolves itself into one of fact.

As to fact, Scholastic writers hold that the scientific hypothesis of Evolution is still only a hypothesis. By the scientific hypothesis is here understood the general theory regarding the fact of Evolution

as distinguished from the special theories advanced to explain the general fact of Evolution by an appeal to special causes, e.g. natural selection, environment. The Darwinian explanation is rejected by scientists, for its principle of natural selection is considered scientifically inadequate, and its teaching of indefinite variability or plasticity of forms is contrary to observed facts, which in general show that both in living nature and in geological strata there exist types sharply determined from one another. There is no evidence whatever for the common genetic descent of all animals and plants from a single primitive organism. The greater number of botanists and zoologists regard a polygenetic evolution as much more acceptable than a monogenetic. It is the task of the future to determine the distinct and independent genetic series. Paleontology knows nothing of common primeval forms but points to parallel series whose origin is unknown; has no evidence in favor of spontaneous awakening of life and of the ascending development out of primitive protoplasmic masses up to the Cambrian era; is silent about successive developments anteceding the rich specific fauna of the Cambrian, and the flora of the Post-Silurian eras; gives no proof in a concrete case for the gradual transformation of one species into another; regards the genesis of angiosperms and of vertebrates as an insoluble problem; gives no information about the early history of mammals; presents the genealogy of the

horse, considered the most striking example of an evolutionary series within a mammalian family as scarcely more than a very moderately supported hypothesis; and knows of no records that point to the relationship between the body of man and that of the anthropoid.

In like manner the study of existing organisms has, up to the present, given no confirmation of the central idea in modern Evolution theories, viz. progressive specific development. E. Wasmann holds that the formation of new species is directly observed in but a few cases and only with reference to such forms as are closely related to each other, e.g. in the plant-genus *Œnothera* and in the beetle-genus *Dinarda*, but Muckermann denies that these variations are examples of the formation of new specific characters. It is true that there are numberless analogies between plants and animals, e.g. the cell-division, the method of fertilization and other analogies of structure and function, but no serious scientist would ever dream of explaining these by a common origin. On the failure to confirm progressive specific development is based the saltatory theory proposed by De Vries in accord with the investigations of Abbot Mendel. In fact, Mendel's Law is the only fact of scientific value in modern Biology. On this law the scientific hypothesis of Evolution now rests and looks to the future for more complete and systematic development.

As a philosophical speculation, Evolution is not confined to the genetic history of plants and animals upon our earth but is extended to embrace the history of the solar system and of the universe. Thus it considers the entire history of the cosmos as a harmonious development brought about by natural laws. Philosophical Evolution appears in two principal forms: Anti-Theistic and Theistic. Scholastic Philosophy rejects Anti-Theistic Evolution, because the theory in this form cannot account for the first beginning nor for the law of its evolution, since it denies a Personal Creator and Lawgiver; again it supposes spontaneous generation, which contradicts the facts of scientific experimentation, and is built upon baseless assumptions. The foremost defender of Anti-Theistic Evolution is Ernst Haeckel. But his system rests on unfounded generalities, is constructed on unscientific methods, e.g. frauds, want of distinction between fact and hypothesis, neglect to correct wrong statements, disregard of facts not agreeing with his *a priori* conceptions, ignorance of history, physics and modern Biology, the use of ridicule when sound arguments fail, and consequently it abounds in numerous errors of every kind.

The attitude of Scholastic philosophers towards Theistic Evolution is twofold: as to fact and as to principle. As to fact, Scholastic Philosophy seeks in the Natural Sciences for the laws which govern the development of the universe. As to principle it

is not opposed to the Theistic conception. For the principle which guides Scholastic Philosophy in the interpretation of nature is threefold: (a) All things in their existence and nature are referred to God as to their principle and ultimate cause. "In the beginning God created heaven and earth" (Gen. i). (b) Created things in relation to God are termed secondary causes, yet they possess true causal efficiency in virtue of their own proper nature, and in proportion to the exercise of their true causal activities the order and harmony immanent in nature unfolds before our eyes. Thus St. Augustine writes, "God governs all things which He has created in such a way that He permits them to exercise and develop their own proper activities" (*The City of God*, VII, c. 30). And St. Thomas says, "The more potent the cause is, the more potent is its efficiency in the sense that its potency is extended to produce more effects" (*Of God and His Creatures*, tr. by Father Rickaby, S.J., II, c. 16), and "since therefore the efficiency of divine providence is the very greatest, it ought to extend its activity through certain means so as to reach the most remote things" (*ib.*, III, c. 77). (c) As a corollary Suarez expresses the principle, "God does not interfere directly with the natural order, where secondary causes suffice to produce the intended effect" (*De opere sex dierum*, II, c. x, n. 13). Thus the power and wisdom of God is not lessened, but is rather enhanced in the production of the universe

by a single creative act of His will and in its natural development according to laws implanted in it by this creative act.

But when we pass from the philosophical theory of Evolution considered in itself or in the abstract, i.e. apart from any actual formulation of the theory as found in any existing philosophical system, and take up the consideration of the evolution theory as presented by Pragmatic writers, it is evident from the foregoing pages that Pragmatic evolution is directly opposed to the teaching of Scholastic Philosophy.

In the first place Pragmatism does not accept God in the Christian meaning of the term. Empiric Pragmatism in fact does not deal with the existence of God, but postulates *belief* in God if, and in so far as, that belief may be useful to the individual. Absolute Pragmatism views God as the extension or integration of human consciousness. God therefore is the product of the human and the human blends into the divine. Creative Evolution likewise is Pantheistic. Instead of the Personal Creator and Ruler of Scholastic Philosophy we are presented with a caricature of the Almighty. The Absolute appears as a tendency dividing into opposite tendencies, one of which endeavors to overcome the other, and in the endeavor is described as being fed with solar energy as limited and dependent. Life and Spirit differ from matter and intellect not in nature but only as counter tendencies. Intellect is configured to matter.

In describing the evolution process, Empiric

ERRATUM

Page 267, line 3, for *science* read *sense*.

Pragmatism uses biological terms and with Metaphysical Pragmatism denies any difference between intellect and science.

III. *Theory of Mental Life*

Pragmatism does not admit the existence of the soul. Hence its Psychology is a Phenomenal Psychology, i.e. a Psychology without a soul. It explains the unity of mental life by "the judging thought," by "present knowledge," by "consciousness" or by "the unity of the organism." Thus its explanation is either purely physiological or consists in personifying "the unity of apperception," which it takes for granted without the slightest attempt to account for this unity.

In direct opposition to this teaching Scholastic Philosophy proposes as the basic doctrine of its psychology the existence of a simple spiritual principle in man which it calls the soul. In proof it appeals to the most elemental facts of conscious experience. The most superficial analysis of conscious life reveals two primary facts: (a) Changes and modifications of thought and feeling, ever varying and ever succeeding one another like a "flowing stream"; (b) An active, permanent, substantial basis of these changes and modifications. This second element explains the unity of consciousness, the fact of personal identity and the possibility of memory. Without this permanent element and

its ever-varying modifications, I would not be able to recognize states of consciousness as "states," i.e. in the plural; there would be no past or future, consciousness would be merely a "state," i.e. in the singular, and not a "stream"; nor could I remember the incidents of my life so as to write, e.g. an autobiography, or make an examination of conscience on the actions of the day, or remember what I did a moment ago, or recall the last sentence I wrote; nor would I be aware that I who now am writing, am the same person who yesterday paid a visit to a friend, who during the past years lived in such and such places, went to such a school or college or university. The past would be a complete blank and, far from entering into the present, would instantly disappear into the unknown. To personify the "present knowledge" or the "present state of consciousness" or "the unity of apperception" is to *recognize* the active permanent element in conscious life, but not to *explain* it (cf. *Christian Philosophy*, The Soul, ch. i).

In explaining the contents of mental life, i.e. knowledge, the attitude of Scholastic Philosophy to Pragmatism is also clear and well defined. By knowledge or thought Pragmatism understands sense-experience as such and this experience refined or modified under the influence of "mind." This refined sense-experience is called "thought" or with Professor Bergson "feeling." Hence thought is of the same nature as sense-experience. Now

Scholastic Philosophy teaches that we have two distinct elements in knowledge, viz. sense-experience, and a higher element, viz. thought, and that the knowledge of sense is essentially different from the knowledge of thought. For proof it appeals to elementary facts of consciousness.

It is evident to any one who carefully analyzes the facts of the conscious life that the act of sense is totally different from the act of intellect. The object of sense is concrete, singular, individual, i.e. a particular, determined concrete individual thing. We perceive it as *this something, here and now*, limited by the material determinations of color, size and form. Hence a sensation is quantitative, has extension, can be measured, e.g. in intensity, and localized, e.g. in a sense-organ or in a definite part of the brain.

The object of intellect, on the contrary, is abstract, unextended and immaterial. We have ideas which cannot be referred to a bodily organ. They move on a plane above sense and belong to an order of entities which have nothing in common with sense. We have the conception of God; we speak of His infinity, power, mercy, holiness. Yet these notions cannot be confined within the limits of sense. Ideals of the true, beautiful and good, notions of right and wrong, first principles, in fact the constructive elements and framework of the sciences, of the arts, industry and commerce, have nothing in common with the operation of sense.

Not only does intellect possess objects which cannot be confined within the representations of the senses, but intellect and sense act in a manner totally different when brought in contact with material things. Thus e.g. the sense shows the "round object," the intellect directly and primarily grasps the "roundness"; the sense presents the "moving object," the intellect seizes the "movement." Thus while the particular data of our knowledge come from the senses, the intellect grasps these data in an immaterial manner. Hence besides sense-knowledge we have a higher knowledge essentially distinct. The higher knowledge has three indissoluble elements: idea, judgment, reasoning; the idea is the basic element.

Scholastic Philosophy teaches that the intellect is indeterminate, i.e. has no separate forms or ideas, as Plato held, by which it determines itself by itself to the knowledge of definite objects. Hence like the senses it is ultimately indeterminate and requires determination from without with this difference that external bodies in contact with the organ of sense determine the act of sensation, whereas the act of sensation awakens, so to speak, the intellect which throws its light on the object and by this illumined object is determined to elicit its acts of thought. Hence the act of sensation is analogous to the act of thought. The intellectual determinant is the *intellectual species impressa* and is not the object perceived but only the determining

cause. Hence the act of knowing is not the act of the object alone nor the act of the subject alone, but the act of subject in so far as it is impressed, actualized, differentiated by the object. The intellect consciously reacts to the determination, and the intellectual expression of the conscious intellectual reaction is the idea or concept, i.e. *verbum mentis*, *the mental word*, which takes outward expression in language.

Hence sense-knowledge is had by contact of the external object with the organ of sense, which contact consists in the impression made by the object upon the sense-organ, and intellectual knowledge is had by contact of the external object with the intellect, effected by and in the act of sensation. In both cases we directly and immediately perceive the *object* or *agent* making the impression, i.e. coming in contact with the sense and the intellect, not the *how* of the impression or contact. In reflective thought the mind may study and analyze and mentally separate the *how* and prepare an explanation for the simple indivisible act of contact, as e.g. in the sciences of Logic and of Psychology. In ordinary daily life, however, we are conscious that our senses and intellect are in direct contact with things; we are not concerned with the *how*; in fact never think about it. For example, I strike my foot against a solid object or I burn the tip of my finger; directly and immediately I am conscious of the resistance to the foot and of a hot object burn-

ing the finger. The anatomist and physiologist by his knowledge of the nervous system may be able to designate the particular nerves which carried the impressions from the foot and the hand to the common sensory in the brain and thus explain the process. But this scientific knowledge does not change the direct perception of the objects. Again I talk to a friend through the telephone or I send him a message on the telegraph wire. What we are directly conscious of is the fact that we are in direct contact with another: I giving, he receiving the message. We do not advert to the wires, poles and keyboards as instruments of the contact, although afterwards upon reflection we may and do recognize them as such.

While the senses and the intellect are in direct contact with external things, yet the contact of sense is different in nature from the contact of intellect. The contact of sense exhibits the external object to the sense as a sense-object, i.e. as extended, figured, sonorous, luminous, etc. The contact of intellect, however, exhibits the external object as an *intelligible*, and so the intellect seeks its nature, meaning, relation to the objects known, its causes and effects.

In illustration we appeal to language for language in the expression of thought, and Comparative Philology reveals the structure of language itself. Place a strange object before the eyes of a child and the question spontaneously comes: *What is*

that? Thus directly and immediately the mind seeks the *whatness* of *that* particular thing. The answer to the question is: That is *such* or *such* a thing. The terms are reversed: The subject of the interrogative sentence becomes the predicate of the declarative sentence and the predicate of the interrogative becomes the subject of the declarative sentence. The predicate of the declarative sentence explains the meaning and nature of the subject. This predicate is a universal idea, because in giving the nature or meaning of this particular subject, it can also be used as a predicate in many more sentences having different individual subjects which nevertheless have the same nature or meaning. Thus language shows how the intellect acts, how in asking and defining the *whatness* it directly and immediately grasps the universal, and how in seeking the *whatness* of a particular thing or in applying the *whatness* to a particular thing it grasps the particular thing also, in a kind of indirect manner.

By virtue of the union of soul and body in our human composite existent being, intellect and sense always accompany each other; the intellect takes its own immediate object ultimately from sense-experience, but the object is superior to the object of sense-experience. Hence there is no *idea* without an *image* of some kind. The *idea* evokes the *image* and vice versa. But they are not thereby to be confused or confounded one with the other. The

image is the representation on the imagination of a concrete object in a concrete material manner, i.e. it is a picture exact or approximate of the object. Hence it is concrete and particular. The *idea*, however, expresses the meaning or definition of the *image* and as such is universal and can be applied to a number of particular images of the same nature. In direct thought the object of the intellect is external things; in reflective thought, however, what we see before the mind's eye are express or approximate or analogous images of the things we are thinking about. When we think of concrete things we can image things expressly. But when we think of immaterial or of spiritual things we must use analogies, signs or symbols. Hence signs or symbols do not refer to the idea but to the imaged picture of the idea. Their very use shows how vast is the difference between the *idea* and the *image* and how the intellect reaches out far above and beyond the concrete representations of sense.

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